Empirical Studies on Asset Pricing and Banking in the Euro Area by Moerman, G.A. (Gerard)
Empirical Studies on Asset Pricing and Banking in the
Euro Area
European capital markets have changed dramatically over the last
couple of years. Due to the harmonization of monetary and policy
rules and the elimination of exchange rate risk (through the intro-
duction of the euro) countries in the European Monetary Union (EMU)
are becoming more integrated. In this thesis the author tries to
determine the consequences of this integration process for asset
pricing in the euro area. The most important conclusion, which is a
central theme of the thesis, is that the characteristics of financial
markets in the euro area have been changing. In other words, inves-
tors and researchers cannot base their expectations on the (long)
historical evidence of these markets, because the structural changes
have a clear impact on the characteristics of the markets. For example,
the author shows that industry information has become more valuable
in terms of portfolio diversification benefits than country informa-
tion, especially after the introduction of the euro, which contrasts
with the literature of the 90’s. Therefore, investors should change
their view in the euro area to a sector-based approach. Most institu-
tional investors, which are the biggest investors in the euro area,
have already changed their view into a sector-based approach. As a
consequence, euro area portfolio managers are nowadays tracking
sector indices instead of country indices. One of the chapters in part
II of the thesis shows the implications of that change for the banking
sector. Stock returns of big banks have become more correlated,
while this is not the case for smaller banks. The author argues that
this is not a result of a similar performance or product portfolio of
these banks, but is likely the result of the change in perspective of
most euro area investors. Next to these topics, the thesis also covers
different asset pricing models (Fama and French three factor models
for the euro area and an international asset pricing model that
provides evidence of a significant risk premium for inflation risk)
and an innovative measure for contagion among European banks.
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 Voorwoord 
Dit proefschrift is een afsluiting van een periode van 5 jaar, waarin ik mij op verschillende 
vlakken duidelijk ontwikkeld heb. Onervaren en net afgestudeerd begon ik als ‘aio’ bij de 
vakgroep Financieel Management aan de faculteit Bedrijfskunde van de Erasmus 
Universiteit Rotterdam. In het begin was de richting nog niet helemaal helder, waardoor 
het eerste jaar meer getypeerd werd door verbreding en cursussen. Toch werd al snel 
duidelijk dat mijn interesse bij de financiële markten lag en dat ik graag wilde onderzoeken 
welke factoren bepalend zijn voor deze markten. Zoals mijn goede vriend Chris Martin 
altijd zegt: 
 
“I was just guessing, numbers and figures, pulling the puzzles apart. 
Questions of science, science in progress….” 
 
(Coldplay, The scientist) 
 
In dit proefschrift heb ik geprobeerd een aanzet te geven tot de oplossing van enkele 
vraagstukken (‘puzzels’) in de financiële wereld en probeer ik een bijdrage te leveren aan 
de wetenschappelijke ‘body of knowledge’. Het is echter nog steeds ‘science in progress’ 
en dit proefschrift is dus ook zeker niet het eindpunt van mijn onderzoeken.  
 Natuurlijk was dit resultaat er niet geweest zonder de aanwezigheid van vele 
anderen die ieder op zijn eigen wijze mij gesteund heeft tijdens het aio-schap. Allereerst 
wil ik mijn promotor Kees Koedijk en copromotor Ronald Mahieu bedanken. Zij hebben 
mij de kans gegeven dit onderzoek uit te kunnen voeren. Kees, alhoewel de gesprekken 
met jou in het begin kort en schaars waren, heb je dit later ingehaald en mij in de juiste 
richting gestuurd. Ronald, jij was meer mijn dagelijkse begeleider en jij hebt altijd klaar 
gestaan om mij te helpen met alle vragen, uiteenlopend van discussies over een paper tot 
de meest kleine details en basale feiten. Verder waren jullie beiden een enorm voorstander 
van het feit dat ik naar het buitenland ging om daar nieuwe inzichten op te doen. Bedankt 
voor die steun! Ook de leden van mijn commissie wil ik bedanken voor de feedback op 
mijn proefschrift en de afzonderlijke artikelen. Het is heel goed als er eens iemand van 
buitenaf met een andere bril naar het onderzoek kijkt. Casper, Sylvester en Ronald 
(Huisman) enorm bedankt daarvoor. 
 Daarnaast zijn er nog talloze andere collega’s die op professioneel èn persoonlijk 
vlak veel voor mij betekend hebben. Zo heb ik zeer fijne herinneringen aan mijn tijd bij de 
vakgroep Financieel Management. Ik heb onze vakgroep als een vruchtbare, stimulerende 
en vriendelijke omgeving ervaren met veel jonge onderzoekers/docenten (en een aantal 
minder jonge maar even interessante mensen). Bij deze wil ik jullie dus allemaal bedanken 
voor de leuke tijd vol met discussies over de economie, finance en natuurlijk allerlei 
andere zaken. Ditzelfde geldt natuurlijk voor alle collega’s die ik op conferenties, ERIM-
  
cursussen en sommige zelfs in de fitnesszaal heb leren kennen. Allen bedankt voor jullie 
input op mijn werk en interesse in mijn bezigheden. Een aantal collega-aio’s wil ik in het 
bijzonder bedanken. Cyriel, Erik, Guillermo, Marieke, Petra, Wessel en Willem voor o.a. 
de leuke kolonisten-van-Catan avondjes en potjes squash of tafeltennis om de frustraties 
van je af te spelen (wat voor sommigen na het spelen van Kolonisten al nodig was...).  
 Een speciaal bedankje gaat er uit naar Mathijs van Dijk en mijn paranimfen, Ben 
Tims en Reggy Hooghiemstra. Jullie hebben mij in Frankfurt opgezocht en met z’n vieren 
hebben we een prachtig concert van Coldplay mogen aanschouwen. Daarnaast wil ik 
Mathijs nog bedanken voor de mooie tijd in Australië! Met Reggy heb ik al die jaren de 
kamer gedeeld. Reggy, bedankt voor alle hulp in die jaren. Niet alleen heb jij me bij 
verschrikkelijk veel kleine dingetjes geholpen, maar bovenal hebben we een sterke 
vriendschappelijke band opgebouwd. Ben, wij zijn tegelijkertijd begonnen en er is denk ik 
geen dag voorbij gegaan dat ik niet jouw kamer ben binnengelopen. Soms voor een 
econometrische vraag, dan weer over voetbal, formule1, Wie is de Mol?, kolonisten etc. 
Zonder jullie waren de afgelopen jaren echt veel saaier geweest!  
 I want to dedicate a special paragraph to all the friends and colleagues I met in 
Frankfurt during my stay at the European Central Bank. The seven months I spent at the 
ECB were the best in my life. The working environment was very fruitful and educative 
and the social atmosphere was great. Special thanks go to Philipp Hartman, Reint Gropp 
and Simone Manganelli. Philipp, you always made sure I had everything I needed and 
introduced me to many other central bankers. Thanks a lot. Reint, thank you for the nice 
discussions and the productive work we did on contagion. Simone, we shared a lot of 
common (research) interests, so far without a resulting paper, but the best is still to come, I 
hope! Naturally, I cannot forget to thank the trainee community (personified by Kallia). 
Being away from home gives a lot of spare time and the community was the best group to 
fill that space, especially with Golden Leaf Terrace Parties.  
Last but not least gaat mijn dank uit naar mijn vrienden en familie. Amir, Erwin, 
Martijn, Jeroen, Raymond, Marco, Maurice, Carla en Jacqueline, bedankt voor jullie 
immer aanwezige interesse. Ook mijn vrienden van het jeugdwerk met in het bijzonder 
Suzanne, Sander, Dijk en Marco, die ervoor zorgden dat ik met beide benen op de grond 
bleef staan. En natuurlijk mijn familie: papa, mama, Aad, Petra, Marianne, Hanneke, Peter, 
Martijn, familie Moerman, familie Zevenbergen, familie Rijneveld en familie Verkerk 
bedankt voor jullie interesse en persoonlijke steun op momenten wanneer ik het nodig had.  
Het spreekwoord zegt: “De laatste loodjes wegen het zwaarst”. Daarom wil ik 
Anneke apart noemen. Ook al ben jij nog niet enorm lang in mijn leven, je hebt me wel 
enorm geholpen tijdens het laatste stukje van mijn promotietraject. Dankjewel. 
 
Gerard Moerman 
Rotterdam, april 2005 
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 Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
European capital markets have changed dramatically over the last couple of years. Not 
only are these financial markets influenced by major global developments, but the 
European integration process also influences them, which is very important in defining the 
changing playground for investors. To start with the latter, the rate at which changes in 
Europe have taken place has been increasing over the most recent decades. The start of the 
integration process, however, had already been initiated in 1950 by the declaration of 
Schuman. This is discussed in more detail in section 1.2. The actual integration process for 
financial markets, however, has accelerated over the last two decades. A new impulse was 
given by the Single European Act that came into force in 1987 and formed the basis for the 
establishment of an internal market for goods, persons, services and capital. The 
introduction of the euro on January 1, 1999 provided a second boost for the European 
integration process. The advent of the euro eliminated the exchange rate risk within the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) and forced interest rates to be equal over all euro-
participating countries. Additionally, as of 1999, monetary policy in Europe has been 
conducted by one central organization, the European Central Bank, instead of by different 
central banks for each member state. A very nice example of evidence of the quickly 
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changing environment in Europe is put forward by Adjaouté and Danthine (2003), who 
plot the evolution of the redemption yields for several euro-area government bonds for the 
period 1985-2002 (Figure 1, chapter 5). For the first part of their sample a clear dispersion 
is noticeable among these government bond redemption yields. However, the differences 
are almost negligible after 1999, which is a direct consequence of the introduction of the 
common currency. This simple observation provides one example of the European 
integration process. In this thesis we focus on European stock markets by examining asset-
pricing models, diversification effects and riskiness of these markets. Several chapters of 
the thesis investigate whether the European integration process resulted in any changes for 
the investors in euro area stock markets. 
1.2 Introduction to the integration process in the euro area 
All chapters in this thesis in some way concentrate on the stock markets in the euro area. 
Most of the chapters try to picture what has changed over the last decade(s) in terms of 
portfolio diversification, asset pricing or risk. The euro area or European Monetary Union 
is an especially interesting area, since the number of changes has been tremendous. The 
harmonization of monetary and policy rules has changed the rules of the game. This thesis 
shows that these changes are also reflected on asset markets in the euro area. The purpose 
of this chapter is to give a short historical overview of the integration process in Europe in 
order to provide a deeper background for the following chapters and to discuss briefly how 
these developments are taken into account in the several studies of this thesis. 
The integration process among the European countries is not just from the recent 
past, but was initiated long before for both political and economical reasons. The actual 
historical roots of the European Union lie just after the Second World War. In order to 
prevent wars like these happening again, the European countries needed to come together, 
starting with the age-old opponents of France and Germany. This led to the “Schuman 
declaration” on May 9, 1950, which is considered to be the birth of the European Union as 
we know it now, and which is called Europe Day for this reason. The declaration proposed 
putting the production of coal and steel of France and Germany under a common High 
Authority, which was also open for other European countries to participate. Only one year 
later the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was signed. 
This treaty is the first of the four founding treaties of the European integration 
process. The others are the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), 
the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Treaty 
on the European Union. This last Treaty is also known as the Maastricht Treaty, and was 
signed on 7 February 1992 (becoming effective on 1 November 1993). Since the 
Maastricht Treaty the European Economic Community is called the European Community. 
Additionally, new forms of co-operation were introduced by means of this treaty, e.g. in 
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the area of defense and “justice and home affairs”. Through this addition, a new structure 
was created, which is both political and economic. The addition of the intergovernmental 
co-operation to the existing European Community forms the structure with the so-called 
three “pillars”. This is the European Union (EU). Over the years, the number of member 
countries of the EEC or EU respectively has been increasing. The Treaty of ECSC was 
signed by 6 countries: Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
In later years other countries joined the European Economic Community: Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom (1973), Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) and 
Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995). Very recently, ten more countries have acceded to the 
European Union. On 1 May 2004, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia all joined the EU. 
So far, the discussion mainly covers the political and economical integration 
process. The monetary integration process is somewhat different, though it’s history is just 
as long. Gros and Thygesen (1998) give an overview of the history of monetary policy in 
Europe starting with the European Payments Union (1950) as a first step towards 
convertibility. The first major move towards an economic and monetary union, however, 
was initiated by the Werner report of 1970. It called for a completion of a monetary union 
by 1980 through a three-stage approach leading eventually to fixed exchange rates and a 
common monetary policy. However, due to financial turmoil (the collapse of the Bretton-
Woods system) the Werner Plan failed to succeed. Only a few elements of the Plan 
survived, amongst which the intra-European exchange-rate management system, also 
known as ‘the snake’. The snake restricted the band of the European exchange rates with 
the US dollar, such that the intra-European exchange rate band would not be too wide. 
However, the ‘snake’ was not very successful in limiting exchange rate fluctuations: 
several countries joined or withdrew from the system, while other exchange rates 
experienced devaluations or revaluations. 
March 1979 was the start of the European Monetary System (EMS) with the goal 
to create a zone of monetary stability, consisting of all EU members. However, not all of 
these members joined the cornerstone of the EMS, namely the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM). The ERM kept each currency within a certain band defined by a grid of rates for 
the various pairs of currencies that could only be changed by mutual consent. At the start 
the number of realignments was relatively high and always vis-à-vis the German Mark. In 
the 80’s realignments occurred less frequently due to monetary policy changes and from 
1987-1992 there were no revaluations at all, since the central rates of the ERM were 
considered to be very credible.  
In the beginning 1992 it looked like the ERM would slowly converge to the 
EMU. However, stabilized expectations changed dramatically after the Danish rejected 
their participation with the EMU through a referendum. This moment is usually indicated 
as the trigger that initiated the ERM crises in 1992-1993. As a consequence, most 
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currencies came under attack and the UK Pound and Italian Lira even left the ERM 
system. Exchange rate markets only tranquilized after the fluctuations margins were 
widened to 15 per cent (coming from 2.25 or 6 per cent for different rates). After the crisis 
was settled, the smooth transition towards the EMU did take place after all. Exchange rates 
fluctuated around their central rates and Austria, Italy, Finland and Greece joined the ERM 
system (as participation in the exchange rate system was one of the convergence criteria 
for participation in the EMU).1 
The start of third stage of EMU took place at 1 January 1999 by fixing the 
exchange rates of the eleven participations countries that fulfilled the convergence criteria 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). Two years later Greece also adopted the euro, while 
Denmark, Sweden and the U.K. chose not to join the EMU. The euro coins and paper were 
introduced on 1 January 2002, three years after fixing the exchange rates. As of 1999 the 
European Central Bank has been responsible for deducting the monetary policy in the euro 
area in cooperation with the central banks of the member states (called European System 
of Central Banks).2  
Though the monetary integration process finally managed to create a monetary 
union, the European integration process is far from finished. Monetary integration is a 
necessary condition for the financial integration of bond and equity markets. “Financial 
market integration is of great importance for the smooth functioning of EMU. The main 
reason is that it can function as an insurance mechanism facilitating adjustment to 
asymmetric shocks” (De Grauwe, 2003). The elimination of exchange rate risk between 
EMU-countries has eliminated an important obstacle for the complete integration of 
financial markets. Adjaouté and Danthine (2003) report that the bond markets have 
integrated very rapidly around 1999. The redemption yields on the government bonds of 
different EMU-member states have almost disappeared and the spread between these 
yields is mainly caused by different default probabilities of the governments under 
consideration. The integration of equity markets is much more time consuming. De 
Grauwe (2003) states that full integration of equity markets still is hampered by legal and 
regulatory differences. Therefore, a country-specific risk factor may still apply to stock 
prices, although the exchange rate risk has disappeared. This thesis concentrates on the 
integration of equity markets. We test whether the structural changes in the euro area have 
had any consequences for investors already. However, the academic literature does not 
provide a uniform methodology in testing for asset market integration. In this thesis a 
number of different methodologies to study the issue of integration are presented.  
                                                          
1 See Gros and Thygesen (1998) for more details on the ERM crisis and the convergence to the EMU. 
2 See Eijffinger and De Haan (2000) for a description of the ECB and ESCB and its tasks in terms of monetary 
and fiscal policy. 
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1.3 Asset pricing consequences 
The brief discussion in the previous sections makes it clear that Europe or the euro area is 
an interesting region for research. After all, the introduction of the euro made the EMU the 
biggest financial counterpart of the U.S. Therefore the asset markets of the EMU are 
receiving increasingly more attention from investors, which feeds the relevance of this 
dissertation. In order to do research on financial markets of the euro area, it is crucial to 
take both global and regional developments into account. Though it is impossible exactly 
to contribute each part of the returns to specific causes, it is crucial to keep these 
developments in mind when performing research. This section will shortly elaborate on 
some of the changes that have to be taken into account. 
Most noticeable is the elimination of the exchange rate risk between the euro 
participating countries as of 1 January 1999. However, all studies in this dissertation use 
data with a history that goes back further than this date. This means that this structural 
break has to be taken into account in some way. Roughly speaking, there are two different 
approaches to incorporate this. The first method is to take the view of one specific investor. 
All returns before 1999 are then translated into the home currency of this investor, such 
that they are comparable. In the literature it is common to use the German investors as a 
representative for the German investor. We employ this view in chapters 2 and 3. The 
other possibility is to study local returns for all securities. The exchange rate risk is then 
either neglected (since it does not affect the results or it would be wrong to translate the 
returns into another currency) or exchange rate factors are explicitly modeled in the 
framework. The latter method is applied in chapters 4 and 5, while chapter 6 uses the 
former. 
Another important, but perhaps not so well known, change is the liberalization of 
the rules for institutional investors. Around 1990, all European pension funds were very 
restricted in their investments in stock markets. First of all, the percentage of funds in 
stocks was very restricted and, secondly, most of this money could only be invested in 
home-currency denoted stocks. In the last decade of the 20th century these rules were 
relaxed substantially. Not only are investors allowed to invest more in stocks in general, 
but also to invest more in foreign stocks. Furthermore, the introduction of the common 
currency enlarged the universe of eligible stocks for the pension funds of euro participating 
countries. In other words, institutional investors have increased their holdings in European 
stocks as a result of both the common currency and the relaxation of restrictive rules on 
their foreign equity position. As a result of both these issues, institutional investors have 
changed their investment styles in European stocks towards a more sector-oriented 
approach. This demand-driven development is an important factor for several chapters in 
this thesis and mostly visible in chapters 2 and 5. 
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The last topic we want to mention is the huge influence the developments in the 
information technology (IT) industry have had on stock markets in general. It is clear that 
the IT-sector has changed our lives in a relatively short period of time. The availability of 
computers and especially access to the internet for practically everybody in the world has 
had a big impact. First of all, there is less information asymmetry because information is 
easily accessible and quickly available. Secondly, there are more products available and 
there is a higher degree of competition. The arrival of the information technology 
precipitated the introduction of more complex instruments and products. Also, the access 
to these and other existing products is much easier through the internet and it makes the 
competition fiercer. The third impact of the technological development is the large influx 
of IT-companies in the last decade of the 20th century and the following ‘IT-bubble’ 
around the turn of the century. The new sector flourished and many start-ups seized the 
opportunities in these markets. Many of these firms went public and attracted capital from 
the financial markets. As a result of the favorable prospects and the extremely high growth 
rates, stock prices rocketed to unprecedented levels. This phenomenon is known as the IT-
hype or bubble. The hype started more or less around 1994 and boomed in 1998/1999, 
while the bubble burst in 2000. The bubble attracted a lot of media attention through the 
never-ending rise of stock prices and the ‘easy profits’ that could be made.  
These three important topics (the elimination of exchange rate risk in the euro 
area, the liberalization of pension fund regulations and the developments in the IT-sector) 
show that the investor has to be careful in making forecasts for euro area stock markets. 
For example, for making cost-of-capital calculations or creating optimal portfolios, it is 
doubtful whether long series of historical returns are still representative for the future 
distribution of returns. Hence, both academics and practitioners should perform careful and 
up-to-date research in order to develop expectations for European stock market returns and 
risks. This thesis presents some studies in this area. 
1.4 Outline 
The core of this thesis consists of five chapters divided over two different parts. Part I 
(chapters 2 – 4) studies the diversification opportunities in the euro area stock markets and 
tests different asset pricing models. Part II (chapters 5 and 6) focuses on the European 
banking sector, examining both the level of integration among bank equity prices and their 
associated risks. In this subsection we briefly discuss the set-up and main conclusions of 
each of these chapters. 
Chapter 2 starts with a focus on the diversification opportunities among different 
categories of stocks. The study adds to the discussion on the well-known country and 
industry effects. The literature on these effects tries to disentangle the sources of risk on 
the basis of two clear characteristics of the underlying firms: the geographical base country 
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and the (dominant) industry the firm operates in. The seminal paper of Heston and 
Rouwenhorst (1994, 1995) provides a simple methodology and shows that geographical 
information is more important than sector information. Many studies closely follow their 
methodology and find similar results. However, recent research by Cavaglia, Brightman 
and Aked (2000) and Adjaouté and Danthine (2001a, 2001b, 2002), amongst others, shows 
that the industry information is becoming more important relative to the country 
information. Moreover, it is expected that this turnover is stronger in the euro area, 
although Rouwenhorst (1999) cannot find any evidence in his pre-euro sample. 
Parallel to the discussion on the declining ratio of country effects over industry 
effects (as sketched above), the empirical methodology of Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994, 
1995), which is employed by most authors, is questioned. Brooks and Del Negro (2002) 
and Adjaouté and Danthine (2002) provide evidence that the underlying assumptions of the 
original methodology are too restrictive and advocate other or more complex techniques 
for these types of studies. Chapter 2 tries to fill this gap through the use of a different 
methodology applied to the euro area specifically. We go back to the theory of Markowitz 
(1952) who solves the portfolio optimization problem in a mean-variance utility 
framework. Using this framework we can easily show which investment category provides 
the best diversification opportunities. We compare the mean-variance frontier of country 
indices only with the frontier composed by sector indices only. For our recent sample since 
1995 of euro area stocks, we find that an investor is better off diversifying over different 
sectors compared to diversifying over different countries alone. This conclusion is 
supported by spanning and intersection tests, especially after the introduction of the 
common currency. Furthermore, we show that this result is very robust. We find the 
similar results when we exclude the IT-sector index and other related indices. The IT-hype 
only strengthened this paradigm shift. Lastly, we show that our conclusions are also valid 
for different volatility regimes, where the level of the volatility is estimated through a 
multivariate GARCH model. 
In chapter 3, we go one step deeper and study the ‘domestic’ three-factor model 
(3FM) based on the Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) methodology for the euro 
area stock markets. The original 3FM was like the Capital Asset Pricing Model developed 
as a global asset-pricing model. However, empirical research has shown that asset pricing 
from a domestic viewpoint is not exactly similar to pricing the same assets from a foreign 
perspective. Only in the case when no frictions exist, like transaction costs, information 
asymmetry and others, should asset pricing follow a global model. Empirical puzzles like 
deviations from the purchasing power parity and the home bias are likely consequences of 
these frictions in the markets. Therefore, many academics and practitioners use local 
versions of the CAPM and the Fama and French three-factor model. Even stronger, Griffin 
(2002) shows that a domestic version of the 3FM has a better performance than the global 
version for the Canada, Japan, U.K., and U.S., providing clear evidence that a domestic 
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model is preferred. In this chapter we investigate which ‘domestic’ model an investor 
should pursue for euro area stock markets. Before the introduction of the common 
currency, a country 3FM would intuitively be most appropriate, but this intuition is less 
strong now the exchange rates are frozen and a euro area 3FM is more suitable. Using a 
sample from 1991 till 2002, we show that the country 3FM has a better performance than 
the euro area version, but the difference is clearly disappearing, which we attribute to the 
rise in the level of European integration. Next to that, we also investigate the performance 
of an industry-specific 3FM versus the euro area 3FM. We find that the industry 3FM 
outperforms the euro area version of the model in pricing industry portfolios. 
Chapter 4 explores the relationship between inflation risk and asset pricing in an 
international context. The starting point for this chapter is formed by the International 
CAPM (ICAPM) as described by Adler and Dumas (1983). In this model asset prices are 
related to market risk and to real exchange rate risk, since investors are mainly concerned 
with asset returns in real terms. By definition, real exchange rate risk can be decomposed 
into nominal exchange rate risk and inflation risk. In the literature, most empirical 
evidence of the ICAPM is based on the assumption that the inflation rates are non-
stochastic and showed that nominal exchange rate risk is priced for international asset 
returns. In chapter 4 we let the inflation differentials (with respect to the numeraire country 
inflation) be stochastic as well. The empirical results in this chapter show that next to 
market and nominal exchange rate risk, inflation rates form a significant source of risk as 
well, both statistically and economically. Additionally, we demonstrate that the risk 
premium for inflation risk is similar in magnitude to the risk premium for nominal 
exchange rate risk, implying that investors are more risk averse to inflation risk than to 
currency risk. Lastly, we test whether the ICAPM holds during our sample and we find 
that the data does not support the ICAPM. 
Chapter 5 is the first chapter that concentrates on the European banking sector. 
Since an integrated banking sector is essential for the European integration process, 
European banking regulations have been harmonized to a high degree over the last few 
decades in order to create the pathway for a single banking market. Nevertheless, the 
European banking industry remains fragmented, as shown by the relatively high market 
shares of banks in their home countries (Dermine, 2003) and the fact that more 90% of the 
loans granted by banks in the euro area are to domestic residents (De Grauwe, 2003). 
Though the real integration among European banks may still be lower, the level of 
financial integration among those banks might show a different pattern. Therefore, chapter 
5 examines the integration process of bank share prices for 41 European banks. The main 
finding is that the correlation between larger banks in Europe has increased substantially 
over our sample period (1991-2003), whereas the correlation between smaller banks has 
become lower. A reason for this result could be that investors perceive that the activities of 
bigger banks are becoming more correlated, while smaller banks seem to be becoming 
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more specialized. Another reason may be that as a result of institutional and other larger 
investors turning their investment strategies towards a European sector-based approach, 
investors increasingly track indices of the European banking sector. These indices are 
typically constructed from the stock prices of the larger banks. This provides a new angle 
on the discussion of possible strategic choices for banks, which are discussed as well. 
In chapter 6 we examine bank contagion within the European Union, building on 
the approach by taken by Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003). The approach is related to the 
growing conviction that the behavior of tail observations for financial market data is quite 
different from the behavior of other observations. Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) provide 
evidence that the number of tail observations is inconsistent with the number of 
observations that would be expected from a normal distribution or even a student t 
distribution. We confirm this belief for European banks’ risk, measured both by the first 
difference of weekly distances to default and abnormal returns. Using Monte Carlo 
simulation we show that the observed frequency of large shocks for European banks can 
also not be explained by these distributional assumptions. Therefore, we propose a non-
parametric approach in the second part of this chapter, that we label “net-contagious 
influence”. We show that this measure should give an accurate indication of contagious 
influence between two banks. Also, we identify those banks that appear to have been of 
systemic importance within individual countries and across countries. 
Chapter 7 presents a summary and a conclusion of this thesis. 
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Chapter 2  
 
Diversification in Euro Area Stock Markets: 
Country vs. Industry 
2.1 Introduction 
The extent to which financial markets and countries have become more integrated has been 
the topic of extensive debate. Capital markets in the euro area are an interesting subject of 
study, because of the rapid changes caused by the unification process and the introduction 
of a common currency. Our research question concerns the consequences of the ongoing 
European integration for investors in the euro area in terms of stock market diversification. 
In this chapter we concentrate on the differences between investments strategies based on 
country factors and on industry factors. 3 
Prior empirical research found that country factors dominated industry factors in 
explaining stock returns (e.g. Roll, 1992; Heston and Rouwenhorst, 1994; Griffin and 
Karolyi, 1998; Rouwenhorst, 1999). These papers concluded that investing according to a 
                                                          
3 For a more detailed discussion on European integration and changes in the European regulation system, see e.g. 
Hardouvelis, Malliaropulos and Priestley (1999), De Menil (1999) or Adjaouté and Danthine(2002) 
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pure country strategy outperformed a strategy based on information from industries only. 
In terms of portfolios, Heston and Rouwenhorst (1995) show that more diversification 
gains can be obtained when an investor diversifies over countries (compared to 
diversification over industries).  
More recent research, however, finds mixed results. According to Carrieri, 
Errunza and Sarkissian (2004), Gerard, Hillion and De Roon (2002) and Adjaouté and 
Danthine (2001a, 2001b) the dominance of country effects has diminished, but industry 
factors are still less important than country factors. On the other hand, Cavaglia, 
Brightman and Aked (2000) and Isakov and Sonney (2002) show that industry factors 
(almost) match the country factors and expect that industry factors will become even more 
important. This conclusion is confirmed by the extension of the Rouwenhorst (1999) 
methodology. In his original paper he concludes that country effects still dominated 
industry effects in the 90’s (based on a sample until August 1998), while a figure on his 
website shows that the industry effects will take over during 2000.4 
Brooks and Del Negro (2002, 2004, 2005) discuss this topic on a global scale 
from different points of view. Brooks and Del Negro (2004) focus on the fact that the rise 
in the industry effects coincided with the information technology/internet “bubble” 
(hereafter IT-hype). When one corrects for this phenomenon it follows that the upward 
trend of the industry effects is less pronounced. In their second paper Brooks and Del 
Negro (2005) use an adjusted version of the Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994, 1995) 
methodology to investigate the relative importance of industry, region and within-region 
effects. They conclude that regional effects can explain the country effects for 60 up to 
90%. 
The third paper of Brooks and Del Negro (2002) discusses the drawbacks of the 
Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994, 1995) methodology, which is followed by most other 
papers. This methodology follows a dummy approach where all companies are a member 
of exactly one country and one industry. Clearly, this is a very strong assumption, 
especially for big multinational firms. Brooks and Del Negro (2002) show that a less 
restrictive model performs better (according to the Akaike and the Schwarz Information 
Criterium). A similar argument is put forward by Adjaouté and Danthine (2002), who also 
criticize the standard Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994, 1995) methodology. 
Summarizing, it seems that until approximately the middle of the 90’s country 
factors were dominant factors in explaining stock returns. Around the turn of the century 
more and more signals show that industry effects are increasing. Some studies (for 
example: Cavaglia, Brightman and Aked, 2000; Brooks and Del Negro, 2004) report that 
on a global scale industry effects are taking over, however, this result is no longer valid as 
                                                          
4 K.Geert Rouwenhorst, K.Geert Rouwenhorst’s homepage, Yale School of Management,  
http://mayet.som.yale.edu/geert (accessed March 02, 2004). 
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soon as one corrects for the IT-hype. For the European area, the evidence is a little bit 
more in favor of the industry factors, even after correcting for the extreme rise in the 
information technology assets. However, all of these results are based on the restricted 
Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994, 1995) methodology, while Brooks and Del Negro (2002) 
show that an unrestricted version of this model is statistically preferred. 
In this study we want to test whether sector-based diversification strategies obtain 
higher diversification benefits than country-based strategies, applied in the euro area 
markets. A priori, a confirmation of this hypothesis would not be a surprise, since it is 
expected/forecasted by economists. Already during the run-up to the introduction of the 
common currency, economists expected sector-based diversification strategies to become 
more important and slowly institutional investors redesigned their departments to take this 
into account. However, Rouwenhorst (1999) could not find any evidence of this expected 
shift with a sample until mid 1998. We revisit this issue with recent data and compare it 
with the results of Rouwenhorst (1999), amongst others. 
This chapter is not aimed at contributing to the (methodological) discussion on 
the relative significance of country and industry factors. Rather, we concentrate on the 
consequences of the changing structure of asset returns in Europe for asset management. 
This is also our main contribution to the literature: we go on step further and directly 
investigate the consequences of the changes in the markets for the portfolios of the 
investors.  
The comparison of portfolios is done by standard mean-variance analysis. Using 
industry and country indices from the period 1995 till 2002 we construct mean-variance 
frontiers and directly compare the efficient portfolios. We show that industry-based 
diversification yields more efficient portfolios than country-based diversification in the 
euro area nowadays. The result is in compliance with the expectations based on economic 
theory, but in contrast with previous studies like Rouwenhorst (1999). We also show that 
this is result is robust to changes in volatility and robust with respect to IT-hype around the 
turn of the millennium. The implication for asset managers is that they should generally no 
longer base their euro area portfolio on a country-diversification strategy. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the section 2.2 we describe the 
methodology used in this chapter. Section 2.3 discusses the data. The results are presented 
in section 2.4 and section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Methodology and model specification 
The main research question that we want to answer is whether diversifying over countries 
or diversifying over industries is the better strategy for the euro area. Then, before 
discussing the details of the methodology used, let us briefly review some underlying 
economic intuition. 
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When we consider the pricing of European stocks, several different factors are 
important. For a specific European stock we can distinguish three different types of 
factors: country specific factors, industry specific factors and other (European) factors (see 
also Carrieri, Errunza and Sarkissian, 2004). European factors, like the interest rate (which 
is equal for all European Monetary Union members after the introduction of the common 
currency) and the exchange rate of the euro with other currencies like the U.S. dollar and 
the Japanese yen are the common factors that drive all stock returns. We expect that the 
shocks from these common factors will have the same impact during the integration 
process or may even become more important.  
The effect of country specific factors is expected to decline over time during the 
integration process of the European countries. For example, the above mentioned interest 
rate is no longer a country specific factor as of the introduction of the common currency. 
Also, as of 1999 the exchange rates between EMU countries were fixed, which eliminates 
the exchange rate risk. On the other hand, some country factors will still remain. 
Investment barriers (like transaction costs) for investing in stocks of other European 
countries are lowered over time, but the costs of international investments are still higher 
than the costs of investing in domestic stocks. The difference between these costs may be 
an important reason for the home-bias effect5 and the explanation for the relevance of the 
country factors. Other examples of country factors are differences in tax regimes, inflation 
rates, economic activity, legislation and natural events (like flooding) that have an impact 
on the economy. 
The last set of factors is the industry factors. This type of factors is very important 
for pricing of individual stocks. R&D investments, mergers, acquisitions or bankruptcies 
within an industry drive market share, market value and returns of firms in that industry. 
We do not expect that the impact of industry shocks has changed very much over time in 
Europe. However, the relative importance with respect to country specific factors is 
expected to increase. 
Clearly, the numbers of factors that might have an influence on stock returns is 
very large, too large to specify them all. Moreover, we do not know the importance of each 
different variable and sometimes it is hard to find correct data that represent the (risk) 
factors we described. Therefore, like most papers in this field, we will not try to specify all 
possible factors.6 Several of these studies show that the proceeding economic integration 
among euro area countries has important consequences for the factors driving asset returns 
in financial markets. In this study we want to concentrate on the implications of the 
                                                          
5 See e.g. Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) and Lewis (1999) 
6 See Fratzscher (2002) for a specification that includes several important factors. He finds that the central driving 
force in the financial integration process in Europe is reduced exchange rate volatility and the monetary policy 
convergence of interest rates and inflation rates. 
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changing structure of security returns for asset management. This will be done using the 
conventional theory of mean-variance analysis. The approach is relatively straightforward 
and intuitively appealing. In order to keep the calculations tractable we apply this 
methodology to stock indices rather than a to broad set of individual stocks. 
Section 2.2.1 discusses the Markowitz (1952) mean-variance methodology. In the 
following section we describe the spanning and intersection tests that we use to compare 
the different efficient frontiers and the last section covers a multivariate GARCH-
methodology. This approach is used to see whether are conclusions are robust for different 
volatility regimes. 
2.2.1 Mean-variance frontiers 
The unconditional portfolio optimization problem will be solved according to the 
methodology proposed by Markowitz (1952) who solves the problem from the point of 
view of an investor with a mean-variance perspective. Given the means – which are 
estimated by the historical averages – and the covariance matrix of both the country and 
the industry indices we plot the mean-variance frontiers. The standard Markowitz (1952) 
mean-variance efficient frontiers follow from this optimization problem.  
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where w represents the weight invested in each index, µ is the average return, ∑ represents 
the corresponding covariance matrix of the return indices and ι is a vector with all 
elements equal to one. The investor minimizes the amount of risk of his portfolio as 
measured by the portfolio variance given a certain demanded return R and subject to the 
budget restriction that all weights should sum up to one. In this chapter we will do the 
analysis for country and industry indices separately to obtain two efficient frontiers. 
Additionally, we perform the same analysis for all investment opportunities (country and 
industry indices together) to see the influence of the added indices. Naturally, this frontier 
will give the best investment opportunities, since the other two investment strategies are 
nested. 
2.2.2 Spanning and intersection tests 
In the unconditional analysis we use spanning and intersection tests to find out whether an 
investor can gain by considering more investment opportunities. The tests are described in 
for example De Roon and Nijman (2001) and are based on regression analysis. Intuitively, 
they are relatively straightforward. An investor chooses an efficient portfolio given one set 
of investment opportunities (in our case indices). The introduction of the second set of 
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indices increases the number of investment opportunities. The test gives an answer to the 
question whether the investor can significantly improve his portfolio by investing in the 
other indices as well. In other words, from a mean-variance frontier point-of-view, adding 
assets to the current portfolio will lead by definition to a shift of the frontier. A rejection of 
the spanning test means that this shift is statistically significant. The intersection test tests 
whether an investor can improve his efficient portfolio given a certain risk-preference or 
risk-free rate. The spanning test compares the whole set of efficient portfolios and tests 
whether the addition of the other set of indices gives significantly better portfolios. The 
rest of this section explains the tests in detail. 
Regression analysis can be used to test whether the inclusion of extra investment 
opportunities really enlarges the efficient set of portfolios. For example, when we test 
whether the inclusion of industry indices is important, we regress the returns of the 
industry indices on the country indices returns (compare equation 20 of De Roon and 
Nijman, 2001): 
ttcoutind RR εβα +⋅+= ,,        (2.2) 
where Rind,t is Kx1 vector of industry index returns for time t, Rcou,t is an Lx1 vector of 
country index returns for time t, εt is a Kx1 vector of normally distributed error terms, α is 
a Kx1 vector of constants and β is a KxL vector of slope coefficients. The test for 
intersection and spanning can now be defined as a Wald-test on the estimated parameters. 
The restrictions imposed by the null hypothesis of intersection are: 
( ) 0=⋅−⋅− couind ιβιηα         (2.3) 
where ιind and ιcou are Kx1 and Lx1 unit vectors respectively with all elements equal to one. 
From the dimensions it is clear that the intersection test is a Wald-test of K restrictions at 
the same time, where K is equal to the number of new investment opportunities introduced. 
The test-statistic has a χ2-distribution with K degrees of freedom. The intersection test 
tests, given a specific value for η, whether mean-variance investors can improve their 
mean-variance efficient set by including the other set of indices. η can be seen as the 
interest rate. We used a rate of 3% per annum, thus η=1.0025 (the monthly rate in gross 
return).7 
The null hypothesis of the spanning test can be stated by the following 
restrictions: 
00 =−⋅= indcouand ιιβα       (2.4) 
                                                          
7 The results are fairly robust. There are some minor changes in the p-values of the tests, but these do not change 
the conclusions. 
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This test consists of 2*K restrictions and the Wald-statistic is χ2-distributed with 2*K 
degrees of freedom. It is easy to see that this test is more restrictive than the intersection 
test: if the restrictions in equation (2.4) hold, by definition the restrictions in equation (2.3) 
hold. For a more detailed discussion on the characteristics of the specific tests, see De 
Roon and Nijman (2001). 
To summarize, in the case that the intersection test is rejected, it means that the 
mean-variance frontiers of the country indices and of both types of indices do not intersect 
for this specific interest rate and that this investor can find a significantly better portfolio 
by spreading his investments over both investment categories. When the hypothesis of 
spanning is rejected, we can conclude that the country indices do not span the universe of 
both types of indices or, in other words, that every investor is better off considering both 
investment categories. 
2.2.3 Conditional Covariance Matrix 
It is a stylized fact that the volatility of stock returns is not constant of time 
(heteroskedasticity). Especially over shorter horizons (e.g. when returns are measured on a 
daily or weekly basis) stock returns tend to display volatility clustering. This characteristic 
is important for managers that try to time the market. In addition, time-varying return 
volatility and cross-correlation also matters from a risk management perspective. One of 
the first models that incorporated this feature is the ARCH-model developed by Engle 
(1982), later generalized by Bollerslev (1986) to the GARCH-model. This section covers a 
multivariate version of the GARCH-model in order to capture the dynamics of the 
volatilities and correlations. 
We will use this model to check the validity of our conclusions with respect to 
different volatility regimes. Combining the historical means (µ) and a conditional 
covariance matrix (Ht) in the investor’s minimization problem (as described in section 
3.2.1) results in the conditional mean-variance frontier. We are mainly interested in three 
different cases: 
1. A period when the overall volatility is very low on average 
2. A period when the overall volatility is very high on average 
3. The last time period considered. 
The first two cases are used as robustness tests on the analysis. Hence, we consider two 
different volatility regimes. The last case is interesting, because it takes all information into 
account. As mentioned above, euro area stock markets have experienced substantial 
structural changes since the introduction of the euro, and joint stock return distributions 
estimated over samples which extend far back into the past might not any more be 
sufficiently representative. Therefore, the last conditional covariance matrix might be 
insightful. 
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It is very important to have an accurate estimate of the conditional covariance 
matrix. However, this is not a trivial issue, especially when the number of variables 
becomes large (because the number of parameters increases exponentially). We will use a 
special methodology for estimating the covariance matrix: principle components GARCH 
or O-GARCH, as proposed by Alexander (1998, 2001, 2003). The remainder of this 
section explains the model in more detail. 
We use a multivariate GARCH-model or, more accurately, Orthogonal GARCH 
also known as Principal Component GARCH (which is nested in the more general BEKK 
model, see Van der Weide, 2002) in order to estimate a time-varying covariance matrix. 
Most research concerning the time behavior of the correlation coefficient uses a bivariate 
model (e.g. Longin and Solnik, 1995), which gives a detailed description of the co-
movements of the two time series considered. However, we are more interested in the time 
patterns for all indices in one system. Therefore, employing a multivariate model instead of 
using a number of different bivariate models is an important improvement. 
The multivariate model for asset returns can be written as: 
),0(~)( ttttt HNRER εε+=      (2.5) 
where Rt represents a vector returns on period t (this can be the returns all country indices 
returns, the returns of all industry indices or the returns of both types of indices) and the 
vector εt represents the error terms, which are assumed to be jointly conditionally normally 
distributed. Ht is the time-varying covariance matrix. In this chapter we will use the 
historical average of the returns for the expectation of the asset return (E(Rt)). In future 
research this can be extended by conditioning on information variables, like the dividend 
yield, the term structure spread, the short-term interest rate and the default spread.  
The matrix Ht is the conditional covariance matrix of the vector error term εt. An 
important part of this model is the specification of Ht, because the number of parameters 
can be very large as soon as the number of return series is higher than two or three. In our 
case (using 10 industry and 11 country indices) it is necessary to find alternative ways to 
estimate the conditional covariance matrix. Different studies proposed methods to study 
the changing correlations between assets.8 We use the Orthogonal-GARCH method 
(hereafter O-GARCH) as proposed by Alexander (1998, 2001, 2003). This method 
transforms the series into independent series (the unobserved economic variables or the 
principal components), which reduces the number of parameters dramatically.9 
                                                          
8 See e.g. Longin and Solnik (1995) and Engle (2002). Especially the last method is very interesting when one 
wants to study the time-behaviour of volatilities and correlations. 
9 In some recent work Van der Weide(2002) proposes a generalized version of the Orthogonal GARCH, also 
called GO-GARCH. This version should have less identification problems and give better estimation results, 
especially when the data are independent. In our case the data are far from independent and some preliminary 
tests showed that the differences of GO-GARCH compared to O-GARCH are not large. Since we use monthly 
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We define the standardized return series as follows: 
i
iit
it
R
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µ−=         (2.6) 
where µi and σi are the mean and standard deviation for the return series Ri. Let X be the 
matrix representation of xit. Furthermore, let V be the matrix of eigenvectors of X’X and Λ 
the corresponding diagonal matrix containing the eigenvalues. Then, the principal 
components (or the unobserved economic factors) are given by: 
XVP =         (2.7) 
By definition the created risk factors are uncorrelated. We can easily show that the 
covariance matrix of P is indeed diagonal: 
Λ=Λ=== VVXVXVPPPVar '''')(      (2.8) 
The variance of the standardized and original return series is then equal to: 
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where M is constant matrix containing the average for each return series and D equals the 
diagonal matrix with σi its principal diagonal. 
The O-GARCH method is based on this orthogonal transformation. Instead of 
estimating very large covariance matrix with an exploding number of parameters with a 
growing number of return series, we can approximate the conditional covariance matrix by 
estimating univariate GARCH on each of the orthogonal series pit.10 This will result in a 
time-varying diagonal covariance matrix for X: Λt. Under the assumption that the 
transformation is also valid in the conditional case, the conditional covariance matrix of 
the original series Ht is then equal to:11 
 DVVDH tt '' Λ=        (2.10) 
This conditional covariance matrix will be used for the creation of conditional mean-
variance frontiers. 
                                                                                                                                                  
data in this paper and the GO-GARCH model has more parameters (caused by the estimation of the so-called 
rotation matrix) we stick to the O-GARCH model.  
10 Since we use monthly data, the number of observations is relatively small. Hence, we do not estimate 
GARCH(1,1) for all series pit, because not all components contain heteroskedasticity. This concerns the principal 
components belonging to the lowest eigenvalues. These are exactly the components that have low influence. For a 
longer discussion on this topic, see Alexander (2003). 
11 See Alexander (1998, 2001, 2003) for a discussion on this restriction.  
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2.3 Data 
In empirical finance having the right dataset is very important, especially for this project. 
On the one hand we would like to have a very long sample of country and industry indices 
returns. On the other hand, we want to be able to compare the results of the different sets 
of indices with each other. Preferably, to be comparable, the stock indices should be 
constructed out of the same pool of stocks. Since we concentrate on the stocks in the euro 
area, it is very hard to find a dataset that combines these two characteristics (unless one 
creates the indices himself). We choose to use the MSCI indices that only start in 1995, 
because the second argument is a little more important. On top of that, one can argue that 
euro area markets have changed so much over time, that longer time series might not be 
representative for the current and future distribution of returns.  
We use both industry and country indices from MSCI for all EMU-participating 
countries except Luxembourg.12 The industry indices are the MSCI sector indices for the 
European Monetary Union area, which are based on exactly these eleven countries. The 
sample consists of monthly returns from January 1995 until October 2002. Since the euro 
was introduced on January 1st 1999, the first part of our sample still contains exchange 
rate risk. Therefore, we take the view of a German investor and translate all returns into 
German Marks. Using the US dollar/German mark exchange rate from Datastream we 
transformed all dollar denoted MSCI indices into German marks. The MSCI indices are 
price indices, since gross indices were not available for the industry indices. Table 2.1 
presents the statistics for the country and the industry indices. 
2.4 Results 
This section presents the results of the methodology described in section 2.2. In section 
2.4.1 the efficient frontiers are based on country indices, industry indices and both types of 
indices are discussed. By definition, the most efficient frontiers can be found by 
considering both types of indices simultaneously. Comparing pure country and pure 
industry indices shows that diversifying over industries gives more diversification 
opportunities. Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 present robustness tests for these conclusions. We 
show that the results are robust with respect to the exclusion of the IT-bubble related 
indices and with respect to different volatility regimes respectively. 
                                                          
12 In the creation of the MSCI industry indices, MSCI also neglects the stocks from Luxembourg. Therefore, we 
ignored these stocks as well in order to keep the datasets comparable. 
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Table 2.1 
Summary statistics 
 
Panel A (above) shows the average monthly return and standard deviation for all the MSCI indices of 
the countries that form the Euro-zone (Luxembourg excluded). The statistics are presented for both 
the whole sample and two different sub samples. Panel B (below) presents the statistics for the MSCI 
industry indices. 
 
    
Total sample 
95:01 – 02:10 
Sub sample I 
95:01 – 98:12 
Sub sample II 
99:01 – 02:10 
Panel A 
 
Country (MSCI index) Return St.dev Return St.dev Return St.dev 
Germany 0.554 7.041 1.806 5.722 -0.746 8.053 
Belgium 0.511 5.141 2.104 4.372 -1.152 5.397 
Spain 1.174 7.061 2.821 7.232 -0.544 6.521 
Finland 2.183 11.731 3.175 9.011 1.147 14.051 
France 0.867 6.097 1.844 5.732 -0.152 6.358 
Greece 0.744 9.372 2.611 9.837 -1.203 8.536 
Ireland 0.633 5.776 2.036 4.876 -0.831 6.311 
Italy 0.814 7.555 2.195 8.617 -0.627 6.021 
Netherlands 0.754 5.961 2.023 5.279 -0.570 6.390 
Austria 0.044 5.445 0.264 6.043 -0.186 4.799 
Portugal 0.513 6.468 2.143 6.629 -1.189 5.898 
       
 
Total sample 
95:01 – 02:10 
Sub sample I 
95:01 – 98:12 
Sub sample II 
99:01 – 02:10 
Panel B 
 
Industry  
(MSCI EMU index) Return St.dev Return St.dev Return St.dev 
Energy 1.099 5.924 1.504 5.825 0.677 6.061 
Materials 0.526 6.176 1.054 5.653 -0.025 6.697 
Industrials 0.678 7.044 1.115 6.114 0.222 7.943 
Consumer Discretionary 0.407 7.052 1.735 5.714 -0.978 8.051 
Consumer Staples 1.049 4.678 2.399 4.894 -0.359 4.030 
Health Care 1.089 5.201 2.002 5.072 0.135 5.216 
Financials 0.732 7.302 2.236 6.960 -0.838 7.394 
Information Technology 1.931 11.729 3.521 8.686 0.272 14.143 
Telecom. Services 1.200 9.564 2.839 6.306 -0.510 11.901 
Utilities 0.659 4.781 2.132 4.469 -0.878 4.653 
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2.4.1 Unconditional mean-variance frontiers 
This section describes the results based on the full sample and two sub periods. Figure 2.1 
depicts the unconditional mean-variance frontier of the total sample for three types of 
investments: country indices only, industry indices only and both types of indices. By 
definition, the best portfolio can be constructed when both investment categories are 
considered at the same time. Comparing countries and industries with each other we can 
clearly see that (over the whole sample) investing in industry indices gave much more 
diversification opportunities than a pure country investment strategy. From a more 
statistical point of view, we can say that both spanning tests are rejected (see Table 2.2 and 
section 2.2.2 on the explanation of the tests). This means that neither the country indices 
nor the industry indices span the mean-variance frontier for both types of investment  
Figure 2.1 
Efficient frontiers based on the whole sample 
 
This figure plots the mean-variance frontiers for three investment categories over the whole sample. 
The solid line represents all investment possibilities when only country indices are considered. The 
dashed line is the mean-variance frontier for the industry indices. The dotted line considers both 
types of indices. 
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Table 2.2 
Results of spanning and intersection tests 
This table presents the results of the spanning and intersection tests, which are taken from De Roon 
and Nijman (2001). Regression analysis can be used to test whether the inclusion of some extra 
investment opportunities really enlarges the efficient set of portfolios. For example, when we test 
whether the inclusion of industry indices is important, we need to regress the returns of the industry 
indices on the country indices returns (compare equation 20 of De Roon and Nijman (2001)): 
11,1, +++ +⋅+= ttcoutind RR εβα  
The test for intersection and spanning can now be defined as a Wald-test on the estimated 
parameters. The restrictions imposed by the hypothesis of intersection are: 
 ( ) 0=⋅−⋅− couind ιβιηα  
The intersection test tests whether there is one specific value of η such that mean-variance investors 
cannot improve their mean-variance efficient set by including the other set of indices. η can be seen 
as the interest rate, we used a rate of 3% per annum, thus η=1.0025 (the monthly rate in gross return) 
The hypothesis of the spanning test can be stated by the following restrictions: 
 00 =−⋅= indcouand ιιβα  
The table is divided into two parts. Panel A presents the p-values of the different tests done when the 
inclusion of industry indices is considered. In case the intersection test is rejected, it means that the 
mean-variance frontiers of the country indices and of both types of indices do not intersect for this 
specific interest rate. When the hypothesis of spanning is rejected, we can conclude that the country 
indices do not span the universe of both types of indices. For panel B it is the other way around 
 
 Panel A: P-values of the tests whether country indices span industry indices, as measured by Wald-
tests on the parameter estimates of this regression:  11,1, +++ +⋅+= ttcoutind RR εβα  
 
 95:01 – 02:10 95:01 – 98:12 99:01 – 02:10 
Intersection test 0.754 0.177 0.956 
Spanning test 0.000 0.000 0.020 
 
 
Panel B: P-values of the tests whether industry indices span country indices, as measured by Wald-
tests on the parameter estimates of this regression:  11,1, +++ +⋅+= ttindtcoud RR εβα .  
 
 95:01 – 02:10 95:01 – 98:12 99:01 – 02:10 
Intersection test 0.997 0.442 0.965 
Spanning test 0.012 0.026 0.832 
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categories. In other words, a mean-variance investor can always gain by adding the other 
type of indices to his portfolio. 
The introduction of the euro in January 1999 is a natural moment to split our 
sample in two halves. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 present the mean-variance frontiers of both sub 
samples. During the pre-euro period (Figure 2.2) a pure country-allocation scheme resulted 
in a similar performance as a pure industry-allocation scheme. A diversification scheme 
that uses both types of indices gives the best performance, which is also supported by the 
Figure 2.2 
Efficient frontiers based on the first sub sample 95:01 – 98:12 
 
This figure plots the mean-variance frontiers for three investment categories over the first sub sample 
(95:01 – 98:12). The solid line represents all investment possibilities when only country indices are 
considered. The dashed line is the mean-variance frontier line for the industry indices. The dotted 
line considers both types of indices. 
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spanning and intersection tests (see Table 2.2).13 In the second sub sample (Figure 2.3) it is  
clear that a more efficient portfolio can be created using industry indices compared to 
using country indices only. In this sample there is no exchange rate risk anymore, which 
could be the reason that investors are better off investing in industries. The hypothesis of 
intersection is not rejected (which is the case for all samples), but the hypothesis that 
                                                          
13 The mean-variance frontiers for the subsamples show a clear outperformance for the diversification over both 
types of indices. This can partly be explained by the fact that the number of observations (four years instead of 
almost eight) influences the estimation of the frontiers. Therefore, we should also take the more statistical 
intersection- and spanning tests into account. The results of these tests can be found in table 2. The tests are 
described in section 2.2. 
Figure 2.3 
Efficient frontiers based on the second sub sample 99:01 – 02:10 
 
This figure plots the mean-variance frontiers for three investment categories over the second sub 
sample (99:01 – 02:10). The solid line represents all investment possibilities when only country 
indices are considered. The dashed line is the mean-variance frontier for the industry indices. The 
dotted line considers both types of indices. 
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industry indices span the investment frontier of both types of indices can also not be 
rejected. In other words, this statistic says that the addition of country indices is not very 
valuable given a mean-variance efficient industry index allocated portfolio. The result is a 
clear indication that investing in industry indices is more important than investing in 
country indices nowadays. 
This is in contrast with the previous literature. During the 90’s the so-called 
country effects were more important than the industry effects (Heston and Rouwenhorst, 
1994, 1995; Griffin and Karolyi, 1998; Rouwenhorst, 1999). Because of the integration 
process in the European area it was expected that country effects would diminish over time 
and that industry effects would take over, but research did not find evidence for that yet. 
More recent research gives ambiguous results. On a global scale, industry effects are 
Figure 2.4 
Efficient frontiers based on the full sample without the IT-sector 
 
This figure plots the unconditional mean-variance frontier with the exclusion of the IT-sector. The 
solid line represents all investment possibilities when only country indices are considered. The 
dashed line is the mean-variance frontier for the industry indices. The dotted line considers both 
types of indices. 
 
 
 
Diversification in Euro Area Stock Markets: Country vs. Industry 29 
 
becoming more important, but it is not clear whether industry factors are currently more 
important than country factors. Our result clearly suggests that the country-diversification 
strategy for the euro area is outdated and that an investor (who considers indices only) 
should at least base his portfolio on industry factors. 
2.4.2 Robustness with respect to the IT-hype 
Isakov and Sonney (2002) and Brooks and Del Negro (2004) correctly state that the rise in 
the industry effects coincided with the rise of the technology stocks. A robustness check on 
the sensitivity of our conclusions with respect to this phenomenon is therefore appropriate. 
We follow Isakov and Sonney (2002) and Brooks and Del Negro (2004) by studying the 
conclusions in case the regarding indices are left out of the sample.  
Figure 2.5 
Efficient frontiers based on the full sample without the IT and Telecom-sector 
 
This figure plots the unconditional mean-variance frontier with the exclusion of the IT and Telecom 
sectors. The solid line represents all investment possibilities when only country indices are 
considered. The dashed line is the mean-variance frontier for the industry indices. The dotted line 
considers both types of indices. 
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Figure 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 show the mean-variance frontiers based on a restricted 
sample: excluding the IT-industry, excluding IT and the Telecom industries and excluding 
IT, Telecom and Finland, respectively.14 We should add that correcting for this 
                                                          
14 The exclusion of the Information Technologies and Telecommunication Serviced industries is clear (also 
following the literature). We also tested the exclusion of Finland, since Nokia heavily influences the stock market 
of Finland. In 2000 (at the top of IT bubble and the middle of our sample) Nokia represent 64% of the total 
Finnish market value! Furthermore, we should add that also most other country indices contain some IT-stocks 
and are thus influenced by this market. However, we cannot correct for that, since we are working with indices. 
 
Figure 2.6 
Efficient frontiers based on the full sample without the IT-sector,  
the Telecom-sector and Finland 
 
This figure plots the unconditional mean-variance frontier with the exclusion of the IT-, the 
Telecom-sector and Finland. The solid line represents all investment possibilities when only country 
indices are considered. The dashed line is the mean-variance frontier for the industry indices. The 
dotted line considers both types of indices. 
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phenomenon is very hard. The hype around the end of the century not only directly 
influenced the rise (and fall) of the IT-related stocks, but it can be argued that it also 
changed the investor’s view about stocks and investments in general. Therefore, excluding 
some indices from the analysis might not be sufficient to fully check for the effects of this 
phenomenon.15 
Before discussing the changes in the results we should repeat that the historical 
means used are based on a relatively short sample. We should therefore interpret the results 
                                                                                                                                                  
Given the good performance of these stocks the mean-variance frontier should be even lower when we could 
correct for that. This fact also strengthens the results we report. 
15 We thank the referee of the ECB working paper series for this point. 
Table 2.3 
Results of minimum-variance portfolio and the Sharpe ratio 
 
This table presents the statistics concerning the conditional mean-variance frontiers (Figures 2.8 till 
2.10) all based on the unconditional covariance matrix. The third column presents the mean and 
standard deviation of the Mean Variance Portfolio (MVP) and the Sharpe ratio for all investment 
categories when all indices are included. Columns 2 to 4 give the same characteristics when IT is not 
included, IT and Telecom are not included or IT, Telecom and Finland are not included, respectively. 
For calculating the Sharpe ratio an annualized interest rate of 3% was used. 
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Countries MVP: mean 0.353 0.353 0.353 0.332 
 MVP: st. dev 4.30 4.30 4.30 4.30 
 Sharpe ratio 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.229 
Industries MVP: mean 1.039 1.158 1.082 1.082 
 MVP: st. dev 3.61 3.68 3.71 3.71 
 Sharpe ratio 0.377 0.354 0.301 0.301 
Both categories MVP: mean 0.762 0.827 0.781 0.753 
 MVP: st. dev 2.97 3.01 3.08 3.09 
 Sharpe ratio 0.451 0.439 0.425 0.397 
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discussed in this section with care. The statistics of the minimum variance portfolio (MVP) 
and the Sharpe ratio for all investment categories and all three robustness tests are 
presented in Table 2.3. Looking at Table 2.3 we see that excluding some of the possible in- 
dices had an influence on the performance. Especially in the case of excluding 2 out of 10 
industry indices it makes sense that the Sharpe ratio should decline. However, our main 
conclusions are still valid. Even in the case where we compare investing in all country 
indices with investing in only 5 industry indices (Figure 2.6), still, the better diversification 
opportunities can be found by diversifying over industries. This evidence suggests that the 
rise in the technology markets has only strengthened the trend of more important industry 
factors. These robustness tests also show that diversifying over both categories remains the 
best strategy. 
Table 2.4 
Results of minimum-variance portfolio and the Sharpe ratio 
 
This table presents the GARCH-parameters for all principal components that contain conditional 
heteroskedasticity. We used the standard ARCH-LM test with a confidence level of 10% to test for 
conditional heteroskedasticity. In case the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity is rejected, we 
estimate a GARCH(1,1) model on the time series of the principal component: 
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Note that the actual level of ω is not relevant, because of the transformation from the original series 
to the principal component series.  
** means that the regarding parameter is statistically significant from zero based on a 95% 
confidence interval 
 
GARCH-parameter ω  α  β  
All Pr.comp. 1 8.721  0.317 ** 0.000  
 Pr.comp. 2 2.493  0.215 ** 0.644 ** 
 Pr.comp. 3 19.414  0.262 ** 0.000  
 Pr.comp. 4 71.237  0.164 ** 0.758 ** 
      
Countries only Pr.comp. 1 12.130  0.140 ** 0.189  
 Pr.comp. 2 18.267  0.221 ** 0.000  
 Pr.comp. 3 35.712  0.164 ** 0.756 ** 
      
Industries only Pr.comp. 1 3.723 ** 0.440 ** 0.000  
 Pr.comp. 2 36.729  0.181 ** 0.744 ** 
  
Diversification in Euro Area Stock Markets: Country vs. Industry 33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 
The conditional volatilities of the principal components 
 
When both types of indices are considered, the test for conditional heteroskedasticity is rejected in 
four (out of 21) cases. A GARCH(1,1) model is estimated for these principle components. This 
figure shows the four resulting conditional volatilities. 
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2.4.3 Robustness with respect to differences in volatility 
The second test we perform, deals with the robustness of our results with respect to 
different volatility regimes. For that purpose we use the O-GARCH methodology as 
described in section 2.2.3, which is a possible multivariate parameterization of a model 
with GARCH-components. Basically, the method identifies the principal components of 
the stock indices. For each component we test for the presence of heteroskedasticity and 
estimate a GARCH(1,1) process if this is the case.  
This procedure is followed three times: for country indices only, for industry 
indices only and for both types of indices simultaneously. Table 2.4 gives the estimates of 
the GARCH-parameters for all the principles components that contained conditional 
heteroskedasticity. The table shows that the number of components for which the null 
hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity is rejected is relatively low: 4, 3 and 2 for all indices, 
only country indices or only industry indices respectively. The variances of all other 
components are constant over time and do not play an important role for this robustness 
test.  
The conditional volatilities are plotted in Figure 2.7. For sake of brevity we only 
plotted the time-varying volatilities of the principle components when we consider both 
types of investments simultaneously. Figure 2.7 shows that there is quite some substantial 
variation in the conditional volatilities. Hence, we want to check whether our conclusions 
are valid for all possible volatility regimes. In order to check this we consider the efficient 
frontiers based on two different periods: a period with a relatively high volatility and a 
period with a relatively low volatility. In general, the volatilities seem to be high around 
the introduction of the euro. Therefore, we chose December 1998 as the high volatility 
period. Two years later the average volatility seems to have hit a low: December 2000 is 
taken as the low volatility period. 
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 present the efficient frontiers based on the conditional 
covariance matrix (resulting from the O-GARCH methodology) for the high and the low 
volatility period respectively. These pictures show that our conclusions are also robust over 
different volatility regimes. Although the differences are less pronounced when the 
volatility is low, a portfolio based on industry indices clearly has a better mean-variance 
ratio than a portfolio based on country indices in both periods considered. The only 
noticeable difference is the higher (lower) portfolio variance, which can be deduced from 
the shift of the whole efficient frontier to the right (left). The efficient frontiers based on 
the last conditional covariance matrix in our sample, thereby including all information (see 
Figure 2.10), also shows similar patterns amongst the frontiers.  
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Figure 2.8 
Conditional efficient frontiers with the covariance matrix based on 98:12 
 
This figure plots the conditional mean-variance frontiers on a specific time period in the sample. The 
frontiers are based on the mean return of the whole sample and the conditional covariance matrix of 
December 1998. The solid line represents all investment possibilities when only country indices are 
considered. The dashed line is the mean-variance frontier for the industry indices. The dotted line 
considers both types of indices. 
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Figure 2.9 
Conditional efficient frontiers with the covariance matrix based on 00:12 
 
This figure plots the conditional mean-variance frontiers on a specific time period in the sample. The 
frontiers are based on the mean return of the whole sample and the conditional covariance matrix of 
December 2000. The solid line represents all investment possibilities when only country indices are 
considered. The dashed line is the mean-variance frontier for the industry indices. The dotted line 
considers both types of indices. 
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Figure 2.10 
Conditional efficient frontiers with the covariance matrix based on 02:10 
 
This figure plots the conditional mean-variance frontiers on a specific time period in the sample. The 
frontiers are based on the mean return of the whole sample and the conditional covariance matrix of 
October 2002 (last month in the sample). The solid line represents all investment possibilities when 
only country indices are considered. The dashed line is the mean-variance frontier for the industry 
indices. The dotted line considers both types of indices. 
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An alternative way of presenting the time variability in the mean-variance 
frontiers is by looking at the Sharpe ratio. The O-GARCH methodology allows us to 
calculate this ratio for each time period in the sample. The changes in the Sharpe ratios 
over time are depicted in Figure 2.11. Again, the same conclusions can be drawn from this 
picture. Next to that, the figure also shows that the time variability based on conditional 
second moments is not extreme. In future research we would like to take this into account 
and extend the research with conditional expected returns. Overall, the results of this 
section support our conclusions and show that an investor in the euro area stock markets 
cannot neglect industry factors. 
 
Figure 2.11 
Time varying Sharpe ratios 
 
This figure plots the Sharpe ratios for each month in the sample based on the estimate of the 
conditional covariance matrix of that period. The solid line represents all investment possibilities 
when only country indices are considered. The dashed line is the mean-variance frontier for the 
industry indices. The dotted line considers both types of indices. In case only country indices were 
considered the Sharpe ratio became negative in a few instances. These observations are not plotted. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
The ongoing process of integration within the European Union and the euro area in 
particular is the subject of much debate. Due to the harmonization of monetary and policy 
rules, most notably the introduction of the euro per January 1st 1999, European financial 
markets are becoming more correlated with each other (see e.g. Adjaouté and Danthine, 
2002; Hardouvelis, Malliaropoulos and Priestley, 1999). This chapter deals with the 
consequences of these changes on the diversification opportunities within the euro-zone. 
Special attention is paid to the difference between country and industry effects. Several 
papers that cover this subject (Roll, 1992; Heston and Rouwenhorst, 1994, 1995; Griffin 
and Karolyi, 1998; Rouwenhorst, 1999) document that country effects are more prevalent 
than industry effects. Recent research (Cavaglia, Brightman and Aked, 2000; Isakov and 
Sonney, 2002) reports that country effects are losing field, which can partly be explained 
by the IT-hype during the late 90’s (Brooks and Del Negro, 2004). Furthermore, there is 
criticism on the restrictive Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994, 1995) methodology (Adjaouté 
and Danthine, 2002; Brooks and Del Negro, 2002). In this chapter we revisit the issue for 
the euro area stock markets and with a different approach we show that industries are more 
important than countries with respect to diversification opportunities. 
We plot the mean-variance frontiers of three investment policies (country indices 
only, industry indices only and both types of indices) for different samples. Our conjecture, 
that the performance of a pure country investment strategy is decreasing as a result of the 
European integration process, is supported by the results in this chapter. The unconditional 
analysis until January 1999 shows that an industry strategy gave similar results as a 
country strategy. Using more recent samples we report evidence that the diversification 
opportunities between countries have been decreasing. In the most recent samples or based 
on the recent conditional covariance matrix it is clear that diversifying over industries is a 
much better strategy than diversifying over countries. Unsurprisingly, the best portfolio 
can be constructed when the investor considers both categories simultaneously, suggesting 
that country specific factors still play at least some role in the determination of stock 
returns and their correlation across euro area stock markets. Concluding, given our 
methodology, the traditional top-down allocation scheme, where it is first decided how to 
divide the money over several countries and secondly how to spread the investments 
within a country, seems to be outdated for the euro area stock markets. This contrasts with 
the results of Rouwenhorst (1999), but is in line with Cavaglia, Brightman and Aked 
(2000) and Isakov and Sonney (2002). They report a rising trend in the relative importance 
of industry factors. Our results suggest that this trend is moving forward. 
We argue that our conclusions are an outcome of the European integration 
process. However, the results might be driven by the extreme performance of IT-stocks 
around the turn of the century, which roughly coincides with the introduction of the euro. 
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Brooks and Del Negro (2004) find that the level of industry effects decreases on a global 
scale after correcting for the IT-hype. We show that our conclusions remain valid after 
excluding indices with a large information technology component and that the industry 
effect only strengthened the IT-hype. Therefore, we attribute the change in the relative 
importance of industry factors to the European integration process. 
 
 
  
Chapter 3  
 
How Domestic is the Fama and French 
Three-Factor Model? An Application to the 
Euro Area 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the introduction of the CAPM by Sharpe (1964) and its extension by Lintner (1965) 
asset pricing models have been an intensive topic of research. In a fully integrated market 
where purchasing power parity (PPP) holds, the global CAPM should price all assets (see 
Grauer, Litzenberger and Stehle, 1976). However, many studies show that PPP usually 
doesn’t hold16. In that case, a correct specification of an asset-pricing model should entail 
exchange rate risk factors. Such international asset pricing models are developed by Solnik 
(1974), Sercu (1980), Stulz (1981) and Adler and Dumas (1983).17 
                                                          
16 See e.g. Abuaf and Jorion (1990), Froot and Rogoff (1995), Chinn (2002), Koedijk, Tims and van Dijk (2004)  
17 Stulz (1995) gives a comprehensive review of the literature on the different asset pricing models. 
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Another extension of the CAPM was suggested by Fama and French (1992, 1993, 
1995, 1996). Besides the world market factor they included two zero-cost portfolios: a 
Small minus Big (SMB) portfolio based on the total market capitalization of the firms 
considered and a High-minus-Low (HML) portfolio which is based on the book-to-market 
value of the stock. In their studies Fama and French show that their asset-pricing model 
performs better than the traditional CAPM. In a later study (Fama and French, 1998), they 
provide the international evidence by investigating the model for a number of countries. 
Despite the good performance of their model several studies question their methodology. 
Daniel and Titman (1997) find that rather the characteristics than the covariance structure 
of the returns explains the cross-sectional variance of the stock returns. Other studies 
(Campbell (1996), Ferson and Harvey (1999) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)) show that 
incorporating conditioning information in a traditional CAPM also increases the ability to 
explain the returns.  
In this chapter we do not contribute to the methodological discussion, but try to 
answer a more practical question. Although Fama and French (1998) advocate a global 
version of their model, many practitioners and academics use a local version of the three-
factor model in order to make correct estimates of the expected stock returns (e.g. for 
portfolio selection problems and cost-of-capital calculations18). Griffin (2002) documents 
that a local three-factor model is better (in terms of adjusted R2 and Jensen’s alpha) than 
the global version for the stock markets of the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and Japan. The 
result is found for both portfolios and individual securities and is also robust for basic 
methodological changes.  
We address the same issue for the euro area. Although not all countries are as 
integrated with the world market as the four large countries mentioned above, the euro area 
forms a very integrated area by itself.19 Over the last decade a number of changes in the 
European Monetary Union have had a big influence. Besides the harmonization of 
monetary and policy rules and legislation, the playing field for institutional investors (the 
largest investors in the European market) changed considerably.20 During our sample 
period the restriction on maximum investments in stocks has been relieved and the 
introduction of the common currency opened up the euro area market for the institutional 
investors even more. Consequently, the termination of the exchange rate risk within the 
                                                          
18 See amongst others Stulz(1998), Koedijk, Kool, Schotman and van Dijk (2002) and Karolyi and Stulz (2002) 
for discussions on the local versus global (I)CAPM, e.g.. for cost of capital calculations. 
19 Hardouvelis, Malliaropoulos and Priestley (1999) show using a conditional framework that most member states 
of the European Monetary Union seem to become fully integrated with each other in 1997. 
20 Institutional investors are usually very restricted concerning investments in stock markets, both in the 
maximum amount invested (in percentages of total assets) and how these investment are allowed to vary over 
different stock markets (it is very common that the greater part has to be invested in local currency-denominated 
markets).  
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euro area spurred the (financial) integration process amongst these countries.21 Given these 
changes and the resulting union, it is interesting to see what factors drive the stock markets 
in this area. As discussed above, Griffin (2002) shows that the domestic model is preferred, 
but which “domestic model” applies to the euro area? Are asset prices driven by local 
country factors or are euro area factors more appropriate nowadays. In this chapter we 
address this issue and examine the behavior of these asset-pricing markets over time as 
well. 
We study the equity markets of all euro-participating countries over the period 
1991:07 until 2002:08. We create portfolios for each country based on the book-to-market 
and the size characteristics of the companies considered. The returns of these portfolios are 
used to test the different asset pricing models. We find that the domestic three-factor model 
(country 3FM) clearly outperforms the euro area three-factor model. Given the European 
integration during our sample (as evidenced by Hardouvelis, Malliaropoulos and Priestley, 
1999), we split the sample in two parts to examine the behavior of the asset pricing models 
in each sub period. We show that the difference in the first part of the sample is substantial 
(the mean absolute pricing error of the country 3FM is up to 40% lower than the pricing 
error of the euro area 3FM). In the second sub sample this difference decreases to 
approximately 7%. Thus, even though the (relative) performance of the euro area model 
has increased substantially, the country 3FM still produces the lowest pricing errors on 
average. 
Furthermore, we also group the stocks along another dimension. Among others, 
Fama and French (1997) show that pricing industry portfolios is very difficult. However, 
no studies (to the author’s knowledge) have implemented an industry-specific three-factor 
model (industry 3FM) following the Fama-French methodology. In this chapter we address 
this issue and compare the results with the euro area 3FM. For each sector we create a 
number of portfolios based on the book-to-market or size characteristics of the firms. As in 
the country case, we find that an industry 3FM clearly outperforms the euro area 3FM. 
This result is robust over the sub periods and holds for both book-to-market and size-sorted 
portfolios. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides the 
methodology used in this chapter. Section 3.3 discusses the data used and explains how the 
portfolios are constructed. Section 3.4 presents the results and section 3.5 concludes. 
                                                          
21 Recent studies, that consider the euro area asset markets in particular, find that the changing environment of the 
euro area is slowly reflected in the financial markets (see e.g. Cavaglia, Brightman and Aked, 2000; Isakov and 
Sonney, 2002).  
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3.2 Methodology 
We estimate different versions of the Fama and French three-factor model (3FM). We 
employ the same methodology and same performance measures as Griffin (2002) and 
apply this approach to the euro area stock markets. This section covers the applied models 
in more detail.  
The 3FM relates the expected return on a stock or portfolio in excess of the risk 
free rate to three different factors: (1) the excess return of the market portfolio; (2) the 
difference between the return on a portfolio of small market capitalization stocks and the 
return on a portfolio of big capitalization stocks (SMB, small minus big); (3) the difference 
between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return on low 
book-to-market stocks (HML, high minus low), which proxies the value or distress 
premium. In a regression framework this model can be written as: 
ittitiftmtiiftit HMLhSMBsRRRR εβα +⋅+⋅+−⋅+=− ][    (3.1) 
where Rit, Rft and Rmt are respectively the return on a stock or portfolio, the risk-free rate 
and the market return; βi, si and hi are the unconditional sensitivities of the ith asset for the 
specific factors, αi is the pricing error and εit the error term. 
In this chapter we focus on the domestic 3FM of Fama & French applied to the 
euro area (or European Monetary Union). The main research question covered in this 
chapter answers how domestic these factors (market return, SMB, HML) should be. A 
natural definition of domestic factors is country-specific factors. However, given the rate 
of integration and the introduction of the common currency in the European Monetary 
Union, a 3FM with euro-area-based factors could also be seen as a domestic model. In 
section 3.2.1 we discuss both of these models and examine which model produces the 
lowest pricing errors. Instead of using geographical characteristics in defining the ‘local 
factors’, one can also create factors for each different sector. As discussed in the 
introduction, the regulatory changes in Europe have been numerous and consequently 
investors should take a sector-based approach in examining the euro area capital markets.22 
Following these lines an industry-based 3FM is perfectly rational. Furthermore, these 
analyses can bring new insights in the discussion on pricing industry portfolios (which is 
very hard according to e.g. Fama and French, 1997). The methodology for the industry-
based factor models is discussed in section 3.2.2. 
                                                          
22 See e.g. Cavaglia, Brightman and Aked (2000), Rouwenhorst (1999), Isakov and Sonney (2002) and  
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3.2.1 Euro area vs. the country three-factor model 
In a fully integrated market there is only one set of factors that prices all assets of each 
country. Assuming that the euro area is a highly integrated area, we can define the euro 
area three-factor regression model (euro area-3FM) as follows: 
ittititiiftit EHMLhESMBsEMRFRR εβα +⋅+⋅+⋅+=−    (3.2) 
where EMRFt is the euro area market excess return, ESMBt represents the small minus big 
portfolios for the euro area and EHMLt is the euro area high minus low portfolio. For the 
definition of the EMU risk factors, we follow the methodology of Griffin (2002), who 
defines the global risk factors as the weighted averages of all domestic risk factors under 
consideration. 
tFttDtt FMRFwDMRFwEMRF ⋅+⋅= −− 11      (3.3) 
where DMRFt and FMRFt are the domestic excess market return and the foreign excess 
market return respectively; the weight wDt-1 is equal to the country’s total market 
capitalization in the previous month over the total EMU market capitalization in the 
previous month and wFt-1 is the weight for all foreign countries and by definition the 
complement of wDt-1. The other two factors (ESMBt and EHMLt) are defined in a similar 
way. 
The three-factor model described in equation (3.2) restricts the domestic and the 
foreign factors to have the same impact on stock returns. If one allows the foreign factors 
to have a different influence on the returns, the following international country factor 
model regression can be defined: 
ittFtFitFtFitFtFi
tDtDitDtDitDtDiiftit
FHMLwhFSMBwsFMRFw
DHMLwhDSMBwsDMRFwRR
εβ
βα
+⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅⋅+
⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅⋅+=−
−−−
−−−
)()()(
)()()(
111
111  (3.4) 
We will refer to this as the international country 3FM. It is formed by decomposing the 
global model into the specific domestic-related components and foreign country 
components.23 If the foreign factors are irrelevant, the international country 3FM collapses 
to the country 3FM: 
ittDitDitDiiftit DHMLhDSMBsDMRFRR εβα +⋅+⋅+⋅+=−   (3.5) 
In order to assess the performance of the three different models considered we 
apply two separate performance measures. First of all, the adjusted R2s of the different 
                                                          
23 In case of highly integrated markets, this specification is not identified. The factor-pairs (e.g. DMRF and 
FMRF) are then highly correlated. We will therefore not pay a lot of attention to this model, but do report the 
results in order to be able to compare them with Griffin (2002). 
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regressions are compared. Although the R2 rises when useful factors are added, it is not the 
best statistic to compare models. A more reliable performance measure is the pricing error 
of the regression (αi). On average, the most effective model is best able to price (portfolios 
of) assets and hence produces a lower pricing error (in absolute terms). The models are 
tested on different groups of portfolios. Following the literature we will mainly focus on 
BE/ME-sorted portfolios and on size-sorted portfolios. 
 
3.2.2 The industry asset pricing model 
This section covers another possible avenue for a “domestic model”. Instead of defining a 
local asset pricing factor model for each country, we also consider asset-pricing models for 
each industry category. As mentioned before, the European (Monetary) Union is in the 
middle of an integration process. Given this dynamic environment many studies have been 
done in order to test for structural changes in the European financial markets. Some of 
these studies argue that industry factors are becoming more important relative to country 
factors (see footnote 5). From this point of view an industry asset pricing model is an 
interesting topic of research. Furthermore, it is well known that industry portfolios are hard 
to price using the normal CAPM or 3FM.24 The rest of this section discusses the 
methodology used for this model.25 
For every industry we create an industry return, a SMB portfolio and a HML 
portfolio. Thus, we can now split up the euro area 3FM (as in equation (3.2)) into an 
international industry model: 
ittOtOitOtOittOOi
tItIitItIitItIiiftit
OHMLwhOSMBwsOMRFw
IHMLwhISMBwsIMRFwRR
εβ
βα
+⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅⋅+
⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅⋅+=−
−−−
−−−
)()()(
)()()(
111,
111 (3.6) 
where IMRFt, ISMBt and IHMLt are the factors for a specific industry and OMRFt, OSMBt 
and OHMLt are the risk factors for the other industries. The model is similar to the 
international country model with the exception that the factors are now industry-based. The 
parameterization allows us to check which factors are the most important in explaining the 
cross-section of returns. In case the factors of the other sectors are irrelevant, the 
international industry model collapses to the industry 3FM: 
ittIitIitIiiftit IHMLhISMBsIMRFRR εβα +⋅+⋅+⋅+=−    (3.7) 
                                                          
24 See, amongst others, Fama and French (1997), Hussain, Diacon and Toms (2002), Van Vliet and Post (2004). 
25 To our knowledge, the industrial Fama & French model has not been a topic of research yet. Hussain & Toms 
(2002) study a related topic. They consider industry portfolios and regress these on the standard (domestic) risk 
factors for the UK. However, the risk factors are still country-based and not industry based. 
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We use BE/ME-sorted and size-sorted industry portfolios for testing the different asset 
pricing models. The performance criteria used for the comparison are the same as 
mentioned above: the (absolute) pricing error (αi’s) and the adjusted R2s.  
Unfortunately, we cannot compare the country and industry model directly, since 
they are not nested. Moreover, there is a slight difference between the two European 
models, which comes from the methodological assumptions that we make (following 
Griffin, 2002). Appendix A discusses this in more detail. Furthermore, we tested an 
alternative specification where the European models are exactly the same, but this doesn’t 
give major changes for our results.26 
3.3 Data 
We apply our methodology to stocks from the euro-participating countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain. Luxembourg is the twelfth country that belongs to the euro area, but it is usually 
ignored in this type of studies because of the small number of stocks in this country. The 
monthly stock returns (including dividends and capital gains) are downloaded from 
                                                          
26 The results of this model are available upon request from the author. 
Table 3.1 
Industry classification codes 
This table displays the FTSE-industry codes. This industry-categorization is used to divide 
all assets in industry specific portfolios. 
 
 INDC3 Definitions 
00 Resor Resources 
10 Basic Basic Industries 
20 Genin General Industries 
30 Cycgd Cyclical Consumer Goods 
40 Ncyg4 Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
50 Cyser Cyclical Services 
60 Ncysr Non-Cyclical Services 
70 Utils Utilities 
80 Totlf Financials 
90 Itech Information Technology 
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Datastream27. For each asset we also retrieve the FTSE industry classification (see Table 
3.1 for the different classifications), market capitalization and the book-to-market 
(BE/ME) ratio for each month. As a conditionally risk-free asset we use the return on the 
one-month euro-mark deposit quoted in London (also extracted from Datastream). All 
asset returns (before the introduction of the common currency) are translated into Deutsche 
marks using the bilateral exchange rates.28 The monthly excess returns are computed by 
subtracting the risk-free rate from the monthly return of each security. Table 3.2 presents 
the summary statistics for the country market indices that are constructed based on the 
assets that fulfill the criteria. Panel B of this table reports the unconditional correlations 
between the several indices. The indices are clearly correlated with each other and most 
country indices are very highly correlated with the euro area index.  
The biggest difference of European data versus US data concerns the number of 
stocks. This holds especially for this study, since we investigate a domestic 3FM for each 
country (and for each industry). Table 3.3 shows the number of stocks that are used for the 
creation of the different factors at the beginning of July for each year. This number can 
decline throughout the year, because of mergers, takeovers, bankruptcies or any other 
reason of delisting. Considering Table 3.3 we see that there are huge differences between 
the European countries and industries. Germany and France are the largest countries with 
approximately 200 listed stocks, while Ireland and Greece are the smallest countries with 
less than 20 stocks in the beginning of the sample. The same holds for the different sectors 
that we consider. There are big differences in the number of stocks of different industries, 
ranging from less than 20 for the Information Technology sector in the first four years of 
our sample to almost 250 in some years for the Financials. We will take this into account 
during the interpretation of the results by presenting our results both for the whole euro 
area as well as for the bigger countries/industries only. 
The sample runs from July 1991 till August 2002. Although this is a fairly short 
sample for this type of studies, we chose to stick to recent data only. The reasons for this 
choice are twofold. First, a much longer time series would lower the listed stocks per 
country even more. Secondly, the local versus global discussion on the Fama and French 
3FM is based on the assumption of market integration. Although one can argue that the 
markets in the beginning of our sample might not be fully integrated, Hardouvelis, 
Malliaropulos and Priestley (2001) find that most of these markets do around 1998. Hence, 
                                                          
27 For each country we selected the stocks that are listed in the Datastream total market index of the countries 
under consideration. These indices cover 80% of all available stocks, which suggests that it covers more than 
99% of the market capitalization of each country. The delisted stocks are taken from the Datastream dead stocks 
lists. 
28 The same holds for the market value and the book-to-market ratio. In order to make a smooth transition to the 
euro-nominated returns, we multiplied all values with the irrevocable exchange rate, which is available at: 
European Central Bank, http://www.ecb.int (accessed 3 October, 2003) 
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the start of the sample is a consideration between more available data versus complying 
with the null hypothesis of integrated markets. 
For the construction of the risk factors we follow Griffin (2002) by applying the 
Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996) methodology. For stocks to be included in the 
analysis the firm must have a stock price for June of year t. Furthermore, the firm should 
have a market value for June of year t and a book-to-market value for December of year t-
1. Firms that have a negative book-to-market value on December of year t-1 are not 
included in the sample. This selection procedure is used for all stocks in the DataStream 
total market index. Given this selection of firms, in June of year t all stocks are ranked on 
size. The sample is then split using the median market capitalization of all firms of a 
country (or industry) into a small (S) and a big (B) portfolio. The stocks are also ranked on 
their book-to-market equity of December of year t-1. For the book-to-market classification, 
the bottom 30% are classified as low book-to-market firms (L), the middle 40% into the 
middle (M) portfolio and the top 30% as high book-to-market firms (H). Using the 
intersection of these independent stock splits we can construct six portfolios: BH, BM, BL, 
SH, SM and SL. The SMB-portfolio is defined as the simple average of all small-stock 
portfolio returns minus all big stock portfolio returns, or SMB= (SH + SM + SL - BH – 
BM – BL)/3 for each month. The HML portfolio is the simple average of all high BE/ME 
stock portfolio returns minus all low stock portfolio returns, or HML= (SH + BH – SL – 
BL)/2 for each month29. 
The test assets are in line with the existing literature. We create portfolios based 
on the ranking of the assets on the BE/ME-ratio or on size. The number of tested portfolios 
is varied, changing from 3 to 6 and 10. By this variation we can test the robustness of our 
results. However, we should note again that the number of stocks is limited for the smaller 
European countries: the larger the number of portfolios, the less stocks that are on average 
in a portfolio. For example, in the beginning of the sample Greece only contained eleven 
stocks. When these are divided over 10 portfolios, it means that 9 out of 10 portfolios only 
contain one stock! For completeness, we apply our methodology on all euro-participating 
countries, but we will check the robustness of the results with respect to the inclusion of 
these smaller countries or industries. 
 
                                                          
29 In the case of Ireland and Greece, the middle book-to-market portfolio does not exist. Because of the limited 
number of stocks in the beginning of the sample, we decided to split the sample into two book-to-market 
portfolios. 
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Table 3.3 
Number of stocks 
This table reports the number of stocks that meet the criteria. The asset must have a listed price for 
June of that respective year, the market value in June should be known and the book-to-market ratio 
for December of the previous year should also be available. Following the standard Fama and French 
methodology we find the following number of stocks for the month of June of that year. The number 
of stocks changes a lot over time due to new issues, mergers, takeovers and bankruptcies. The Fama 
and French portfolios are updated in June each year and therefore this table reports the number for 
that month. Due to delistings the number of stocks per country and for some portfolios might decline 
over the year. The addition of stocks only occurs in June of the following year, when the new 
portfolios are constructed. Panel A contains the numbers over the different countries included and 
Panel B covers the same statistic for the different industries. 
 
   PANEL A: THE NUMBER OF STOCKS PER COUNTRY FOR EACH YEAR 
 
Country 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 
Germany (BD) 177 191 204 211 220 227 211 210 197 215 209 198 
Belgium (BG) 46 45 47 51 50 47 50 43 41 38 33 32 
Spain (ES) 48 55 64 66 69 72 97 107 108 111 102 101 
Finland (FN) 32 34 36 38 56 60 65 66 63 57 53 46 
France (FR) 253 253 258 268 266 263 253 247 221 197 177 170 
Greece (GR) 11 17 22 24 28 31 42 41 45 50 56 45 
Ireland (IR) 15 16 16 17 17 17 18 20 34 36 35 31 
Italy (IT) 77 83 90 91 102 114 120 126 132 129 121 111 
Netherlands (NL) 149 150 144 142 141 136 138 144 142 124 104 90 
Austria (OE) 35 38 40 47 58 64 68 66 57 55 50 47 
Portugal (PT) 33 34 42 43 47 45 49 54 54 46 40 41 
             
Total 876 916 963 998 1054 1076 1111 1124 1094 1058 980 912 
  
 
    PANEL B: THE NUMBER OF STOCKS PER INDUSTRY FOR EACH YEAR 
 
Sector 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 
00 Resor 59 55 50 54 54 46 45 41 33 25 23 20 
10 Basic 138 140 145 154 165 174 184 184 182 165 158 151 
20 Genin 152 155 155 160 170 168 166 154 150 141 127 110 
30 Cycgd 84 89 90 96 99 104 106 113 109 106 96 88 
40 Ncyg4 89 101 103 104 112 120 111 119 122 117 105 100 
50 Cyser 105 106 107 109 121 125 136 146 147 145 145 140 
60 Ncysr 39 43 48 46 45 44 46 45 42 44 37 36 
70 Utils 33 35 35 36 37 37 37 39 41 38 37 33 
80 Totlf 159 174 212 221 230 232 251 251 230 222 196 180 
90 Itech 18 18 18 18 21 26 29 32 38 55 56 54 
              
 Total 876 916 963 998 1054 1076 1111 1124 1094 1058 980 912 
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3.4 Results 
We use the same performance criteria for measuring the performance of the different asset 
pricing models as Griffin (2002). The first criterion is the pricing error, also called 
Jensen’s alpha. Under the null hypothesis that the factor model is indeed the data 
generating process, the predicted value of alpha in the estimated equation should be equal 
to zero (see equation (3.2), (3.4) and (3.5) for the European, the international or the 
domestic model respectively). The estimated value of alpha then gives the pricing error of 
the asset-pricing model under consideration. For each group of assets we report the mean 
absolute pricing error.30 The second criterion is the average adjusted R-squared, which is 
the explanatory power of the regression.  
3.4.1 The country vs. the euro area 3FM 
For every country in our sample we regress the time series of returns of the different book-
to-market sorted portfolios on three versions of the 3FM: the euro area 3FM, the 
international country 3FM and the (local) country 3FM (see equations (3.2), (3.4) and 
(3.5)). The results are summarized in the Table 3.4. The first three rows cover the average 
results. The following three rows contain the same results but only concerning the bigger 
countries (Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands), while the rest of the table presents 
the performance measures for each country separately. 
For example, when the stocks are divided into three book-to-market sorted 
portfolios we find that the euro area 3FM performs worse than the other two models based 
on both performance criteria. The mean absolute pricing error for the euro area 3FM 
(0.449) is more than double compared to the international model (0.191) or the domestic 
model (0.189). The adjusted R2 of the euro area 3FM (0.482) is also substantially lower 
than 0.859 and 0.851 of the international and the domestic asset-pricing model 
respectively. The results stated in the second and third row represent the cases where the 
number of portfolios is increased to six or ten. The overall performance of the asset pricing 
models declines (the mean absolute pricing errors rise, while the R2s drop), but the relative 
conclusions stay the same: both the domestic 3FM and the international country 3FM are 
clearly better in explaining the cross-section of stock returns than the euro area 3FM is.  
                                                          
30 One can also test the pricing errors using the statistical procedures as proposed by Gibbons, Ross and Shanken 
(1989). These tests showed that most pricing models didn’t have significant alpha’s. This is partly caused by the 
fact that our sample period is relatively short and the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken-test only holds asymptotically under 
normally distributed errors. Furthermore, the results are very similar to the mean absolute pricing error criterion. 
Since this last criterion is more relevant in economic terms, we chose to only report the results on the absolute 
pricing errors. 
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Table 3.4 
Country vs. euro area model, book-to-market sorted portfolios, full sample 
This table presents the two performance measures resulting from regressing the book-to-market 
sorted portfolios of the countries considered using the full sample on three different asset pricing 
models: the euro area 3FM, the international country 3FM and the country 3FM (see equation (3.2), 
(3.4) and (3.5) respectively). For each model the mean absolute pricing error is stated in the first 
column of the model and the second column contains the average adjusted R2. The top rows depict 
the averages of the performance measures for all countries and the three following rows average over 
the four largest countries (France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands). 
   
     
European model International model Country model The number of 
portfolios and 
Country considered Av. |α| Av. R
2 Av. |α| Av. R2 Av. |α| Av. R2 
Average, 3 0.449 0.482 0.191 0.859 0.189 0.855 
Average, 6 0.428 0.424 0.289 0.737 0.286 0.730 
Average, 10 0.483 0.366 0.365 0.628 0.343 0.620 
       
(only big countr.) 3 0.324 0.657 0.181 0.891 0.210 0.887 
(only big countr.) 6 0.309 0.590 0.289 0.788 0.270 0.782 
(only big countr.) 10 0.336 0.530 0.276 0.709 0.250 0.701 
       
Germany  3 0.309 0.730 0.292 0.880 0.315 0.881 
Germany 6 0.239 0.663 0.242 0.795 0.249 0.795 
Germany 10 0.233 0.591 0.198 0.713 0.175 0.702 
       
Belgium 3 0.293 0.510 0.022 0.850 0.048 0.850 
Belgium 6 0.230 0.423 0.214 0.686 0.242 0.686 
Belgium 10 0.402 0.349 0.326 0.565 0.378 0.563 
       
Spain 3 0.185 0.544 0.247 0.854 0.227 0.844 
Spain 6 0.252 0.487 0.350 0.770 0.382 0.761 
Spain 10 0.324 0.434 0.383 0.672 0.427 0.664 
       
Finland 3 0.718 0.400 0.392 0.825 0.177 0.807 
Finland 6 0.697 0.339 0.385 0.682 0.271 0.663 
Finland 10 0.692 0.285 0.492 0.575 0.355 0.554 
       
France 3 0.229 0.775 0.217 0.904 0.273 0.903 
France 6 0.294 0.684 0.316 0.804 0.338 0.802 
France 10 0.289 0.622 0.288 0.734 0.333 0.727 
       
Greece 3 0.579 0.214 0.363 0.907 0.387 0.908 
Greece 6 0.586 0.176 0.439 0.792 0.453 0.791 
Greece 10 0.749 0.150 0.614 0.680 0.589 0.680 
       
Ireland 3 0.761 0.270 0.211 0.710 0.269 0.707 
Ireland 6 0.602 0.247 0.154 0.570 0.304 0.547 
Ireland 10 0.558 0.169 0.419 0.393 0.475 0.374 
       
Italy 3 0.330 0.508 0.098 0.916 0.124 0.914 
Italy 6 0.360 0.493 0.239 0.857 0.167 0.852 
Italy 10 0.400 0.467 0.297 0.794 0.201 0.789 
       
Netherlands 3 0.427 0.616 0.116 0.866 0.127 0.851 
Netherlands 6 0.342 0.519 0.361 0.696 0.326 0.679 
Netherlands 10 0.423 0.439 0.323 0.596 0.293 0.584 
       
Austria 3 0.885 0.372 0.046 0.901 0.094 0.902 
Austria 6 0.830 0.301 0.243 0.732 0.239 0.734 
Austria 10 0.852 0.258 0.334 0.619 0.283 0.612 
       
Portugal 3 0.226 0.363 0.096 0.835 0.040 0.836 
Portugal 6 0.278 0.336 0.240 0.726 0.173 0.722 
Portugal 10 0.390 0.262 0.342 0.571 0.262 0.569 
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This result is robust over the number of portfolios used.31 
When we compare the international (country) 3FM with the country 3FM the 
differences are much less pronounced. First of all, the adjusted R2s of the international 
model are marginally higher. This means that the foreign factors hardly have any extra 
explanatory power compared to the domestic factors, which is in line with expectation, 
since these factors are highly correlated. However, the international version of the 3FM is 
not necessarily better in explaining the portfolio returns. In all cases for BE/ME-sorted 
portfolios the country model has a better performance measured by the mean absolute 
pricing error. This result is somewhat striking at first glance, but is also reported by Griffin 
(2002). He finds the same result using data for the UK, US, Japan and Canada. Apparently, 
the local factors are far more informative in terms of asset pricing than the other factors 
are. As a robustness check, we also averaged the results for the bigger countries only (rows 
4-6). In that case, all conclusions are the same, except for the 3-sort, where the 
international country 3FM has a lower mean absolute pricing error than the country 3FM. 
Also, the difference between the domestic and the euro area 3FM is less pronounced, but 
the domestic 3FM is clearly favorable on both performance measures. 
Table 3.5 shows the results for size-sorted portfolios and the same asset pricing 
models. Again we see that euro area 3FM has the worst performance of three models by 
far. The R2s almost double and the mean absolute pricing errors lower substantially 
ranging from 30% to 60% of the absolute pricing error of the euro area 3FM. The 
performance of the international and the country model are again very similar. The R2s of 
the international 3FM are slightly higher than those of the country 3FM, while the results 
based on the absolute pricing errors differ over the different number of portfolios used. 
Either way, it can be concluded that the three added factors in the international model do 
not add much explanatory power. 
3.4.2 The industry vs. the euro area 3FM 
Several studies (amongst others, Fama and French, 1997; Van Vliet and Post, 2004) show 
that pricing industry(-sorted) portfolios is very difficult. Most of the studies, however, use 
global factors in the asset-pricing models. We propose to use a different specification of 
the Fama-French 3FM: a factor-model using industrial factors. We test the performance of 
a pure industry 3FM against a euro-area 3FM, as given by equations (3.2) and (3.7). For 
                                                          
31 In case we only use three portfolios, we know that the portfolios contain enough stocks, but on the other hand 
this favors the country model. After all, the domestic market is split into three smaller subsets and hence the 
explanatory variables in the country three-factor model are more correlated with the dependent variables. 
Therefore, we should also consider a higher number of portfolios (in our case we used 6 and 10 portfolios). The 
drawback of using more different portfolios is that the number of stocks per portfolio is decreasing. This holds 
especially for smaller countries, like Greece and Ireland that have less than 20 stocks in the beginning of the 
sample. For this reason we also check all our results in case we only consider the bigger countries (or in the 
following section industries), which contains at least 50 stocks throughout the whole sample. 
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Table 3.5 
Country vs. euro area model, size sorted portfolios, full sample 
This table presents the two performance measures resulting from regressing the size sorted portfolios 
of the countries considered using the full sample on three different asset pricing models: the euro 
area 3FM, the international country 3FM and the country 3FM (see equation (3.2), (3.4) and (3.5) 
respectively). For each model the mean absolute pricing error is stated in the first column of the 
model and the second column contains the average adjusted R2. The top rows depict the averages of 
the performance measures for all countries and the three following rows average over the four largest 
countries (France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands). 
 
European model International model Country model The number of 
portfolios and 
Country considered Av. |α| Av. R
2 Av. |α| Av. R2 Av. |α| Av. R2 
Average, 3 0.349 0.495 0.139 0.871 0.153 0.864 
Average, 6 0.398 0.435 0.236 0.765 0.240 0.757 
Average, 10 0.467 0.383 0.329 0.670 0.319 0.661 
       
(only big countr.) 3 0.202 0.676 0.100 0.917 0.087 0.913 
(only big countr.) 6 0.238 0.617 0.180 0.831 0.173 0.826 
(only big countr.) 10 0.324 0.559 0.265 0.755 0.259 0.747 
       
Germany  3 0.056 0.718 0.081 0.909 0.075 0.908 
Germany 6 0.167 0.640 0.144 0.832 0.115 0.830 
Germany 10 0.261 0.573 0.184 0.739 0.168 0.738 
       
Belgium 3 0.131 0.542 0.042 0.817 0.054 0.807 
Belgium 6 0.197 0.449 0.097 0.701 0.162 0.691 
Belgium 10 0.243 0.383 0.158 0.597 0.212 0.585 
       
Spain 3 0.144 0.582 0.156 0.905 0.140 0.904 
Spain 6 0.241 0.527 0.195 0.840 0.188 0.839 
Spain 10 0.281 0.479 0.356 0.770 0.320 0.769 
       
Finland 3 0.947 0.409 0.192 0.850 0.164 0.826 
Finland 6 0.720 0.364 0.387 0.747 0.187 0.711 
Finland 10 0.699 0.303 0.446 0.649 0.308 0.619 
       
France 3 0.189 0.734 0.026 0.900 0.034 0.892 
France 6 0.330 0.676 0.245 0.804 0.278 0.793 
France 10 0.437 0.598 0.449 0.712 0.502 0.696 
       
Greece 3 0.649 0.167 0.257 0.896 0.330 0.895 
Greece 6 0.742 0.148 0.328 0.794 0.346 0.795 
Greece 10 0.802 0.138 0.386 0.698 0.431 0.696 
       
Ireland 3 0.274 0.344 0.093 0.813 0.239 0.792 
Ireland 6 0.429 0.261 0.244 0.630 0.421 0.606 
Ireland 10 0.663 0.185 0.469 0.466 0.587 0.454 
       
Italy 3 0.430 0.545 0.182 0.958 0.145 0.958 
Italy 6 0.356 0.539 0.210 0.914 0.204 0.913 
Italy 10 0.410 0.512 0.238 0.872 0.179 0.871 
       
Netherlands 3 0.131 0.708 0.112 0.901 0.093 0.894 
Netherlands 6 0.097 0.611 0.123 0.775 0.094 0.769 
Netherlands 10 0.186 0.555 0.191 0.695 0.188 0.682 
       
Austria 3 0.573 0.306 0.096 0.846 0.127 0.844 
Austria 6 0.666 0.259 0.216 0.724 0.254 0.725 
Austria 10 0.581 0.213 0.246 0.587 0.249 0.585 
       
Portugal 3 0.309 0.386 0.291 0.783 0.281 0.781 
Portugal 6 0.436 0.307 0.402 0.657 0.389 0.658 
Portugal 10 0.574 0.276 0.491 0.590 0.370 0.579 
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Table 3.6 
Industry vs. euro area model, book-to-market sorted portfolios, full sample 
This table presents the two performance measures resulting from regressing the book-to-market 
sorted portfolios of the industries considered using the full sample on three different asset pricing 
models: the euro area 3FM, the international (industry) 3FM and the industry 3FM (see equation 
(3.2), (3.6) and (3.7) respectively). For each model the mean absolute pricing error is stated in the 
first column of the model and the second column contains the average adjusted R2. The top rows 
depict the averages of the performance measures for all industries and the three following rows 
average over the six largest industries. (Basic Industries, General Industries, Cyclical Consumer 
Goods, Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods, Cyclical Services and Financials). 
 
European model International model Industry model The number of 
portfolios and 
Industry considered Av. |α| Av. R
2 Av. |α| Av. R2 Av. |α| Av. R2 
Average, 3 0.380 0.576 0.237 0.843 0.225 0.833 
Average, 6 0.421 0.490 0.295 0.688 0.275 0.674 
Average, 10 0.445 0.422 0.317 0.581 0.311 0.568 
       
(only big industr.) 3 0.287 0.652 0.203 0.865 0.201 0.852 
(only big industr.) 6 0.320 0.569 0.254 0.732 0.251 0.717 
(only big industr.) 10 0.346 0.506 0.287 0.640 0.275 0.626 
       
Resor 3 0.465 0.338 0.236 0.691 0.254 0.680 
Resor 6 0.443 0.275 0.327 0.487 0.289 0.475 
Resor 10 0.497 0.222 0.339 0.390 0.348 0.375 
       
Basic 3 0.189 0.628 0.229 0.853 0.214 0.835 
Basic 6 0.193 0.576 0.212 0.699 0.278 0.676 
Basic 10 0.221 0.511 0.202 0.609 0.255 0.582 
       
Genin 3 0.361 0.741 0.375 0.862 0.421 0.851 
Genin 6 0.612 0.632 0.446 0.733 0.383 0.719 
Genin 10 0.553 0.576 0.381 0.665 0.325 0.651 
       
Cycgd 3 0.252 0.618 0.166 0.859 0.155 0.852 
Cycgd 6 0.123 0.518 0.220 0.704 0.281 0.698 
Cycgd 10 0.300 0.460 0.352 0.608 0.387 0.600 
       
Ncycg 3 0.459 0.498 0.095 0.833 0.093 0.814 
Ncycg 6 0.448 0.422 0.128 0.674 0.123 0.657 
Ncycg 10 0.459 0.347 0.258 0.557 0.256 0.548 
       
Cyser 3 0.208 0.667 0.088 0.846 0.099 0.828 
Cyser 6 0.285 0.554 0.241 0.704 0.199 0.678 
Cyser 10 0.329 0.489 0.281 0.595 0.214 0.576 
       
Ncysr 3 0.487 0.536 0.233 0.867 0.295 0.857 
Ncysr 6 0.434 0.456 0.214 0.722 0.274 0.701 
Ncysr 10 0.466 0.358 0.283 0.585 0.333 0.571 
       
Utils 3 0.114 0.424 0.063 0.866 0.060 0.868 
Utils 6 0.194 0.312 0.179 0.644 0.132 0.639 
Utils 10 0.361 0.236 0.260 0.481 0.244 0.471 
       
Totlf 3 0.253 0.760 0.264 0.934 0.222 0.934 
Totlf 6 0.262 0.713 0.278 0.878 0.244 0.877 
Totlf 10 0.214 0.654 0.246 0.806 0.214 0.801 
       
Itech 3 1.009 0.550 0.616 0.814 0.440 0.809 
Itech 6 1.216 0.445 0.708 0.631 0.552 0.624 
Itech 10 1.050 0.364 0.566 0.519 0.531 0.509 
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Table 3.7 
Industry vs. euro area model, size-sorted portfolios, full sample 
This table presents the two performance measures resulting from regressing the size-sorted portfolios 
of the industries considered using the full sample on three different asset pricing models: the euro 
area 3FM, the international (industry) 3FM and the industry 3FM (see equation (3.2), (3.6) and (3.7) 
respectively). For each model the mean absolute pricing error is stated in the first column of the 
model and the second column contains the average adjusted R2. The top rows depict the averages of 
the performance measures for all industries and the three following rows average over the six largest 
industries. (Basic Industries, General Industries, Cyclical Consumer Goods, Non-Cyclical Consumer 
Goods, Cyclical Services and Financials). 
 
European model International model Industry model The number of 
portfolios and 
Industry considered Av. |α| Av. R
2 Av. |α| Av. R2 Av. |α| Av. R2 
Average, 3 0.359 0.624 0.182 0.838 0.173 0.822 
Average, 6 0.376 0.540 0.224 0.720 0.218 0.700 
Average, 10 0.465 0.464 0.337 0.612 0.320 0.593 
       
(only big industr.) 3 0.259 0.704 0.126 0.877 0.113 0.858 
(only big industr.) 6 0.306 0.630 0.187 0.775 0.173 0.752 
(only big industr.) 10 0.349 0.556 0.239 0.673 0.222 0.650 
       
Resor 3 0.273 0.445 0.114 0.710 0.098 0.686 
Resor 6 0.233 0.336 0.159 0.542 0.129 0.517 
Resor 10 0.493 0.253 0.359 0.433 0.373 0.422 
       
Basic 3 0.190 0.717 0.135 0.880 0.123 0.861 
Basic 6 0.321 0.658 0.241 0.783 0.189 0.757 
Basic 10 0.354 0.583 0.316 0.683 0.244 0.654 
       
Genin 3 0.344 0.788 0.189 0.894 0.081 0.842 
Genin 6 0.537 0.652 0.350 0.778 0.214 0.726 
Genin 10 0.654 0.600 0.363 0.701 0.322 0.650 
       
Cycgd 3 0.209 0.698 0.108 0.873 0.113 0.863 
Cycgd 6 0.159 0.603 0.103 0.750 0.169 0.738 
Cycgd 10 0.207 0.520 0.173 0.644 0.187 0.633 
       
Ncycg 3 0.253 0.587 0.093 0.831 0.101 0.814 
Ncycg 6 0.228 0.514 0.162 0.703 0.186 0.685 
Ncycg 10 0.210 0.444 0.157 0.597 0.159 0.582 
       
Cyser 3 0.371 0.679 0.111 0.869 0.115 0.859 
Cyser 6 0.335 0.635 0.115 0.775 0.132 0.753 
Cyser 10 0.349 0.560 0.179 0.663 0.184 0.634 
       
Ncysr 3 0.423 0.565 0.369 0.806 0.399 0.795 
Ncysr 6 0.475 0.457 0.420 0.669 0.480 0.657 
Ncysr 10 0.593 0.373 0.611 0.554 0.599 0.540 
       
Utils 3 0.351 0.411 0.131 0.784 0.161 0.782 
Utils 6 0.403 0.330 0.184 0.642 0.176 0.638 
Utils 10 0.397 0.261 0.212 0.510 0.266 0.505 
       
Totlf 3 0.187 0.752 0.121 0.915 0.142 0.911 
Totlf 6 0.255 0.718 0.149 0.859 0.151 0.850 
Totlf 10 0.321 0.630 0.244 0.753 0.239 0.747 
       
Itech 3 0.985 0.599 0.451 0.822 0.396 0.813 
Itech 6 0.816 0.502 0.361 0.696 0.359 0.680 
Itech 10 1.075 0.419 0.760 0.579 0.632 0.566 
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reasons of comparison we also include an international industry 3FM (similar to the 
international country 3FM) as denoted by equation (3.6). The test assets for these models 
are formed by sorting all assets of a specific industry on book-to-market or on size. Thus, 
we use BE/ME-sorted industry portfolios and size-sorted industry portfolios in this section. 
The results presented in Table 3.6 coincide with the results of the previous 
subsection. The euro area 3FM does not contain enough information to price the BE/ME-
sorted portfolios as efficient as the international and the industry 3FM, that both contain 
the local industry factors. The R2s of the euro area 3FM are significantly lower and mean 
absolute pricing error is higher. The difference between the international industry and 
(local) industry 3FM is very small. The industry model does have lower absolute pricing 
error for all number of book-to-market sorted portfolios (3, 6 and 10), but this only holds 
on average and not for each industry separately. The results on the size-sorted portfolios 
contain no surprises (see Table 3.7). The conclusions are the same as for the book-to-
market sorted sector portfolios stating that the more local 3FM is better capable in 
explaining the cross-section of stock returns. In order to test whether our results are not 
driven by outliers in smaller industries, we also present the performance measures for the 
bigger sectors only. These are reported on rows 4-6 of Table 3.6 and 3.7. The performance 
for all models improves slightly, which might be explained by the fact that the test 
portfolios contain more stocks than the industry portfolios of smaller sectors. The relative 
performance, however, remains the same. Summarizing, Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show that a 
local industry 3FM is more capable of explaining the cross-section of industry returns than 
a euro area version of this model. This result shows that an industry-based 3FM might be 
more appropriate in terms of pricing industry portfolios. Clearly, more research needs to be 
done in this area, but we leave this for future research.  
The sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 have shown that a local three-factor model is 
preferred over the euro area version of the model over the whole sample. Using BE/ME- 
and size-sorted portfolios we have shown that a domestic 3FM or an industry 3FM has a 
clear outperformance compared to the euro area 3FM in terms of both R2s and the mean 
absolute pricing error. In the following section we will present the results in case the 
methodology is applied to sub periods of our sample in order to test the behavior of these 
models over time. 
3.4.3 European integration and the relative performance of asset pricing models 
The European Monetary Union has been a very dynamic environment during our sample 
period. A number of changes in the monetary and legislation system have been 
implemented in order to achieve a higher level of (real) integration. For example, 
institutional investors were restricted concerning investments in foreign stocks (stocks 
denoted in different currency). This restriction is relaxed with respect to other euro-
participating countries and since the advent of the euro this restriction was relaxed in a 
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Table 3.8 
Country vs. euro area model, results for the sub samples 
This table presents the two performance measures resulting from regressing the book-to-market 
sorted and size-sorted portfolios of the industries considered for two different sub samples on three 
different asset pricing models: the euro area 3FM, the international (industry) 3FM and the industry 
3FM (see equation (3.2), (3.6) and (3.7) respectively). For each model the mean absolute pricing 
error is stated in the first column of the model and the second column contains the average adjusted 
R2. The first three rows of each panel depict the averages of the performance measures for all 
countries and the three following rows average over the four largest countries (France, Germany, 
Italy and the Netherlands). Panel A and B present the figures for both sub samples for the book-to-
market sorted portfolios. Panel C and D present the same statistics for the size-sorted portfolios. 
 
European model International model Industry model The number of 
portfolios and 
industries considered Av. |α| Av. R
2 Av. |α| Av. R2 Av. |α| Av. R2 
PANEL A: FIRST SUBSAMPLE 1991:07 – 1997:01, BOOK-TO-MARKET SORTED PORTFOLIOS  
Average, 3 0.439 0.458 0.181 0.894 0.175 0.889 
Average, 6 0.501 0.409 0.303 0.783 0.292 0.776 
Average, 10 0.590 0.353 0.417 0.667 0.399 0.656 
       
(only big countr.) 3 0.364 0.599 0.173 0.920 0.140 0.914 
(only big countr.) 6 0.359 0.549 0.238 0.839 0.204 0.832 
(only big countr.) 10 0.388 0.495 0.284 0.757 0.244 0.743 
       
PANEL B: SECOND SUBSAMPLE 1997:02 – 2002:08, BOOK-TO-MARKET SORTED PORTFOLIOS  
Average, 3 0.653 0.515 0.348 0.851 0.332 0.847 
Average, 6 0.613 0.454 0.423 0.725 0.411 0.717 
Average, 10 0.675 0.401 0.538 0.627 0.499 0.616 
       
(only big countr.) 3 0.438 0.705 0.298 0.878 0.324 0.871 
(only big countr.) 6 0.464 0.636 0.465 0.769 0.422 0.760 
(only big countr.) 10 0.469 0.580 0.467 0.695 0.439 0.685 
       
PANEL C: FIRST SUBSAMPLE 1991:07 – 1997:01, SIZE-SORTED PORTFOLIOS   
Average, 3 0.492 0.482 0.175 0.891 0.178 0.886 
Average, 6 0.539 0.424 0.273 0.797 0.272 0.791 
Average, 10 0.571 0.366 0.357 0.691 0.352 0.688 
       
(only big countr.) 3 0.350 0.621 0.107 0.928 0.094 0.924 
(only big countr.) 6 0.374 0.567 0.165 0.849 0.131 0.846 
(only big countr.) 10 0.388 0.514 0.229 0.776 0.224 0.772 
       
PANEL D: SECOND SUBSAMPLE 1997:02 – 2002:08, SIZE-SORTED PORTFOLIOS  
Average, 3 0.520 0.529 0.238 0.864 0.197 0.854 
Average, 6 0.547 0.467 0.316 0.759 0.313 0.748 
Average, 10 0.714 0.421 0.495 0.669 0.450 0.655 
       
(only big countr.) 3 0.248 0.732 0.212 0.920 0.177 0.915 
(only big countr.) 6 0.360 0.674 0.321 0.837 0.312 0.829 
(only big countr.) 10 0.496 0.620 0.483 0.766 0.460 0.753 
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Table 3.9 
Industry vs. euro area model, results for the sub samples 
This table presents the two performance measures resulting from regressing the book-to-market 
sorted and size-sorted portfolios of the industries considered for two different sub samples on three 
different asset pricing models: the euro area 3FM, the international (industry) 3FM and the industry 
3FM (see equation 2, 6 and 7 respectively). For each model the mean absolute pricing error is stated 
in the first column of the model and the second column contains the average adjusted R2. The first 
three rows of each panel depict the averages of the performance measures for all industries and the 
three following rows average over the six largest industries. (Basic Industries, General Industries, 
Cyclical Consumer Goods, Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods, Cyclical Services and Financials). Panel 
A and B present the figures for both sub samples for the book-to-market sorted portfolios. Panel C 
and D present the same statistics for the size-sorted portfolios. 
 
European model International model Industry model The number of 
portfolios and 
industries considered Av. |α| Av. R
2 Av. |α| Av. R2 Av. |α| Av. R2 
PANEL A: FIRST SUBSAMPLE 1991:07 – 1997:01, BOOK-TO-MARKET SORTED PORTFOLIOS  
Average, 3 0.433 0.634 0.262 0.837 0.234 0.820 
Average, 6 0.493 0.528 0.337 0.680 0.292 0.665 
Average, 10 0.556 0.444 0.447 0.571 0.415 0.555 
       
(only big industr.) 3 0.323 0.717 0.197 0.889 0.148 0.882 
(only big industr.) 6 0.397 0.619 0.259 0.754 0.209 0.743 
(only big industr.) 10 0.445 0.545 0.356 0.658 0.309 0.646 
       
PANEL B: SECOND SUBSAMPLE 1997:02 – 2002:08, BOOK-TO-MARKET SORTED PORTFOLIOS  
Average, 3 0.407 0.560 0.312 0.850 0.344 0.844 
Average, 6 0.578 0.482 0.483 0.696 0.483 0.686 
Average, 10 0.530 0.420 0.434 0.600 0.457 0.591 
       
(only big industr.) 3 0.341 0.633 0.263 0.868 0.313 0.857 
(only big industr.) 6 0.472 0.557 0.409 0.741 0.422 0.729 
(only big industr.) 10 0.443 0.502 0.386 0.655 0.422 0.643 
       
PANEL C: FIRST SUBSAMPLE 1991:07 – 1997:01, SIZE-SORTED PORTFOLIOS   
Average, 3 0.374 0.669 0.264 0.843 0.243 0.825 
Average, 6 0.413 0.577 0.335 0.726 0.314 0.706 
Average, 10 0.561 0.485 0.530 0.604 0.486 0.582 
       
(only big industr.) 3 0.267 0.762 0.192 0.888 0.170 0.878 
(only big industr.) 6 0.324 0.672 0.237 0.786 0.229 0.774 
(only big industr.) 10 0.393 0.588 0.330 0.679 0.299 0.662 
       
PANEL D: SECOND SUBSAMPLE 1997:02 – 2002:08, SIZE-SORTED PORTFOLIOS  
Average, 3 0.409 0.613 0.155 0.840 0.209 0.826 
Average, 6 0.499 0.536 0.279 0.725 0.335 0.707 
Average, 10 0.556 0.467 0.395 0.630 0.430 0.617 
       
(only big industr.) 3 0.328 0.687 0.108 0.883 0.166 0.867 
(only big industr.) 6 0.445 0.626 0.252 0.784 0.293 0.763 
(only big industr.) 10 0.487 0.556 0.333 0.691 0.357 0.673 
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more natural way. Clearly, this might have a considerable impact on financial markets. For 
example, if financial integration has increased during our sample period, we would expect 
that the (relative) performance of the euro area 3FM would increase compared to the 
country/industry (and international) 3FM. Therefore, we want to split our sample in two 
halves to test for differences over the two sub periods. Table 3.8 contains the results of the 
country, international and euro area 3FM model for both sub samples, for the book-to-
market sorted test portfolios and for size-sorted portfolios.32 Table 3.9 presents the same 
results of the industry portfolios using the industry, international industry and euro area 
3FM.  
Due to different market conditions the actual level of the performance measures 
are not directly comparable, but the conclusions to be drawn on the relative performance of 
the models are similar. In almost all cases, the euro area factor model is not able to perform 
better than any of the other models in both of the sample periods. Also, the performances 
of the international and local (both the (local) country and the (local) industry model) are 
not very much apart. More interesting, however, is to compare the relative performances 
over the different periods with each other. Let’s define κi,j as the ratio of the mean absolute 
pricing error of the model i over the corresponding value of the model j: 
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Since a lower value of the alpha corresponds with a better performance of the model, a 
value of κcountry,euro area that is lower than one, means that the country factor model performs 
better than the euro area factor model in terms of absolute pricing errors. This κ-indicator 
summarizes the relative performance of the two models into one number. In the rest of the 
analysis, we will only use the κ-indicator with the alphas of the euro area 3FM in the 
denominator. Then, in case the level of equity market integration between different 
countries (industries) has increased during our sample period, the κ-indicator shows a 
higher value for the second sub sample compared to the first sub sample.  
Figure 3.1 shows the values of the κ-indicator for the different models and each 
sub sample.33 The first two pairs of bars relate the mean absolute pricing error of the  
                                                          
32 Table 3.8 and 3.9 only report the average result for sake of brevity. The results for the individual countries are 
available from the author upon request. 
33 In order to calculate the values for κ we used the average value of the absolute alphas of the ten sorted 
portfolios. If the number of portfolios is small, we might favor the domestic (country or industry) model over the 
European model, because of a high correlation between the local market return and the local portfolios. The 
drawback of using more portfolios is that the number of assets per portfolio decreases. This is especially an issue 
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country 3FM with the euro area 3FM. We see a slight increase in the relative performance 
of the euro-area 3FM for the book-to-market sorted portfolios, while for the size-sorted 
portfolios κ hardly changes over the different sub samples. The results for the comparison 
of the industry 3FM with the euro area 3FM are depicted in the two other pairs of bars. 
                                                                                                                                                  
when we study smaller countries like Greece and Ireland (see Table 2). Therefore, we will also examine the 
results for the bigger countries (industries) only. 
Figure 3.1 
The values for κ averaged over all countries or industries 
This figure shows the values for κ (as defined in equation 3.8) for all tested portfolios. κ is the ratio 
of average absolute alpha of the country or the industry 3FM over the corresponding value of the 
euro area 3FM. 
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The first two couples of bars indicate the κcountry,euro-area for the book-to-market sorted portfolios and 
the size-sorted portfolios. The third and fourth pair depict κcountry,euro-area for these portfolios. The left 
bar of each pair represents the κ-indicator in the first sub sample and the right bar for the second sub 
sample. We used the pricing errors of 10-sorts in each case, but using a 3-sort or 6-sort gives similar 
conclusions. The ratios can easily be calculated using the numbers from the Tables 3.8 and 3.9 for 
the countries and industries respectively. For example, the most left bar uses the performance 
measures from Table 3.8, panel A, of the ten book-to-market portfolios (3rd row containing 
numbers): κ = 0.399/0.590 = 0.68. 
 
            
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Cou_BM Cou_MV Ind_BM Ind_MV
1st sub sample
2nd sub sample
 
How Domestic is the Fama and French Three-Factor Model? 63 
 
These show mixed evidence with respect to the κ-indicator. The value of κ for the book-to-
market sorted portfolios increases, while it decreases for the size-sorted industry portfolios. 
One could conclude that there are no significant changes in the relative performance of the 
different factor models over the sub samples. We should, however, bear in mind that these 
results are based on the whole sample and thus includes the smaller countries and 
industries. As mentioned before, this can influence our results. First of all, the portfolios of 
these countries are very small and we should be careful in interpreting their results. 
Secondly, although these countries have adopted the euro, they might still be less 
integrated with the European Monetary Union than other, bigger countries.  
For that reason Figure 3.2 also depicts the κ-indicators in case only the bigger 
countries and bigger industries are considered.34 Concentrating on the results for the 
industry sorted portfolios we are again confronted with mixed results. The value of κ for 
the size-sorted portfolios shows no change at all, while the κ-ratio for the book-to-market 
sorted industry portfolios gives a clear increase. The ratio is still below 1, which means 
that on average the local industry 3FM is better in terms of mean absolute pricing error 
than the euro area version of the model, but the difference is almost negligible. When we 
compare the country 3FM with its euro area counterpart, however, a clear difference 
between the first and second sub sample can be found. Where the euro area 3FM clearly 
performs worse in the first part of the sample (with κ-values of 63% for the book-to-
market portfolios and 58% for the size-sorted portfolios), the performance of the two 
models is almost similar in the second part of the sample (the values of κ increased to 94% 
and 93% respectively). This result could likely be a consequence of the increased rate of 
integration in the EMU and it might indicate that asset pricing in the euro area has been 
changing.  
A more detailed view on the performance measures for the four bigger countries 
shows that the conclusion is fairly robust. All four countries considered show an increase 
both for the book-to-market and the size-sorted portfolios, except for Germany in case 
book-to-market portfolios are studied (the κ-ratio decreased from 87% to 79% in that 
case). The overall result is robust. The number of portfolios used in the regressions (3 or 6 
instead of 10) does not influence the outcome of our conclusions. Furthermore, one can 
argue that the euro area factors are still based on all countries, while factors based on the 
biggest four countries might show a different behavior. Unreported results show that the 
conclusions are similar when the “global” factors are based on the big countries only.35 
                                                          
34 A country or industry is considered big as soon as the number of assets in this group is higher than 50 for the 
complete sample. This means that only four countries are considered big in this sample: France, Germany, Italy 
and the Netherlands. There are six industries that meet this criterion: Basic Industries, General Industries, 
Cyclical Consumer Goods, Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods, Cyclical Services and Financials. 
35 These results are available upon request. 
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Concluding we can state the (local) country model is losing field against the 
European three-factor, although its performance is still slightly better. The industry asset-
pricing model, however, outperforms the European version in both sub samples. A 
tentative conclusion would therefore be that industry factors are nowadays more important 
Figure 3.2 
The values for κ averaged over all bigger countries (4) or industries (6) 
This figure shows the values for κ (as defined in equation 3.8) for all tested portfolios. κ is the ratio 
of average absolute alpha of the country or the industry 3FM over the corresponding value of the 
euro area 3FM. 
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The first two couples of bars indicate the κcountry,euro-area for the book-to-market sorted portfolios and 
the size-sorted portfolios based on the bigger countries only (France, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands). The third and fourth pair depict κcountry,euro-area for these portfolios base on the bigger 
industries (Basic Industries, General Industries, Cyclical Consumer Goods, Non-Cyclical Consumer 
Goods, Cyclical Services and Financials). The left bar of each pair represents the κ-indicator in the 
first sub sample and the right bar for the second sub sample. We used the pricing errors of 10-sorts in 
each case, but using a 3-sort or 6-sort gives similar conclusions. The ratios can easily be calculated 
using the numbers from the Tables 3.8 and 3.9 for the countries and industries respectively using the 
values based on the bigger groups only. For example, the most left bar uses the performance 
measures from Table 3.8, panel A, of the ten book-to-market portfolios based on the biggest 
countries (6th row containing numbers): κ = 0.244/0.388 = 0.63. 
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in terms of asset pricing than country factors concerning assets from the euro area. 
Though, we should bear in mind that the European models are not fully comparable given 
our choice of the methodology. In order to test this conclusion more research attention 
should be paid to the industry three-factor model. 
3.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter we examine different asset-pricing models applied to stocks in the euro 
area. All models are an interpretation of the Fama and French three-factor model, which 
contains a market factor, a small-minus-big factor and a high-minus-low factor (see 
equation 3.1)). Although Fama and French (1998) provide evidence for the international 
version of the model (i.e. when the factors are global), many practitioners and academics 
use a domestic version of this asset-pricing model. Moreover, Griffin (2002) shows that 
the domestic three-factor model clearly outperforms the global model for the US, Canada, 
Japan and the UK. In this chapter we study different domestic versions of the Fama and 
French three-factor model for the euro area. Motivated by the number of regulatory 
changes in the European Monetary Union, our sample period runs from 1991-2002. This 
period not only covers the introduction of the common currency, but also numerous 
harmonizing impulses in order to facilitate real and financial integration in the European 
Union.  
The first part of this chapter centers on the euro area 3FM versus a country 
version for eleven euro-participating countries using both book-to-market and size-sorted 
portfolios. We show that the euro area 3FM clearly underperforms the country 3FM, as 
measured by both the mean absolute pricing error and the R2. The international version of 
the model (which splits all factors into a domestic and a foreign part) has a similar 
performance as the country model. In other words, the three foreign factors hardly explain 
and sometimes even jeopardize the performance of the asset-pricing model.  
We also test different asset pricing models for industry portfolios. In general, 
industry portfolios are very hard to price, as reported by Fama and French (1997) and Van 
Vliet and Post (2004). The models tested include again the euro area 3FM and a local 
industry asset-pricing model. The latter one contains three Fama-French factors that are 
fully based on stocks of one industry only. We examine the performance of these versions 
of the 3FM with BE/ME-sorted and size-sorted industry portfolios. The results indicate, 
similar to the comparison of the country 3FM with the euro area 3FM, that the industry 
3FM (the “local” version of the model) outperforms the euro area 3FM. Although this 
finding is very surprising, it might suggest that an industry three-factor model can more 
easily explain industry portfolio returns. However, more specific research on industry 
portfolios is needed in order to understand industry portfolio dynamics. 
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We executed the same analyses for two equal sub periods. This is a robustness 
check on the validity of our conclusions. However, one can interpret the outcomes of the 
analyses as a measure for the European equity market integration. It is well known that the 
number of regulatory changes has been huge during the ongoing integration process in the 
European Union. Next to the harmonization of monetary and policy changes, the relaxation 
of investment restrictions for European institutional investors has had an enormous impact 
on the integration process. As a result, the relative performance of the euro area 3FM 
might increase compared to the local country 3FM. We document this increase in the 
relative performance for all major euro-participating countries (Germany, France, Italy and 
the Netherlands). In the first part of the sample the mean absolute pricing error of the local 
(country) 3FM is on average 40% lower than the euro area factor model, whereas this 
difference decreased to less than 10% for the second sub period (see Figure 3.2). This 
finding suggests that asset pricing in the European Monetary Union is changing as well. 
For the industry portfolios we find mixed evidence with respect to the relative performance 
of the different asset pricing models for the book-to-market and size-sorted portfolios. We 
do find, however, that the industry 3FM outperforms the euro area 3FM for all tested 
portfolios and periods. We realize that this is – to our knowledge- the first study applying 
the Fama-French methodology using industry based factors. Therefore, more research 
should be dedicated to the industry 3FM. 
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3.A Appendix 
The methodology section explains the construction of all different three-factor models that 
are tested in this chapter. It is stated that the two European versions of the asset-pricing 
model are not comparable, which is explained in this appendix. The factors are defined as 
the weighted averages of the local country or local industry factors. For the market factor 
this does not constitute a difference. The European market factor is exactly the same, 
regardless whether it is constructed using the different country factors or the different 
industry factors: 
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    (3.9) 
where Xitw 1−  is the weight of asset i at time t-1 measured by the market value of asset i 
relative to the total market value of country/industry X (which can be the domestic market 
D, the foreign market F, the European market EUR, the industry I or the other industries 
denoted by O) and SX is the number of assets in country/industry X and N is the total 
number of assets. 
The same does not hold for the SMB and HML portfolios. These portfolios are 
constructed as simple averages of smaller portfolios (SH, SM, SL and so on) and therefore 
the stocks will not have the same weights in case the portfolios are constructed using 
country or industry factor portfolios. Intuitively, this is also clear: the large stocks in a 
small country might not be a large stock in European context. However, we choose to 
follow the methodology of Griffin (2002) in order to be able to compare our results with 
the literature.  
Another possibility is to construct the ESMB and EHML independently from the 
country and industry information. In that case the model would be a true European Fama 
and French three-factor model, but it would not be a nested model of the international 
country or international industry model anymore. This is a second reason to stick to the 
methodology of Griffin (2002). We also calculated the results using this other European 
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model, but the results are not very different from the currently used model. In most cases 
the performance measures are approximately equal to each other. 
  
Chapter 4  
 
The World Price of Inflation Risk 
4.1 Introduction 
In a world in which neither investment nor consumption opportunity sets differ across 
countries, all risk-averse investors should hold their wealth in the risk-free asset and a 
single portfolio of risky assets that is common to all investors. This portfolio must be the 
market portfolio of risky assets. Grauer, Litzenberger, and Stehle (1976) develop an 
International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) in which the global market portfolio is 
the only priced risk factor. When purchasing power parity (PPP) does not hold, investors in 
different countries have different consumption opportunity sets.36 This implies that there is 
heterogeneity in their evaluation of the (real) returns from the same security. In that case, 
expected excess returns on risky factors are a linear function of their covariance with the 
global market portfolio as well as their covariance with nominal exchange rate risk factors. 
                                                          
36 Deviations from PPP occur either because of differences in preferences across countries or due to deviations 
from the law of one price. We refer to Adler and Dumas (1983) for an exposition of this point. 
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International asset pricing models in the presence of deviations from PPP are developed by 
e.g. Solnik (1974), Sercu (1980), Stulz (1981), and Adler and Dumas (1983).37 
While several panel studies of PPP (e.g. Taylor and Sarno (1998) and Wu and Wu 
(2001)) present evidence of mean reversion in real exchange rates in the long run, 
numerous empirical papers show that substantial deviations from PPP occur at short 
horizons.38 This implies that asset prices may well be affected by both global market and 
currency risk factors. Dumas and Solnik (1995) report evidence in favor of foreign 
exchange risk premia in the conditional multifactor ICAPM framework of Solnik (1974) 
and Sercu (1980). They examine the stock market indices of Germany, Japan, the U.K., 
and the U.S. over the period 1970-1991. De Santis and Gérard (1998) employ a more 
comprehensive econometric methodology to test the ICAPM for the same four countries 
over the period 1973-1994. Their analysis supports a conditional ICAPM that includes 
both global market risk and three currency risk factors related to the German mark, the 
Japanese yen, and the British pound. In an unconditional analysis, Vassalou (2000) finds 
that exchange rate factors can explain part of the cross-sectional variation of the returns of 
individual securities within 10 industrialized countries over the period 1973-1990. 
This chapter is focused on two potentially important restrictions in the ICAPM 
literature: (i) inflation rates are assumed to be constant in the theoretical model of Solnik 
(1974) and Sercu (1980) as well as in the empirical tests by Dumas and Solnik (1995) and 
De Santis and Gérard (1998) and (ii) in the model of Adler and Dumas (1983) the prices of 
inflation and nominal exchange rate risk are assumed to be equal. Relaxing these 
restrictions leads to a model in which asset returns depend on their sensitivity to both 
inflation risk and nominal exchange rate risk. There are three reasons why we think this is 
important. First, while inflation rates are known to be substantially less volatile than 
nominal exchange rates, to our knowledge no study exists that explicitly tests this 
restriction in the Solnik-Sercu model. Our study provides empirical evidence against the 
assumption that domestic inflation is non-stochastic. Second, outside the international asset 
pricing literature, many studies regard inflation risk as an important source of systematic 
risk. Recent theoretical term structure models by e.g. Buraschi and Jiltsov (2003) and Ang 
and Bekaert (2004) explicitly take account of priced inflation risk. Evans (1998) strongly 
supports the presence of time-varying inflation risk premia in U.K. index-linked bonds. 
While this does not imply that investors should hold hedge portfolios that provide a hedge 
against fluctuations in inflation differentials, disregarding inflation risk could have an 
important impact in the framework of an ICAPM. However, we are not aware of any 
international asset-pricing model that incorporates this potentially important risk factor. 
                                                          
37 See Dumas (1994) and Stulz (1995) for an overview of international asset pricing. 
38 Examples are Froot and Rogoff (1995), Chinn (2002), and Lopez and Papell (2003). 
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Third, an ICAPM without inflation risk factors neglects the possibility that real exchange 
rate risk is priced when nominal exchange rate fluctuations are absent. This may be 
relevant in the context of European currency risk. Nominal exchange rate fluctuations 
within the European Monetary Union (EMU) ceased to exist at the introduction of the euro 
in 1999. This does not necessarily imply, however, that European inflation risk is not 
priced in asset returns.39 
We estimate and test the conditional version of our model including priced risk 
factors related to the global market portfolio, nominal exchange rates, and inflation 
differentials. We study the equity markets of France, Germany, Japan, the U.K., and the 
U.S. over the period 1975:01-1998:12. Following De Santis and Gérard (1998), we employ 
a parsimonious multivariate GARCH process to test the pricing implications of the model. 
Our findings strongly support a model that includes inflation risk in addition to global 
market and nominal exchange rate risk. We confirm the result of De Santis and Gérard 
(1998) and De Santis, Gérard, and Hillion (2003) that the (time-varying) prices of nominal 
exchange rate risk are significantly different from zero. In addition, we also find strong 
evidence in favor of priced inflation risk for all countries in the sample. The hypothesis 
that the world prices of inflation risk are constant over time and the hypothesis that they 
are equal to zero are rejected at any conventional statistical significance level. We show 
that inflation risk is not only statistically significant, but also has an economically 
important contribution to expected returns on international securities. Inflation risk premia 
in asset returns are generally of the same order of magnitude as nominal exchange rate risk 
premia. Our results can be interpreted as evidence against the restrictions imposed by the 
ICAPM 
An interesting and relevant application of our model concerns the post-euro 
period. While nominal exchange rate fluctuations have terminated within the euro area in 
1999, differences in inflation may entail nontrivial real exchange rate risk. Recent work by 
Koedijk, Tims, and van Dijk (2004) presents evidence against the hypothesis of PPP for 
individual country pairs within the euro area. In a conditional test of the model including 
inflation risk over the period 1975-2003, we find that the time-varying price of inflation 
risk related to the German-French inflation differential is significant over the post-euro 
period. This evidence suggests that even for economically closely integrated countries 
                                                          
39 Several empirical studies indicate that substantial real exchange rate changes (i.e. inflation differentials) occur 
within a single currency zone. Parsley and Wei (1996) report half-lifes of price discrepancies for 51 goods and 
services in 48 U.S. cities amounting to 1 to 4 years. Cecchetti, Mark, and Sonora (2002) consider consumer price 
indices for 19 U.S. cities over the period 1918-1995. They estimate the half-life of PPP deviations to be 
approximately 9 years. Differences in inflation rates measured over ten-year intervals can differ by as much as 1.6 
percent per annum. Rogers (2001) constructs price indices for 26 European cities over the period 1990-1999 and 
concludes that “… deviations from the law of one price are large,” although price dispersion across cities has 
been reduced over the past decade. Lutz (2002) analyzes four different data sets of final goods prices in European 
countries and finds limited evidence that price dispersion has decreased in the past decade. 
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investors demand a risk premium for their exposure to inflation risk. These results may 
have important implications in the context of portfolio management and capital budgeting 
decisions. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2 we review the literature on 
international asset pricing models and we discuss the ICAPM employed in our asset 
pricing tests. Section 4.3 provides a description of the methodology. Section 4.4 discusses 
the data and presents summary statistics. In section 4.5 we present the results of our 
empirical analysis of the modified ICAPM, while section 4.6 applies the framework of the 
ICAPM including inflation risk to the post-euro area. Section 4.7 concludes. 
4.2 The model 
Our study starts out with the ICAPM of Adler and Dumas (1983). The model can be 
constructed as follows. Consider a world economy with L + 1 countries (currencies), 
numbered l = 0, 1, …, L, with currency 0 as the measurement or numeraire currency.40 
Apart from the measurement currency deposit, there are M = N + L + 1 securities, 
comprising of N equities or portfolios of equities, L non-measurement currency deposits, 
and the world portfolio of equities which is the Mth and last security. All returns are 
measured in the numeraire currency and in excess of the risk-free rate, which corresponds 
to the short-term deposit rate in the numeraire currency. The pricing restrictions on asset i 
imposed by the conditional version of the ICAPM of Adler and Dumas (1983) can be 
expressed as follows: 
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40 As is pointed out by e.g. Adler and Dumas (1983, footnote 3) and Stulz (1995, p. 219), the ICAPM is not 
specifically international in the sense that consumption opportunity sets can also differ within a country. 
“International” asset pricing models may therefore also apply to a single currency zone such as the U.S. Stulz 
(1995) contends that governments affect savings and lending decisions of investors by (i) defining the rights and 
obligations of the holders of financial assets issued within a country, (ii) defining the rights and obligations of the 
residents of a country (for instance in relation to taxation and the trading of assets), and (iii) defining legal tender 
within a country. This distinguishes “international” finance from “domestic” finance. 
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In equation (4.1) rit denotes the nominal return on security or portfolio i from time t − 1 to t 
in excess of the risk-free rate, Ωt-1 is the information set that investors use in choosing their 
portfolios, rmt is the nominal return on the world market portfolio in excess of the risk-free 
rate, and πl0t is the domestic inflation rate of country l measured in the numeraire currency. 
These domestic inflation rates can be decomposed as πl0t = slt + πlt, where slt denotes the 
nominal exchange rate change of currency l in terms of currency 0 and πlt is the domestic 
inflation rate of country l measured in currency l from time t − 1 to t. Furthermore, θl is the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion for investors from country l, θt-1 is an average of the 
risk aversion coefficients of all countries, weighted by its relative wealth at time t − 1 as 
represented by Wl,t-1/Wt-1. Dumas and Solnik (1995) refer to the time-varying coefficient 
δm,t-1 in equation (4.1) as the “world price of market risk.”41 They call the time-varying 
coefficients δl,t-1 the “world prices of exchange rate risk.” 
The ICAPM of Solnik (1974) and Sercu (1980) is a special case of equation (4.1). 
In the Solnik-Sercu model, the domestic inflation rates expressed in local currency πlt (l = 
0, 1, …, L) are assumed to be non-stochastic. Therefore, the L + 1 covariance terms in 
equation (4.1) collapse into L covariance terms with the nominal exchange rates. The only 
two empirical studies we are aware of that empirically test the ICAPM, i.e. Dumas and 
Solnik (1995) and De Santis and Gérard (1998), also adopt the restriction that inflation 
rates are constant over time. No research has been done on the validity of this restriction. 
When we relax the assumption that inflation rates are non-stochastic and only assume that 
the domestic inflation rate in the numeraire country (expressed in the numeraire currency) 
is constant, we obtain an intuitively appealing representation of the ICAPM:42 
MiqrrrrE
L
l
tltittltmtittmtit ...,,1]|,cov[]|,cov[]|[
1
11,11,1 =Ω+Ω=Ω ∑
=
−−−−− δδ  (4.2) 
where qlt ≡ πl0t − π0t = slt + πlt − π0t is the real exchange rate change of currency l in terms 
of currency 0. Hence, this version of the ICAPM incorporates the world price of market 
risk and L “world prices of real exchange rate risk.” This specification is consistent with 
investors maximizing their wealth in real terms and thus holding portfolios that provide a 
hedge against real (not nominal) exchange rate changes. The model in equation (4.2) is less 
restrictive than the Solnik-Sercu version of the ICAPM and allows for the possibility of 
priced real exchange rate risk when nominal exchange rates are fixed. Section 4.5 of this 
chapter provides an empirical test of the conditional version of this model.  
                                                          
41 Other authors, e.g. Harvey (1991), use the term “the world price of covariance risk” for δm,t-1. 
42 Note that the number of risk premia in this model is reduced to L, as the domestic inflation rate in the numeraire 
country is assumed to be non-stochastic. Without loss of generality, we can subtract this inflation rate from the 
domestic inflation rates of the other L countries expressed in the numeraire currency. 
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The covariance between rit and qlt could possibly reflect two separate sources of 
risk: nominal exchange rate risk and inflation risk. An interesting and germane issue is the 
relative importance of these risk factors. A related question is whether they reinforce each 
other or partially cancel each other out. The distinction between these two separate sources 
of risk may become especially relevant when we study inflation risk in the euro area. 
Within the euro area, real exchange rate risk contains both the nominal exchange rate and 
inflation risk components before the introduction of the euro in 1999 and only the inflation 
risk component after 1999. If inflation risk is priced in international asset returns, this is 
also likely to constitute a relevant priced risk factor in the post-euro era. Therefore, we 
extend the model specified in equation (4.2) by allowing the prices of nominal exchange 
rate risk and inflation risk to differ: 
Mir
srrrrE
L
l
ttltittl
L
l
tltittltmtittmtit
...,,1]|)(,cov[
]|,cov[]|,cov[]|[
1
101,
1
11,11,1
=Ω−+
Ω+Ω=Ω
∑
∑
=
−−
=
−−−−−
ππγ
ϕδ
 (4.3) 
We refer to the time-varying coefficients as the world prices of nominal exchange rate risk 
and to as the “world prices of inflation risk.” Estimates and tests of this model are 
presented in section 4.5. A rejection of the hypothesis that ϕl,t-1 and γl,t-1 are equal can be 
interpreted as evidence against the ICAPM. 
4.3 Empirical methodology 
We want to estimate the conditional version of models (2) and (3). We employ the 
parsimonious multivariate generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic 
(GARCH) approach of De Santis and Gérard (1997, 1998).43 Our starting point is the 
conditional ICAPM with real exchange rate risk factors as depicted in equation (4.2). This 
equation states the moment conditions for the excess returns of the assets under 
consideration. Adding a disturbance term orthogonal to the information available at the end 
of time t − 1 yields the econometric representation of the model that can be used to 
estimate the risk premia: 
∑
=
−+−− Ω++=
L
l
tttttlntltmtmt HNhhr
1
1,1,,1, ),0(~|εεδδ    (4.4) 
                                                          
43 This methodology has been widely adopted in the literature, see e.g. Carrieri (2001), Carrieri, Errunza, and 
Majerbi (2003), and De Santis, Gérard, and Hillion (2003). 
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where Ht is the (M × M) covariance matrix of the excess returns at time t and hi,t is the ith 
column of the covariance matrix Ht. The world prices of market and real exchange rate risk 
are time-varying and are function of a number of instrumental variables Zt-1 that represent 
the information set Ωt-1. 
If all investors are risk averse, the world price of market risk is positive (see 
equation (4.1)). Following De Santis and Gérard (1997), we force the price of market risk 
to satisfy this restriction by modeling the risk premium as an exponential function of the 
information variables. The real exchange rate risk premia are not restricted to be positive 
and hence the prices of real exchange rate risk are modeled as a linear function of the 
information variables: 
)'exp( 11, −− ⋅= tmtm Zκδ        (4.5) 
LlZtltl ,...,1' 11, =⋅= −− κδ       (4.6) 
The data section covers in detail which instrumental variables are used. 
An important and well-documented characteristic of security returns is the 
heteroskedasticity in their volatilities. This feature has to be taken into account when 
estimating the world prices of risk. Therefore, we follow the approach of De Santis and 
Gérard (1997, 1998) by imposing a diagonal GARCH process on the conditional second 
moments of the assets. In other words, Ht depends only on past squared residuals and an 
autoregressive component, while the covariances depend on past cross products of 
residuals and an autoregressive component. Furthermore, we assume that the process is 
covariance stationary. The process for Ht can then be written as follows: 
1110 ''')'''( −−− ∗+∗+−−∗= tttt HbbaabbaaHH εειι     (4.7) 
where H0 is the unconditional variance-covariance matrix of the residuals, ι is a (M × 1) 
vector of ones, a and b are (M × 1) vectors containing the unknown parameters and * 
denotes the Hadamard product (element by element matrix multiplication). H0 is not 
directly observable, but can be consistently estimated using the iterative procedure 
developed by De Santis and Gérard (1997). In the first iteration of this estimation 
procedure, H0 is set equal to the sample covariance matrix of the returns. In subsequent 
steps, H0 is updated using the estimated residuals at the end of the previous iteration. For a 
detailed discussion of the properties of the GARCH parameterization we refer to De Santis 
and Gérard (1997). 
Under the assumption that the errors are conditionally normally distributed, we 
can express the log-likelihood function as follows: 
∑∑
=
−
=
ΨΨΨ−Ψ−−=Ψ
T
t
ttt
T
t
t HH
TML
1
1
1
)()()'(
2
1|)(|ln
2
12ln
2
)(ln εεπ   (4.8) 
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where Ψ is the vector of all unknown parameters. We use quasi-maximum likelihood 
(QML) standard errors obtained with the estimation methodology proposed by Bollerslev 
and Wooldridge (1992), because the restriction of conditional normality is often violated. 
The model parameterization described above is also employed for the model that 
incorporates nominal exchange rate and inflation risk factors separately (equation (4.3)). 
The econometric specification of this model can be expressed by: 
∑ ∑
=
−
=
++−+−− Ω+++=
L
l
tttt
L
l
tlLntltlntltmtmt HNhhhr
1
1
1
,1,,1,,1, ),0(~|ηηγϕδ  (4.9) 
where the process for Ht is given in equation (4.7) and the risk premia are modeled as a 
function of the instrumental variables Zt-1 in the following way:  
 )'exp( 11, −− ⋅= tmtm Zκδ        (4.10) 
 LlZtltl ,...,1' 11, =⋅= −− λϕ       (4.11) 
 LlZtltl ,...,1' 11, =⋅= −− µγ       (4.12) 
4.4 Data 
We use monthly returns on stock indices for the G5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the 
U.K., and the U.S.) in addition to a value-weighted world index over the period 1975:01-
1998:12. For our analysis of the post-euro period we also consider data over the period 
1999:01-2003:12. All stock index data are obtained from Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) and include dividends. We collect nominal end-of-period exchange 
rates against the U.S. dollar from International Financial Statistics (IFS). Returns on both 
equity indices and exchange rates are discrete and expressed in terms of the German mark. 
We use consumer price index (CPI) data from IFS to compute real exchange rate returns 
and inflation rates. For the conditionally risk-free asset we take the return on the one-
month euro-mark deposit quoted in London (extracted from Datastream). Monthly excess 
returns are computed by subtracting the risk-free rate from the monthly return on each 
security. 
The choice of instrumental variables is potentially very important in conditional 
tests of asset pricing models. However, the model does not provide any guidance as to the 
choice of the information variables and the number of instrumental variables is limited by 
the econometric methodology. Our selection of instruments builds on previous empirical 
research (notably Harvey (1991), Ferson and Harvey (1993), Dumas and Solnik (1995) and 
De Santis and Gérard (1997, 1998)). We include the dividend yield on the world equity 
index (in excess of the risk-free rate), the U.S. default premium measured by the yield 
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differential between Moody’s Baa and Aaa rated bonds, and the change in the U.S. term 
premium calculated as the difference between the yield on the ten-year U.S. Treasury note 
and the Federal Funds Rate.44 The dividend yield is obtained from Datastream and the 
bond yields are taken from the website of the Federal Reserve System.45 
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics over the period 1975:01-1998:12. Panel A, 
B, and C depict information on the summary statistics for the equity indices and the real 
exchange rates, the instrumental variables, and the nominal exchange rates and inflation 
differentials, respectively. The stock indices earn monthly excess returns ranging from 59 
basis points for Japan to 117 basis points for the U.K. The skewness and especially the 
kurtosis generally show large deviations from the values of the normal distribution. The 
distribution of the excess returns on the U.K. stock index in particular exhibit very fat tails, 
which is primarily due to several extreme returns in 1975 (also documented by De Santis 
and Gérard (1998)). The Jarque-Bera test strongly rejects the assumption of normally 
distributed returns for all series. Real exchange rate returns are fairly close to zero over the 
sample period, except for the Japanese yen, which showed a substantial appreciation 
against the German mark in real terms. The standard deviation of all real exchange rates in 
the sample is substantial. As is noted by a number of previous studies (e.g. Rogoff (1996)), 
inflation differentials are considerably less volatile than nominal exchange rates. Panel D 
of Table 4.1 contains the unconditional correlations between stock index returns and real 
exchange rate returns. Correlations between equity returns are all positive and range from 
0.283 to 0.550. Correlations between real exchange rates are all positive and smaller than 
0.5. Stock index returns and real exchange rates are generally negatively correlated and 
assume values of up to –0.609. Unconditional correlations between equity returns and 
nominal exchange rate returns are negative and generally substantial, as indicated by Panel 
E. Equity returns do not strongly correlate with inflation differentials. Correlations are 
generally very close to zero, except for the inflation differential between Germany and the 
U.S. Finally, correlations between nominal exchange rate returns and inflation differentials 
are remarkably low, amounting to less than 0.1 with only one exception. 
                                                          
44 In line with De Santis and Gérard (1998), we also estimated our model with the change in yield on the one-
month euro-dollar deposit as an additional instrumental variable. Our optimization procedure becomes 
considerably less efficient due to the addition of this variable and hence we decided to omit it. However, the 
inclusion of this instrument in the information set does not materially affect our estimation results and does not 
statistically improve our specification. Unreported evidence on this issue is available from the authors. 
45 Federal Reserve System, homepage, http://www.fed.gov/ (accessed April 27, 2004). 
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4.5 Empirical results 
This section presents estimates and tests of two different models. First, we estimate the 
model presented by equation (4.2). In this version of the ICAPM, the assumption that 
domestic inflation rates expressed in local currency are non-stochastic is relaxed, and asset 
returns depend on their covariance with the global market portfolio and real exchange rate 
risk factors. Second, we provide estimates and statistical tests of the model in equation 
(4.3). This model posits that asset returns depend on global market risk, nominal exchange 
rate risk, as well as inflation risk. Both model specifications are considered in their 
conditional version, implying that covariances are allowed to vary over time.  
Our empirical analysis uses five country stock indices (Germany, France, Japan, 
the U.K., and the U.S.), four real exchange rate indices, and the world market index. All 
returns are measured in German marks and hence we consider the real exchange rate risk 
of all four remaining countries in the sample versus the German mark. Nominal exchange 
rates are also measured versus the German mark, while the inflation rate differentials are 
defined as the difference between the inflation rate of the four remaining countries (France, 
Japan, the U.K., and the U.S.) and the German inflation rate. As abundant evidence in the 
academic asset pricing literature demonstrates that prices of risk exhibit time-varying 
behavior, we let the world prices of risk vary over time by conditioning on a number of 
variables that proxy for the state of the economy. For model (2), the functional forms for 
the relation between the prices of risk (market and real exchange rate risk) and the 
instrumental variables Zt-1 are given by equations (4.5) and (4.6). For our implementation 
of model (4.3), the corresponding functional firms are reflected in equations (4.10), (4.11), 
and (4.12) for market, nominal exchange rate, and inflation risk respectively. Testing the 
hypothesis of time-variation of the prices of risk is straightforward within our framework. 
Table 4.2 presents the estimation results for the ICAPM with real exchange rate 
risk, as denoted by equation (4.4). We examine the period 1975:01-1998:12, as the 
adoption of the euro in January 1999 instigated a structural break in the (real) exchange 
rates (primarily between Germany and France). Section 4.6 addresses this issue in more 
detail. Panel A of Table 4.2 shows the point estimates and the standard errors of the mean 
equation parameters and Panel B depicts the estimates of the (conditional) covariance 
equation parameters. Several of these parameters (all of the covariance process) are 
significant in isolation. More interesting, however, are the specification tests that assess the 
significance of a number of parameters simultaneously. For each of the five world prices of 
risk, we performed a likelihood-ratio test in order to investigate (i) whether the prices of 
risk are constant or time varying and (ii) whether the prices of risk are significantly 
different from zero. Concerning the world prices of real exchange rate risk, we apply the 
tests to all prices of risk simultaneously as well as separately for each real exchange rate in 
the sample. The results of the specification tests are reflected in Panel C of Table 4.2.
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The first two tests in Panel C focus on the world price of market risk. This price 
of risk is significantly different from zero, while we reject the hypothesis that the world 
price of market risk is constant at the 10% significance level. This is in line with the results 
of Dumas and Solnik (1995) and De Santis and Gerard (1998). All other specification tests 
in Panel C assess the prices of real exchange rate risk. The tests show that these prices of 
risk are jointly time varying (p-value of 0.016) and reject the hypothesis of no real 
exchange rate risk at the 95 percent confidence level (p-value of 0.041). A more detailed 
perspective on the importance of real exchange rate risk is given by the specification tests 
for each real exchange rate separately. The evidence indicates that only the real exchange 
rate of Japan and the U.K. have a significant impact on the pricing of the assets under 
consideration. The prices of the real exchange rates of the French franc and the U.S. dollar 
versus the German mark are insignificant. The null-hypothesis that the prices of real 
exchange rate risk are constant is strongly rejected for Japan and the U.K., but not for the 
other countries. 
Previous empirical tests of the ICAPM assume that the inflation rate is non-
stochastic and hence only incorporate nominal exchange rate risk. The world prices of 
nominal exchange rate risk are typically highly significant in these studies. Table 4.2 
shows, however, that the prices of exchange rate risk related to France and, more 
surprisingly, the U.S. are not significantly different from zero. In our empirical study, these 
prices of risk are associated with real exchange rate risk and hence consist of two 
components: nominal exchange rate risk and inflation risk. A relevant issue is whether 
these components of the price of currency risk partially offset each other, notably for 
France and the U.S.  
In order to establish the sign and relative magnitude of inflation risk and nominal 
exchange rate risk premia, we extend our analysis to include both sources of risk 
separately. The total number of excess returns included in the analysis is then equal to M' = 
N + L + L + 1 assets, consisting of N local stock market indices, L nominal exchange rate 
factors, L inflation rate factors, and the world market index. All prices of risk factors are 
assumed to be time-varying and depend on the instruments Zt. The empirical specification 
of the model is given by equations (4.9) to (4.12). Table 4.3 presents the results of the 
analysis. The estimates of the mean equation are depicted in Panel A. Comparing the 
nominal exchange rate risk parameter estimates with the inflation rate risk parameters, we 
observe a number of differences. First, the parameters corresponding to the inflation rate 
risk are generally higher in absolute terms than the value of the corresponding nominal 
exchange rate risk parameters. Second, the prices of nominal exchange rate and inflation 
risk often exhibit opposite sensitivities to the instruments. Only the coefficients on the 
world dividend yield have the same sign for all nominal exchange rate – inflation rate 
combinations (negative for France and Japan and positive for the U.K. and the U.S.). The 
estimates of the variance equation are presented in Panel B of Table 4.3. The parameter 
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estimates of a are consistently higher for the nominal exchange rates than for the inflation 
risk factors. It is also clear that the standard errors for the inflation risk factors are lower 
than the standard errors for the nominal exchange rate risk factors. Finally, inflation risk 
factors show a higher persistence denoted by an estimate for b that is very close to 1.  
Panel C of Table 4.3 displays the results of a number of specification tests that 
assess the significance and time-variation of the prices of risk. In line with the results in 
Table 4.2, we strongly reject the hypotheses that the price of market risk is constant over 
time and equal to zero. The prices of nominal exchange are also highly significantly 
different from zero, both jointly and for each individual nominal exchange rate in the 
sample. In contrast to our findings in Table 4.2, French and U.S. currency risk thus also 
carry a significant price of risk in this model. This is consistent with previous empirical 
research detecting priced nominal exchange rate risk factors. The most striking results in 
Table 4.3, however, concern inflation risk. For all inflation risk factors (jointly and 
separately), the hypothesis that their prices of risk are equal to zero is rejected at any 
conventional significance level. This indicates that, despite the fact that the variance of the 
inflation differentials is substantially lower than the variance of the nominal exchange 
rates, inflation risk constitutes a significant priced risk factor in international equity 
returns. Finally, we find strong evidence against a specification of the model in which the 
prices of nominal exchange rate and inflation risk are constant. 
While both the prices of nominal exchange rate risk and the prices of inflation 
risk in our model are significant in statistical terms, the contribution of either or both 
sources of risk to asset returns could be small in economic terms. Figure 4.1 presents plots 
of the nine different prices of risk in our model over the period 1975-1998. The graphs also 
contain a line representing the average price of risk over the sample period as well as the 
Hodrick-Prescott filtered prices. The latter can be used to obtain an insight in the general 
trend over time, as the point estimates are subject to estimation error. (Note that the scaling 
differs for the graphs of the prices of market, nominal exchange rate, and inflation risk.) 
All prices of risk exhibit substantial variation over time. The graph of the world price of 
market risk is very similar to the plot depicted in Figure 1 of De Santis and Gérard (1998), 
with peaks in the mid 1970s, in the year 1980, and around 1983. The average price of 
market risk in our model is 0.075, which is substantially higher than the estimate of De 
Santis and Gérard. A plausible explanation for this is that the world market portfolio in the 
ICAPM without inflation risk factors partially absorbs the prices of inflation risk, which 
are generally negative in our sample. The graphs of the prices of nominal exchange rate 
risk resemble the general patterns observed by De Santis and Gérard (1998). All exchange 
rate risk prices seem to matter for international asset pricing. The sample means are equal 
to 0.154 for France, –0.021 for Japan, 0.066 for the U.K., and 0.0087 for the U.S. While 
the mean values are relatively close to zero, all four prices of risk attain considerable 
higher values in some periods and all assume both positive and negative values over the 
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Figure 4.1 
The prices of market, nominal exchange rate, and inflation risk 
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Figure 4.1 - continued  
The prices of market, nominal exchange rate, and inflation risk 
The Price of Nominal Exchange Rate Risk U.K.
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
Pr
ic
e 
of
 ri
sk
Estimated HP-Filtered Average  
The Price of Nominal Exchange Rate Risk U.S.
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
Pr
ic
e 
of
 ri
sk
Estimated HP-Filtered Average  
The Price of Inflation Risk France
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
Pr
ic
e 
of
 ri
sk
Estimated HP-Filtered Average  
90   Chapter 4 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 - continued  
The prices of market, nominal exchange rate, and inflation risk 
The Price of Inflation Risk Japan
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sample period (although the price of nominal exchange rate risk related to the French franc 
is virtually always positive). The prices of inflation risk are strikingly large. Averages over 
the sample period amount to –0.752 for France, 0.842 for Japan, -0.687 for the U.K., and –
0.725 for the U.S. However, these large prices of risk are to a large extent counterbalanced 
by very small covariances between asset returns and inflation risk factors. As a 
comparison, the unconditional covariance between German equity returns and the U.S. 
inflation risk factor is equal to 0.145, while the covariance between German equity returns 
and the world market returns is 12.743. Nevertheless, despite the limited (co)variance of 
inflation differentials, the high prices of risk are likely to produce substantial inflation risk 
premia in asset returns. 
In order to assess the importance of inflation and nominal exchange rate risk 
premia relative to each other and relative to the global market factor, we decompose the 
expected asset returns in our sample into the risk premia related to the various sources of 
risk. The (time-varying) premium for market risk for asset i can be computed as the 
product of the price of market risk δm,t-1 and the conditional covariance cov[ rit , rmt | Ωt-1 ]. 
Similarly, the l nominal exchange rate risk premia for asset i can be estimated with ϕl,t-1 × 
cov[ rit , slt | Ωt-1 ] and the term γl,t-1 × cov[ rit , πlt − π0t | Ωt-1 ] constitutes an estimate of the 
inflation risk premia for asset i. Figure 4.2 depicts the development of the risk premia for 
German equity over time. The top panel gives an overview of the aggregate contributions 
of market, nominal exchange rate, and inflation risk to expected Germany equity returns. 
The middle and bottom panel depict individual nominal exchange rate and inflation risk 
premia related to France, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. (Note that the scaling of the middle 
and bottom panels is different from the top panel.) A number of important observations 
emerge. Global market risk is the dominant component of the total risk premium on 
Germany equity, amounting to around 90 basis points per month on average over the 
period 1975-1998. This risk premium is strongly time varying as both the price of market 
risk and the conditional covariance between German equity returns and returns on the 
global market index exhibit considerable fluctuations.  
The aggregate premium for nominal risk exchange rate risk is generally negative. 
The average value computed over the entire sample is –0.104. As the sample averages of 
conditional risk premia can be expected to approximate their unconditional values, this 
suggests that an unconditional analysis of nominal exchange rate risk would indicate that 
the premium for currency risk is relatively modest. However, the premium was markedly 
negative in most of the 1970s and 1990s, but strongly positive in the early and mid 1980s. 
The sample average of the absolute value of the premium is almost 20 basis points per 
month or roughly 2.4 percent per annum, while occasionally values of up to 70 basis points 
per month are reached (both positive and negative). Moreover, the aggregate currency risk 
premium disregards possible offsetting effects across the four nominal exchange rates in 
the sample. The middle panel of Figure 4.2 demonstrates that the contribution of every  
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Figure 4.2 
Estimated risk premia decomposition: MSCI Germany 
MSCI Germany: Aggregate Risk Premia
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individual nominal exchange rate has been economically substantial for prolonged periods 
of time. The sample averages of the risk premia related to the French franc and the 
Japanese yen are approximately 5 basis points per month, but both sources of risk carried a 
substantial premium in German equity returns in the 1980s, reaching values of up to 50 
basis points per month. The premium for U.K. risk was highly negative in the 1970s, large 
and volatile in the early 1980s, and consistently negative again in the late 1980s. Nominal 
exchange rate risk related to the U.S. became the principal source of currency risk in the 
1990s, with a negative risk premium of roughly 27 basis points per month over the period 
1992-1998. 
Figure 4.2 shows that the premia for inflation risk in the returns in the MSCI 
Germany index were economically substantial over the period 1975-1998. The sample 
average of the aggregate risk premium of –4.6 basis points per month is relatively small, 
but the average absolute value is equal to 26 basis points, which is even somewhat higher 
than the aggregate premium for currency risk. The aggregate premium for inflation risk 
was negative for most of the 1970s and 1990s, but substantial and positive in the 1980s 
(averaging more than 30 basis points per month in the years 1982-1988). In the mid 1970s 
and 1980s the premia for inflation risk and nominal exchange rate risk generally had 
opposite signs, but both turned negative around 1990. The bottom panel of Table 4.2 
illustrates the cross-sectional differences in inflation risk premia. The U.K. premium 
assumed small negative values for almost the entire sample period. The inflation risk 
premium for Japan was positive in most months with an average absolute value of 13 basis 
points over the sample period. This premium was large in the 1980s, but vanished during 
the 1990s. Investors in the German equity index generally received a positive risk premium 
for inflation risk related to France, but the premium was negative in 1975-1977 and 
especially in the early 1980s, attaining a value of –61 basis points in April 1981. It is 
interesting to see that the French inflation risk premium has picked up in the late 1990s. 
The most important source of inflation risk in German equity returns clearly was the risk 
associated with the inflation differential with the U.S. The sample mean of the absolute 
premium amounts to no less than 22 basis points on a monthly basis, or over 2.5 percent 
per year. Since the mid 1980s, the premium for U.S. inflation risk has generally been 
negative and relatively steady around –0.2. U.S. inflation risk carried a large and positive 
premium in the mid 1970s and was highly volatile in the first half of the 1980s. In this time 
period, the U.S. inflation risk component in expected returns on the MSCI Germany index 
was occasionally of the same order of magnitude as global market risk. 
Figure 4.3 depicts the market risk, nominal exchange rate risk, and inflation risk 
components in the expected returns on equity indices in France, Japan, the U.K., the U.S., 
as well as the world market index. Although the total equity premia for the equity indices 
is to a large extent explained by the premium for market risk, both aggregate nominal 
exchange rate risk premia and aggregate inflation risk premia are often large. For France 
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the average market risk premium was 1.249 percent per month and the mean absolute 
nominal exchange rate and inflation risk premia amounted to 0.562 percent and 0.565 
percent, respectively. The nominal exchange rate risk premium is always negative, while 
inflation risk generally bears a positive risk premium. Both sources of risk seem to be more 
important in the first half of the sample period than in the second half, although the market 
risk premium also diminishes in the 1990s. There are considerable differences in the 
relative importance of currency and inflation risk among the other countries in the sample. 
For the U.K. in particular nominal exchange rate risk and inflation risk represent very 
significant parts of the total risk premium. The average absolute risk premium for inflation 
risk equals more than 35 basis points per month for U.K. equity. For Japan and the U.S. 
these risk premia are less important, but nevertheless nontrivial (mean absolute values of, 
respectively, 27 and 22 basis points per month). The graph for the world market index 
reflects the characteristics of all markets. The exchange rate and inflation risk premia are 
generally of opposite sign for France and the U.K., while they often reinforce each other 
for Japan and the U.S. It is important to note that the graphs in Figure 4.3 do not give 
insight in the magnitude and development of individual currency and inflation risk premia. 
As an example, the aggregate inflation risk premium for the U.S. is relatively small, but 
individual inflation risk premia are substantial. Sample averages of (absolute) inflation risk 
premia incorporated in U.S. equity returns are equal to, respectively, –0.118 (0.273) 
percent per month for France, 0.202 (0.203) for Japan, –0.119 (0.121) for the U.K., and –
0.145 (0.292) for the U.S. 
The evidence in Table 4.3 and in Figures 4.1-4.3 strongly indicates that inflation 
differentials between countries entail nontrivial priced risk factors in asset returns. This 
constitutes strong evidence against the Solnik-Sercu assumption that domestic inflation is 
non-random. An important issue is why inflation risk premia are comparable in size to 
nominal exchange rate risk premia, while the time-series volatility of inflation differentials 
is notably smaller than nominal exchange rate volatility. A plausible answer to this 
question is that hedging inflation risk is much more complicated than hedging against 
nominal exchange rate fluctuations. Currency risk can be hedged easily and cheaply using 
exchange-traded financial products (such as options and futures) on generally very liquid 
markets. The most straightforward way to hedge inflation risk is through index-linked 
bonds. However, as noted by e.g. Evans (1998), these bonds do not form a perfect hedge 
against inflation risk. Moreover, they are only available in a small number of countries. 
The findings presented in this section suggest that, as a result, inflation risk can be 
identified as a distinct and important source of systematic risk in asset returns. This 
conclusion could have important implications for asset pricing in countries between which 
no nominal exchange rates exist, but inflation rates do differ. The recognition of inflation 
risk as a separate source of priced risk could be of vital importance in the absence of  
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Figure 4.3 
Estimated risk premia decomposition: MSCI equity indices 
MSCI France: Aggregate Risk Premia
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nominal exchange rate risk. The next section assesses the significance of inflation risk in 
Europe after the introduction of the euro in 1999. 
4.6 The termination of nominal exchange risk in the euro area 
In this section we apply the model introduced in section 4.2 in a setting in which nominal 
exchange rate risk has disappeared. Since the establishment of the EMU at the beginning 
of 1999, nominal exchange rates have been fixed among euro area countries. While this 
obviously implies that nominal exchange rate risk between euro area countries no longer 
Figure 4.3 - continued  
Estimated risk premia decomposition: MSCI equity indices 
MSCI U.S.: Aggregate Risk Premia
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carries a price, inflation differentials between these countries may still produce non-zero 
prices of inflation risk. This would have important implications for asset pricing. This 
section presents estimates and tests of the model incorporating nominal exchange rate and 
inflation risk depicted in equation (4.3) for asset returns in France, Germany, Japan, the 
U.K., and the U.S. over the period 1975:01-2003:12. As studying the euro area in isolation 
could lead to biases due to the fact that non-EMU sources of currency risk are neglected, 
we also include other countries and currencies in the analysis. At the same time, we need 
to restrict the total number of countries analyzed, because the incorporation of more assets 
and risk factors hampers the estimation procedure considerably. Hence, our analysis 
focuses on the price of inflation risk related to inflation differentials between France and 
Germany.46 Unfortunately, estimating the model over the post-euro period is not feasible, 
as the number of parameters to be estimated requires a substantial time-series length. 
Estimating the model over the full period 1975-2003 raises a challenge for the empirical 
implementation of the model, because the nominal exchange rate of the French franc 
versus the German mark experiences a structural break in 1999. This holds especially for 
estimating the covariance matrix, as the volatility of the concerning variable becomes zero 
by definition after 1998. We apply an adaptation of the methodology of De Santis and 
Gérard (1998) in order to deal with this issue. A detailed description of the methodology is 
given in Appendix 4.A. 
Table 4.4 presents the results of several specification tests of the model estimated 
over the period 1975-2003.47 The world price of market risk is highly significant, although 
the hypothesis that this price of risk is constant over time is no longer rejected. We find 
some evidence for statistically significant prices of risk for all four nominal exchange rates 
in the sample. The evidence is strong for the exchange rate of the French franc versus the 
German mark, but slightly weaker for the other currencies in the sample. A specification of 
the model in which the prices of nominal exchange rate risk are unconditional is clearly 
rejected. Consistent with the results in the previous section, inflation risk factors carry 
highly significant prices of risk, both jointly and individually. Both the hypotheses that the 
prices of inflation risk are equal to zero and that the prices are constant over time are 
rejected at any conventional significance level. Most interesting, however, is to examine 
the price of inflation risk and especially of the inflation differential of France versus 
Germany. Figure 4.4 shows this price of inflation risk over the entire sample period 1975-
                                                          
46 Unreported results show that similar findings are obtained when we estimate the model with data for other 
European countries (e.g. Italy or the Netherlands) instead of France. We bias our results against finding 
significant intra-EMU inflation risk after the introduction of the euro by choosing a country that is economically 
closely integrated with Germany. The results are available from the authors.  
47 Naturally, the estimation results are very similar to those reported in table 3, as the samples largely overlap. In 
order to conserve space, the parameter estimates of the model are not included in the table. They are available 
from the authors. 
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2003. The absolute level of the price of inflation risk in 1999-2003 does not appear to be 
notably lower than in the period before the introduction of the common currency (except 
for the high prices in the early 1980s). During the post-euro period the price of inflation 
risk is large and positive in the first three years, while the price becomes negative in 2002 
and 2003. Overall, these findings suggest that even when nominal exchange rate 
fluctuations are not present, differences in inflation rates across countries may lead to non-
zero risk premia. This may have important consequences asset managers and corporate 
finance practitioners. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter analyzes whether inflation risk is priced in international asset returns. We test 
two assumptions commonly made in the international asset pricing literature. First, the 
Solnik-Sercu version of the ICAPM as well as the empirical tests of the ICAPM by Dumas 
and Solnik (1995) and De Santis and Gérard (1998) assume that domestic inflation rates 
expressed in local currency are non-stochastic and hence inflation risk is not priced. An 
empirical analysis of the specification of the ICAPM with real exchange rate risk 
presented in this chapter provides an assessment of the validity of this assumption. Second, 
the ICAPM does not allow for a specification in which inflation risk and nominal exchange 
Figure 4.4 
The price of inflation risk over the full sample period 1975-2003 
The Price of Inflation Risk France
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rate risk are treated as separate sources of risk. Although inflation risk is often hinted at as 
an important risk factor, we are not aware of any theoretical or empirical research that 
studies this distinct source of risk in the context of an international asset-pricing model. 
Finally, the finding that inflation risk is priced would have important consequences in light 
of the establishment of the EMU in 1999. While nominal exchange rate fluctuations within 
the euro area have been brought to an end in 1999, differences in inflation rates between 
European countries may involve nontrivial inflation risk. 
Using the methodology of De Santis and Gérard (1997, 1998), we estimate and 
test our model including inflation risk factors using asset returns from Germany, France, 
Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. over the period 1975-1998. We find strong evidence in favor 
of the hypothesis that inflation risk is priced in international security returns. Inflation risk 
prices are highly significant, both jointly and for all four individual countries in the sample 
vis-à-vis Germany. The prices of inflation risk vary considerably over time and the 
hypothesis that the price of inflation risk is constant is rejected at any conventional 
significance level. Our findings indicate that the world price of market risk as well as the 
world prices of nominal exchange rate risk are also highly statistically significant. As the 
prices of inflation and nominal exchange rate risk are significantly different, we find 
evidence against the restrictive specification of the ICAPM. It is interesting to note that in 
the ICAPM with real exchange rate risk, only the world market portfolio and the real 
exchange rates of Japan and the U.K. bear a significant price of risk. The real exchange 
rates of France and the U.S. are not priced. Given the fact that we do find significant prices 
for both nominal exchange rate risk and inflation risk for France and the U.S., this result 
can at least partly be explained by offsetting premia for these sources of risk. 
Inflation risk factors also have an economically important impact on expected 
asset returns. The average contribution of the aggregate inflation risk premium in equity 
returns (in absolute value) ranges from 26 basis points per month for Germany to more 
than 56 basis points for France. During some periods (notable the early 1980s) aggregate 
inflation risk premia assumed values that were considerably higher. Moreover, these 
aggregates neglect offsetting effects in the risk premia related to the inflation differentials 
between individual countries. For instance, even the inflation risk associated with inflation 
differentials between the closely integrated economies of France and Germany is 
substantial. The mean absolute value of this risk premium amounts to 12 (35) basis points 
per month in German (French) equity returns over the period 1975-1998. The magnitude of 
inflation risk premia is generally of the same order as nominal exchange rate risk premia. 
Finally, we examine the importance of EMU inflation risk after the introduction 
of the euro by extending our analysis to the period 1975-2003. We show that inflation risk 
related to French-German inflation differential still has a considerable effect on expected 
security returns after 1999. Our results have important implication for portfolio 
management and capital budgeting. 
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4.A.  Empirical methodology for section 4.6   
 The termination of nominal exchange rate risk in the euro area 
This appendix contains a detailed description of the methodology used to estimate the 
conditional model in section 4.6. Because this analysis covers both the pre-euro and the 
post-euro period and we include both Germany and France, our estimation procedure has 
to take into account that the nominal exchange rate between these countries has been 
frozen after they adopted the euro. This implies a structural break in the nominal exchange 
rate series, as a result of which we cannot use the same specification for this risk factor 
before and after 1999. In general, the structural break leads to two versions of equation 
(4.3): 
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Equation (4.13) is exactly the same as equation (4.3) and holds as long as the nominal 
exchange rates are not frozen (the euro was adopted on January 1, 1999). Suppose, without 
loss of generality, that the euro area exchange rates are the last N excess returns in rit, then 
as the model for the second part of the sample period can be expressed as follows: 
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where N is the number of frozen nominal exchange rates and r′it denotes the vector of (M – 
N) excess returns. In our empirical application, all parameters in the mean equation of 
(4.14) are estimated using the full sample period, while the parameters concerning the 
frozen exchange rates are based on data until December 1998 only.  
The structural break also has consequences for the estimation of the conditional 
covariance matrix. Because the number of elements in the return vector decreases as of 
January 1999, the size of covariance matrix is reduced. This means that after 1999 we only 
use the upper (M – N) × (M – N) part of the original covariance matrix. The same holds for 
the parameters, as only the first (M – N) values of the vectors a and b apply after 1999. The 
new covariance matrix equation is as follows (with new notation for all symbols to denote 
the difference with equation (4.7)):  
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where H′t is the (M – N) × (M – N) covariance matrix at time t and H′0 is the (M – N) × (M 
– N) unconditional covariance matrix. The unconditional covariance matrix H′0 is set equal 
to the sample covariance matrix of the returns over the full sample, while the H0 of 
equation (4.7) is based on the sample until December 1998. This is necessary in order to 
provide a plausible estimate of the covariances with the nominal exchange rates that 
disappear after January 1999. Naturally, this leads to a discrepancy between the two 
covariance matrices and thus our results in the application should be interpreted with care. 
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Financial Integration Through Benchmarks: 
The Case of the Banking Sector 
5.1 Introduction 
The motivation of this chapter is a compelling paradox in the banking sector in the 
European Union (EU). Over the last decades the EU pursued the creation of a single 
banking market as a cornerstone for a single market for services. Starting with the First 
Banking Directive48 in 1977, the banking regulations have been harmonized to a high 
degree within the European Union. In 1985 the White Paper on “Completing the Internal 
Market” by the European Commission, establishing free circulation of goods, people, and 
capital, created the pathway for a single banking market. The paradox is that despite all 
these changes most of the banks are still very domestically orientated. For example, a 
recent article in the Financial Times says the following as a reaction to the bid by Spain’s 
Santander Central Hispano for Britain’s Abbey National: 
                                                          
48 Directive 77/780/EEC on The Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the 
Taking Up and Pursuit of Credit Institutions. 
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“The main reaction, however, has been to see the bid … as an exception that 
proves the rule that European retail banking is still overwhelmingly conducted 
along national lines”.49 
 
There is a vast literature on banking and banking regulations. For example, 
Dermine (2003) presents an overview of European banking, covering both the past and the 
future developments of this industry. He covers in detail the harmonization process, the 
consequences of the integration process in the EU and the introduction of the common 
currency for the banking industry in Europe. The present EU banking sector forms a single 
banking market, with home country control and mutual recognition. By law, any provider 
of banking services can establish itself across the Union and is entitled to the same rights 
as all existing banks in that country. From 1990-2000 the number of mergers and 
acquisitions has increased in the EU (Slager, 2004), which might be partly contributed to 
the changes in the regulatory system. However, the banking industry in the EU remains 
fragmented in practice, since most acquisitions are domestic. The banks that venture a 
foreign investment through branches, joint ventures or acquisitions, do not attain high 
market shares in other European countries. Possible reasons for this fact are issues of trust, 
asymmetric information and transaction costs. A closely related study by Gual (2004) 
provides similar conclusions. Although the harmonization process has progressed 
substantially, there are a couple of reasons why the integration process is not complete. 
The main reasons are natural or strategic barriers (like distance and language) and other 
important differences (company law, contract law and fiscal matters).50 
In this chapter we take a different point of view and evaluate integration of banks’ 
stock returns across the European Union. We extend the methodology of De Nicoló and 
Kwast (2002), who examine the relation of systemic risk with financial consolidation by 
measuring an increase in bivariate correlations, by not only estimating the level of bank 
                                                          
49 The Financial Times Limited, 2004, “Borderless Banking: Why are pan-European Financial Mergers so hard?”, 
Financial Times (London, England), 9 September 2004. 
50 To a certain extent, the situation in the European Union is comparable to the US banking industry. Until the end 
of the 1970s the US had a very segmented banking sector, since the states limited geographical expansion by 
blocking the entry of banks from other states. After that period states slowly started relaxing these laws, paving 
the way for a more national banking system. By now, the US banking sector has become highly integrated and the 
percentage of US banks’ assets held by out-of-state bank holding companies is high (in only a few states this 
percentage is lower than 40%, see Morgan, Rime and Strahan 2003). Here lies the most important difference 
between the US and European banking sector. Although banking regulations have been harmonized over the last 
decades, the actual integration of the banking sector is far less developed in Europe than in the US. This can, e.g., 
be seen from the low market share of foreign banks in the EU (in 1999, this percentage is in most EU-countries 
lower than 10%). According to Slager (2004), who studies internationalization of major global banks from 1980-
2000, argues that European integration cannot be compared to the U.S. banking deregulation. This is due to the 
fact that it is hard to exploit potential efficiency gains and that fiscal policies on savings and pensions are not 
harmonized. 
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equity integration but also simultaneously find an estimate for a separate proxy of the 
systemic risk potential, which is purely based on risky periods. As a result, we argue that 
our estimate for the systemic risk potential is more accurate than using the stock price 
correlations directly as De Nicoló and Kwast (2002)51. Our argument is supported by other 
papers52 showing that correlations during more volatile (bear) markets are higher than 
usual.53 Given these considerations, we estimated a regime-switching model to 
differentiate between the states that bank returns can be in. Such a model is capable to 
incorporate the behavior of banks’ asset return in different states of the world. 
Furthermore, Ang and Bekaert (2002) show that a regime-switching specification can deal 
with changing correlations during volatile (bear) markets. 
Our main finding is that, contrary to the lack of real integration, we do find an 
increase in the level of equity market integration for big European banks, while the stock 
returns of smaller banks show a more diverging behavior. Simultaneously, we find that the 
(systemic) risk, as measured by the correlation in the high volatility regime, has not 
increased for most bank pairs in our sample. We argue that a likely explanation for this 
result is caused by the changes in the demand for European stocks. Institutional investors 
have increased their holdings in European stocks as a result of both the common currency 
and the relaxation of restrictive rules on their foreign equity position. As a result of both 
these issues institutional investors have changed their investment styles in European stocks 
towards a more sector-oriented approach. Consequently, the banks with the higher market 
capitalizations will likely be included in the benchmark portfolios of these investors. As a 
result the stock prices of the larger banks will become more correlated. A possible 
implication of our finding is that banks may follow different strategies. One strategy is to 
remain small and target the activities to specific segments (specialization). Another 
strategy is to become a larger bank that offers a wide range of services. As a result the 
latter bank will likely be part of the benchmark index for the European banking sector. The 
advantages for these banks are obvious: better access to capital providers, lower costs of 
capital and higher credit ratings. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we will discuss 
the methodology in more detail. In section 5.3 a description of the data that we use in this 
chapter is given. The results will be discussed in section 5.4 and section 5.5 concludes. 
                                                          
51 See De Bandt and Hartmann (2001) for a detailed overview of research on systemic risk. 
52 See e.g. Campbell, Koedijk and Kofman (2001), Longin and Solnik (2001) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
53 A related area of research centers on the high volatility periods specifically and studies the possibility of 
contagion. See e.g., Gropp and Moerman (2004) who study contagion for the European banking sector using a 
non-parametric approach. 
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5.2 Methodology 
This section describes the models that we apply in this chapter. As discussed in the 
introduction we are interested in the level of the interdependencies between stock prices of 
European banks and especially the change in its level. We model these interdependencies 
with a conditional correlation structure. A regime-switch model governs the dynamics in 
the correlation structure. In this study we will concentrate on a regime-switch model with 
time varying correlations, which is an extension to the model proposed by Ang and 
Bekaert (2002).54 
A well-known characteristic of stock returns is that they do not follow a normal 
distribution. In particular, when considering the joint behavior of stock returns, there is 
evidence that the behavior of the returns in the tails is different from the non-tail returns. 
Historical returns show that large negative shocks tend to spill over to other markets easier 
than regular shocks.55 The correlation or interdependence between stock markets seems to 
be higher in the (negative) tail of this distribution than the correlation of the whole 
distribution. This phenomenon has led to a stream of literature, which tries to estimate the 
changes in the correlations after a large shock. See, for example, Boyer et al. (1999), 
Longin and Solnik (2001), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), and Corsetti et al., (2002). One of 
the conclusions is that the estimated conditional correlation is biased upwards as soon as 
the volatility increases. Several adjustments have been proposed, but there is still no 
consensus or method to estimate the coefficients in an unbiased manner. However, it is 
clear that we need to correct for this bias, because Longin and Solnik (2001) show using 
exceedence correlations that the normal distribution (with or without GARCH-
adjustments) is not capable at all to reconstruct the same exceedence correlations from the 
data. Ang and Bekaert (2002) show that a multiple regime-switch model is capable in 
explaining the exceedence correlations much better than earlier proposed models by, for 
example, Longin and Solnik (2001). The performance improvement can be explained by 
the fact that a regime-switch model is much more flexible in terms of modeling the 
persistence in both the conditional means and variances, compared to the single-regime 
bivariate approach in Longin and Solnik (2001).  
Our model is based upon bivariate comparisons between bank equity returns. Let 
Rit and Rjt be the local returns on bank i and j, respectively. Let RMt be the return on a broad 
European stock index, like the STOXX index.56 Let eij,t+1 be the exchange rate return 
                                                          
54 Baele, Vander Vennet and Van Landschoot (2004) also use a regime-switch model in order to investigate 
whether stock returns of banks with different risk profiles exhibit different risk sensitivities over the business 
cycle. They find that better capitalized and functionally diversified banks are better protected against business 
cycle troughs.  
55 This idea was also pursued in the articles by Longin and Solnik (2001) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002), 
although they used a different modeling approach. 
56 See Section 3 for a description of the data. 
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between the currencies in which bank i and j returns are denominated. If these currencies 
are the same, the exchange return is equal to zero. In the case of two banks from the euro 
area, the exchange rate factor is equal to zero as of 1 January 1999. We assume that the 
individual returns have one common factor: the market return. The bivariate model is 
based upon the following equation: 
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We assume that the εi,t+1 (εj,t+1) are identically and independently normally 
distributed with variances equal to 1, and Σt(st+1) is the covariance matrix of the returns. 
Note that we do not allow the 2x1 coefficient vector of means (αi, αj)' to vary between 
regimes.57 This is motivated by the results in Ang and Bekaert (2002) who show that the 
hypothesis of equal estimates of the conditional means (αi, αj)' in different regimes cannot 
be rejected. By not making these coefficients state-dependent, the parameter estimate is 
much more robust. Estimation of the more general regime-switch model does not change 
our general findings.58 
The regimes st+1 follow a Markov chain with constant transition probabilities. We 
assume that the individual variances of the two stock returns can be in either a high or a 
low regime. This implies that we have 4 (2 x 2) regimes, which can be written as: 
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In words, we allow for a covariance structure of the two stock returns that can vary 
between either low or high states. In order to restrict the number of parameters we 
structure the transition matrix in the following way: 
QP⊗=Π         (5.3) 
                                                          
57 Likewise, we do not allow for regime-dependent vectors ( )', ji ββ  and ( )', ji γγ . 
58 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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with P and Q transition matrices. 
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where [ ]lowslowsp ititi === + |Pr 11 , is the probability that stock i’s volatility remains in 
the low volatility state. Consequently, [ ]lowshighsp ititi ===− + |Pr1 11 . Likewise, [ ]highshighsp ititi === + |Pr 12 , and [ ]highslowsp ititi ===− + |Pr1 12 . This 
parameterization creates two times two independent regimes, in other words, each asset 
can be in the low volatility or high volatility regime independent of the state the other asset 
is in. As a result we have 4 probability parameters governing the transition between 
regimes. 
To complement our model we allow for conditional heteroskedasticity in the 
returns by imposing an ARCH(1) process on the errors in both the high and low states:59 
( ))(,0~)(| 1,1,1, lowhNlowh tititi +++ε , with 2 1,,,1, )( ++ += tilowilowiti lowh εδω    (5.6) 
( ))(,0~)(| 1,1,1, highhNhighh tititi +++ε , with 2 1,,,1, )( ++ += tihighihighiti highh εδω   (5.7) 
Note that this model nests the constant volatility model. When the coefficients δi,low and 
δi,high (i, j=1,2) are zero, we have a constant volatility model again.  
We are mainly interested in the interdependence structure of European banks over 
time. With the regime-switch specification we can distinguish between a higher rate of 
integration and a 'higher risk of contagion'. In this chapter integration and contagion are 
defined from a pure statistical point of view by focusing on the correlation coefficient. 
More specifically, regime 1 measures the interdependence between the banks in “normal” 
(low volatility) markets. We expect that the correlation between the European banks’ stock 
returns has risen over the last decade facilitated by the liberalization of European capital 
markets, the harmonization of monetary and policy rules and the Basel committee 
requirements, which require banks to have a sound capital structure. We measure this 
                                                          
59 One could also apply the more familiar GARCH model for describing the conditional heteroskedasticity in each 
regime (see Gray, 1996), however, the regime switch specification already subsumes a lot of the 
heteroskedasticity of the asset returns. Furthermore, Kim and Nelson (1999) argue that modeling GARCH in the 
regime switch specification would destroy the Markov properties of the process through the lagged conditional 
variance measure. 
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hypothesized increase in the correlation coefficient by allowing for a linear time trend in 
the correlation. That is, we replace the coefficients iρ  (i=1,…,4) in (2) with: 
( ) ( ) ( )11111 +×+= +++ tss ttt λρρ , 1+ts =1,…,4,    (5.8) 
with λ1 a parameter that applies to all regimes and the ( )1+tsρ  regime-dependent constant 
parameters. Formulating the time-behavior of the correlations in this way, we are able to 
test for a higher rate of integration between banks by investigating the significance of λ1. 
The functional specification of the correlation coefficient forces it to lie between –1 and 
1.60 
Furthermore, we want to investigate the level of interdependence during times of 
financial distress and especially whether this changes over time. Motivated by Longin and 
Solnik (2001) we enrich the correlation dynamics in the high volatility regime (st+1 = 4) by 
adding another time trend: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )144 211 +×++=+ tt λλρρ .     (5.9) 
This specification allows us to test whether in a joint high-volatility regime the 
correlation trend differs from those in other regimes. In other words, this formulation 
allows us to test whether the risks during volatile (bear) markets has increased more than 
proportionally. A positive value for λ2 would signify an increased risk during volatile 
markets, while a negative value indicates that asset returns are more spread during periods 
of high volatility. The outcome can be an important input in the discussion about the 
efficiency of the Basel agreements. 
5.3 Data 
We will use stock data from the largest banks in Europe from the DataStream database. 
Our data period covers the period from 1 January 1990 to 3 March 2003. The data is 
sampled at a weekly frequency, which results in 687 weekly observations. Ideally we 
would like to use stock data from the largest European commercial banks. Unfortunately, 
not for all these banks data is available for the complete data period. An important reason 
for this is that many banks have merged or have been acquired by other banks as a result of 
the consolidation process in the European banking sector (see Slager, 2004). We opted for 
a balanced sample, thereby deleting banks that do not have stock price data available for  
                                                          
60 In order to force the correlation coefficients to the interval [-1,1] we use a logistic function in our likelihood 
evaluations: ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) 11exp1
1exp2
11
11
11 −+++
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Table 5.1 
Summary Statistics 
This table summarizes the statistics of the weekly returns of the 41 European banks in our sample. 
The lowest row of the table also contains the statistics of the Dow Jones Euro STOXX 600 index that 
we used to proxy the European market. Sample period: January 1, 1990 – March 3, 2003. The first 
column of the table presents the market capitalization of the bank (measured in 2000, Bankscope). 
 
 Bank 
M
ar
ke
t 
ca
pi
ta
liz
at
io
n 
M
ea
n 
St
an
da
rd
 
de
vi
at
io
n 
M
in
im
um
 
M
ax
im
um
 
Sk
ew
ne
ss
 
K
ur
to
si
s 
1 Fortis 332,092 0.166 4.18 -21.19 16.62 -0.311 5.61 
2 KBC Bank 176,909 0.205 3.78 -15.25 21.74 0.374 6.48 
3 Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank 694,300 0.015 4.89 -19.95 21.67 -0.093 5.86 
4 Commerzbank 454,500 -0.029 4.55 -17.70 29.33 0.198 7.70 
5 Deutsche bank 927,900 0.076 4.17 -16.54 22.70 0.038 5.30 
6 IKB Deutsche Industriebank 32,359 0.039 2.49 -9.06 11.45 0.155 5.29 
7 Danske Bank 182,520 0.220 3.49 -12.18 15.69 0.341 4.61 
8 Jyske Bank 17,044 0.191 3.22 -21.09 25.81 0.750 13.75 
9 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 292,557 0.276 4.77 -19.64 27.96 0.378 7.41 
10 Banco Espanol de Credito 44,381 0.017 5.72 -61.95 65.65 0.694 49.49 
11 Banco Popular Espanol 31,288 0.325 3.77 -16.38 14.33 0.138 4.36 
12 Banco Santander Central Hispano 347,288 0.249 4.85 -24.34 22.60 -0.141 5.93 
13 Natexis Banques Populaires 113,131 0.069 4.15 -16.81 18.35 0.269 5.10 
14 Societe Generale 455,881 0.266 5.16 -22.08 26.85 0.274 5.50 
15 Alpha Bank 30,183 0.476 5.99 -21.59 29.28 0.701 6.15 
16 Commercial Bank of Greece 16,164 0.528 7.54 -34.06 57.66 1.247 10.86 
17 EFG Eurobank Ergasias 16,833 0.482 7.92 -29.25 46.90 1.850 12.18 
18 Allied Irish Banks 77,932 0.284 4.12 -15.45 16.58 -0.063 4.69 
19 Anglo Irish Bankcorp 11,047 0.383 4.39 -13.25 17.50 0.354 4.28 
20 Bank of Ireland 73,859 0.372 4.07 -17.06 13.23 -0.007 3.93 
21 Banca Agricola Mantovana 10,190 0.140 2.98 -14.43 21.36 0.756 11.60 
22 Banca Intesa 331,364 0.267 5.69 -22.05 38.55 0.930 8.99 
23 Banca di Roma 132,729 -0.017 6.09 -22.82 35.89 0.739 7.89 
24 Banca Populare Bergamo 37,670 0.141 3.38 -12.20 16.84 0.475 5.73 
25 Banca Populare Commercial e Industria 20,911 0.066 3.95 -16.83 31.39 1.031 12.63 
26 Banca Populare di Intra 3,929 0.195 3.39 -13.15 15.82 0.595 6.22 
27 Banca Populare di Lodi 34,223 0.083 3.90 -15.31 24.22 0.583 7.55 
28 Banca Populare di Milano 28,282 0.094 4.70 -29.58 24.62 0.302 7.17 
29 Credito Emiliano 15,148 0.135 5.89 -18.83 27.60 0.751 5.48 
30 Credito Valtellinese 7,416 0.074 2.93 -17.39 13.94 0.651 9.04 
31 Unicredito Italiano 202,649 0.294 5.65 -26.49 53.70 1.619 16.54 
32 Banco Comercial Portugues 61,850 0.043 3.72 -14.36 25.00 0.980 10.21 
33 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB) 118,261 0.363 8.23 -47.54 120.90 5.101 75.33 
34 Svenska Handelsbanken (SHB) 114,194 0.378 5.79 -22.54 69.30 3.239 39.25 
35 Abbey National 293,395 0.212 4.41 -15.54 21.30 0.199 4.96 
36 Barclays 486,936 0.294 4.69 -17.77 22.49 0.162 5.07 
37 Close Brothers 3,241 0.301 4.54 -17.74 30.92 0.482 8.38 
38 Schroders 4,180 0.278 4.73 -24.56 24.58 -0.163 7.31 
39 Singer & Friendlander Group 2,792 0.180 4.32 -14.16 25.10 0.839 6.25 
40 Standard Chartered 161,964 0.392 5.58 -22.43 42.31 0.728 8.69 
41 Royal Bank of Scotland 206,176 0.413 4.91 -21.10 21.70 0.185 5.62 
         
 Dow Jones Euro STOXX 600 index  0.157 2.44 -12.49 7.30 -0.597 5.49 
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the whole sample. The number of remaining banks is equal to 41. We recognize that this 
procedure could cause our results to suffer from selection bias. Caution should be kept 
when interpreting the results in the sense that our results apply to the chosen banks only. In 
Table 5.1 we list the banks in our sample together with some descriptive statistics. We 
leave the problem of including banks with shorter sample periods in our analysis for 
further research.  
Since we have banks’ stock returns from countries with different currencies we 
need to consider the impact of the relevant exchange rates. As our methodology focuses on 
the joint dynamics of bank shares we chose to use returns denoted in local currencies. In 
order to allow for a possible impact of exchange rates we have included an exchange rate 
factor in equation (5.1) for bank pairs shares denoted in different currencies. The weekly 
exchange rates are taken from DataStream. 
The market return that we use is the Dow Jones Euro STOXX 600 index, which is 
a broad index on European stocks denoted in euros.61 In Table 5.1 we have included the 
summary statistics for this series as well. 
5.4 Results 
Using the returns on bank shares we apply the model suggested in section 5.2 on each 
combination of banks. In order to have an impression of the estimation results for one 
particular combination of banks we present the estimation results of the regime switch 
model for Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank (BHVB) from Germany and Abbey 
National from the U.K. The range of products that these banks offer is relatively similar 
(mortgages). The local currency denominated stock returns for both banks are plotted in 
Figure 5.1. In Table 5.2 we have listed the estimation results from the regime switch 
model. All parameters in the mean equation (5.1) are significant. The variance parameters 
iσ  (i=1,…,4) show that the regimes are in line with the model set-up. Based on a 
likelihood ratio selection criterion we add conditional variance terms - through an ARCH 
model, see equations (5.6) and (5.7) - to the model in regimes 1 and 2.62 The constant 
terms in the correlation specifications (equation (5.8)), and the special case for the high 
volatility regime (equation (5.9)), show that the constant correlation coefficients 
iρ (i=1,…,4) between returns is negative except for regime 2. More interestingly, we see 
that λ1 is negative, albeit not significantly, implying that there is a tendency for the 
correlation coefficient between these two banks to decline over time. The high volatility 
                                                          
61 STOXX, STOXX Limited, http://www.stoxx.com (accessed June 03, 2003). 
62 Estimation results from this procedure can be obtained from the authors. 
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Figure 5.1 
Returns on Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank and Abbey National 
We consider one specific bank pair in more detail: Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank and Abbey 
National. This figure depicts the weekly return series of both assets, which served as an input to the 
regime-switching model. The upper graph is the picture of the returns of the German bank and the 
lower graph depicts the returns of Abbey National. 
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Table 5.2 
Estimation results of the regime switch model: 
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank and Abbey National 
This table presents the parameter estimates and standard errors of the complete regime switching 
model for one specific bank pair: Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank (denoted by bank1) and Abbey 
National (denoted by bank2). The four states in the variance equation are based on the two possible 
states that each banks asset can be in. State 1(4) represents the state where both assets’ volatilities are 
low(high), while state 2 is the state where the volatility of bank 1 is low, while the volatility of bank 
2 is high, for state 3 the other way around. 
 
  Parameter estimates Standard error 
Mean equation   
 α1  Constant, bank1 -0.081 *** 0.013 
 α2  Constant, bank2 0.146 *** 0.016 
 β1  Market, bank1 1.079 *** 0.004 
 β2  Market, bank2 0.944 *** 0.004 
 γ1  Exch.rate, bank1 0.310 *** 0.010 
 γ2  Exch rate, bank2 0.504 *** 0.012 
     
Variance equation   
 ω1, low 5.63 *** 0.298 
 ω1,high 22.28 *** 8.540 
 ω2,low 8.48 *** 0.530 
 ω2,high 35.70  29.56 
 δ1,low 0.034 *** 0.004 
 δ1,high 0.307 *** 0.010 
 δ2,low 0  -- 
 δ2,high 0  -- 
     
 1ρ  -0.060  0.031 
 2ρ  0.452  0.471 
 3ρ  -0.017  0.144 
 4ρ  -0.518  1.661 
     
Transition parameters   
 P11 0.992 *** 0.000 
 P22 0.991 *** 0.000 
 Q11 0.986 *** 0.000 
 Q22 0.953 *** 0.000 
     
Lambda parameters    
 λ1 -0.226  0.192 
 λ2 1.165  2.847 
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Figure 5.2 
Smoothed probabilities for Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank  
versus Abbey National 
This is an example of the smoothed probabilities of our regime-switching model. The pictures below 
show the smoothed probabilities of all four possible states for the complete bank pair model (i.e. 
including the parameters λ1 and λ2) for the bank pair: Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank and 
Abbey National. 
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      (continued on next page) 
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regime correlation correction parameter λ2 is positive (again not significantly so), 
suggesting that the returns between these banks are increasingly higher correlated in that 
regime. 
In order to obtain an idea about the impact of the parameter values in each of the 
regimes we need to find out what regime is the most likely at every moment in the sample 
period for the bivariate return process. This can be achieved by calculating the smoothed 
regime probabilities that we present in Figure 5.2.63 In the first half of the sample regime 1 
is the most dominant one. Later, starting around 1997, regimes 3 and 4 are the most 
dominant ones. Regime 2 (high volatility for Abbey National and a low volatility for 
BHVB) does not occur frequently. Together with the previous observation this implies that 
the volatility of BHVB in general is higher than the volatility of Abbey National. The fact 
that regime 1 cannot be found in the latter part of the sample suggests that the volatility of 
both return series has increased. As regimes 3 and 4 seem to be the most influential in this 
period it can be said that the correlation coefficients exhibit some interesting behavior. 
When both volatilities are high (regime 4) the correlation seems to increase as λ1 + λ2 is 
larger than zero, while the correlation in regime 3 decreases over time (since λ1 is 
negative). This can be best seen from Figure 5.3, where the weighted average of the 
correlation coefficient is depicted.64  
                                                          
63 For background information on calculating smoothed probabilities from a switching regime model see, for 
example, Kim and Nelson (1999). 
64 Note however that the correlation dynamics are not significant in this example and are mainly used to get an 
impression of the estimation results. 
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In this chapter we are interested in the behavior of the correlation dynamics in the 
banking sector as a whole. Table 5.3 presents the summary statistics on all the bank pairs 
that we have investigated65. On average the results seem to be in line with the example of 
BHVB and Abbey National. However, we find that both the λ1 and λ2 parameters are (on 
average) positive, which suggests that the correlation between bank stock returns increases 
over time, irrespective of the regime. On average the correlation increases faster over time 
in regime 4. Figure 5.4 plots the λ1 and λ2 parameters for all 764 bank pairs. As can be seen 
from the table already, the dispersion in λ2 is much higher than in λ1. Also, the figure 
suggests that there is a (weak) negative relationship between these two parameters, which 
would point to an offsetting effect of the two parameters in regime 4, as is the case in our 
example of BHVB and Abbey National. Note that in general the regimes are identified 
consistently with the parameter definitions and interpretations from section 5.2. 
                                                          
65 De Nicoló and Kwast (2002) used the same methodology. They examined the time-varying correlations in a 
less flexible framework for bivariate US bank returns.  
Figure 5.3 
Time varying correlation between BHVB and Abbey National 
This graph depicts the changing correlation coefficient over time between the Bayerische Hypo- und 
Vereinsbank (BHVB) and Abbey National. This coefficient is a weighted average of the four 
different correlations of each regime, with the weights equal to the inferenced probabilities of the 
regime-switching model. 
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Table 5.3 
Statistics of the model coefficients 
We have 41 banks in our sample, which would result in 820 bank pairs. For sake of robustness, we 
excluded some of the models in the following way. 56 of these bank pair models were excluded 
based on the restriction that all probabilities should be higher than 0.5 and that all correlation 
coefficients should be smaller than 0.9975 in absolute value. In the deleted pairs the regimes might 
be too heavily influenced by outliers, which would result in misinterpretations of the regimes. The 
table below gives the statistics of the model coefficients on the remaining 764 bank pair models. In 
434 models a conditional heteroskedasticity correction (ARCH) has been performed. 
 
Parameter Average Median St.dev Min Max Observations 
α1 -0.038 -0.037 0.166 -0.580 0.361 764 
α2 -0.017 -0.028 0.185 -0.538 0.374 764 
β1 0.726 0.733 0.356 0.130 1.404 764 
β2 0.693 0.731 0.356 0.117 1.339 764 
γ1 -0.054 -0.037 0.226 -0.941 0.600 764 
γ2 -0.013 0.000 0.358 -1.071 1.192 764 
P11  0.946   0.964   0.052  0.604  0.998 764 
P22  0.888   0.934   0.118  0.504  1.000 764 
Q11  0.936   0.966   0.072  0.644  0.998 764 
Q22  0.878   0.927   0.116  0.502  1.000 764 
1ρ  0.036 0.012 0.189 -0.401 0.832 764 
2ρ  0.027 0.022 0.265 -0.945 0.955 764 
3ρ  0.020 0.008 0.263 -0.968 0.980 764 
4ρ  0.020 0.034 0.465 -0.989 0.997 764 
ω1, low 6.06  5.30 4.14 0.70 18.74 764 
ω1,high 47.67  23.20 71.87 8.55 651.81 764 
ω2,low 7.33 5.94 4.97 0.69 20.36 764 
ω2,high 78.04 30.89 146.20 9.67 1,918.45 764 
δ1,low 0.113 0.096 0.119 0.000 0.595 434 
δ1,high 0.122 0.071 0.134 0.000 0.727 434 
δ2,low 0.096 0.096 0.100 0.000 0.603 434 
δ2,high 0.117 0.048 0.161 0.000 0.973 434 
λ1 0.076 0.079 0.578 -1.930 2.041 764 
λ2 0.304 0.172 2.845 -18.748 18.700 764 
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Based on the set of bivariate estimation results we conduct some analyses on the 
parameters of interest λ1 and λ2 by conditioning on a number of indicators: variance, 
unconditional correlations, euro membership, and bank sizes. In Table 5.4 we split our 
sample based on the unconditional variances of the assets under consideration66. The upper 
part of the table concentrates on those bank pairs, where the volatilities of the low states 
were below (above) the median of σi,low simultaneously. Let’s discuss the first row in more 
detail. It turns out that 188 bank pairs can be identified where σ1,low and σ2,low are lower 
than the median of σi,low. In 92 of these cases λ1 is positive, of which 7 are significantly 
positive. Consequently, in 18 (=25-7) cases λ1 is significantly negative. In other words, 
banks that have a relatively low volatility show a decrease in their correlation. On the other
                                                          
66 The unconditional variances for each regime can easily be found from the regression results. In case the ARCH 
components are not significant, the variances of the assets are simply equal to ω2i, state. When an ARCH 
component is included in the model , the unconditional variance can be calculated using: 
2
,
,2
, 1 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−= lowi
statei
statei δ
ωσ  
Figure 5.4 
Correlation time trend coefficients 
This graph depicts the relationship between λ1 and λ2. λ1 is plotted on the horizontal axis and λ2 is 
on the vertical axis. The plot shows the λ’s of all bank pairs, irrespective of the significance of these 
parameters. 
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hand, banks that have a relatively high volatility (row 2) seem to become more correlated 
over time (29 out of 188 cases show a significantly positive estimate for λ1). We also 
examine the estimates of λ2, but these do not show any striking results. The lower part of 
Table 5.4 summarizes the results in case all four unconditional volatilities are lower or 
higher than the median for these values. The results confirm the conclusions found in the 
upper part of the table. 
Table 5.4 
Results after a split based on the variance 
This table presents some statistics for the parameters λ1 (time trend in all correlation coefficients) 
and λ2 (extra time trend only for regime 4, i.e. when both assets are in the high volatility regime). 
The whole set of bivariate results is divided into subsets according to a split based on the median of 
the unconditional variance of each parameter. Based on the subsets we can see whether there are 
differences for certain classes of assets. The upper part of the table deals with the case of assets that 
both banks have a lower or higher variance estimate (compared to its median) for the low volatility 
regime The lower part of the table concentrates on the cases where all four volatilities are lower 
(higher) than the median of these volatilities. The median of the volatilities is the median over both 
assets (over σ1,low and σ2,low for the low volatility, σ1,high and σ2,high for the high volatility 
respectively). See footnote 66 for more information on the calculation of the unconditional 
volatilities. The median unconditional variance of the low and high volatility regime is 5.627 and 
29.861 respectively 
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Both volatilities in base regime are simultaneously lower or higher than the median 
λ1 (variances low in base regime) 188 92 (48.9%) 25 (13.3%) 7 (28.0%) 
λ1 (variances high in base regime) 188 128 (68.1%) 35 (18.6%) 29 (82.9%) 
        
λ2 (variances low in base regime) 188 100 (53.2%) 19 (10.1%) 9 (47.4%) 
λ2 (variances high in base regime) 188 109 (58.0%) 9 (4.8%) 6 (66.7%) 
      
ALL volatilities are simultaneously lower or higher than the median 
λ1 (all variances lower) 103 47 (45.6%) 16 (15.5%) 5 (31.3%) 
λ1 (all variances higher) 105 69 (65.7%) 17 (16.2%) 13 (76.5%) 
        
λ2 (all variances lower) 103 61 (59.2%) 10 (9.7%) 6 (60.0%) 
λ2 (all variances higher) 105 66 (62.9%) 5 (4.8%) 3 (60.0%) 
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Table 5.5 
Results after a split based on the correlation coefficients 
This table presents some statistics for the parameters λ1 (time trend in all correlation coefficients) 
and λ2 (extra time trend only for regime 4, i.e. when both assets are in the high volatility regime). 
The whole subset is divided into subsets based on the estimates of the correlation coefficients. Only 
the correlations of regime 1 and regime 4 are taken into account, since both assets are then in the 
same regime (low volatility vs. high volatility).  
The first part of the table compares the λ-parameters in case the correlation in regime 1 is lower 
(higher) than its median (0.012). The second part presents the same for the correlation in regime 4 
(median = 0.034). The last part of table takes the intersection of these two restrictions. 
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Subsamples based on the comparison of the correlation of regime 1 with its median 
λ1 (corr1 < median(corr1)) 382 315 (82.5%) 61 (16.0%) 60 (98.4%) 
λ1 (corr1 => median(corr1)) 382 128 (33.5%) 44 (11.5%) 7 (15.9%) 
        
λ2 (corr1 < median(corr1)) 382 164 (42.9%) 24 (6.3%) 7 (29.2%) 
λ2 (corr1 => median(corr1)) 382 252 (66.0%) 35 (9.2%) 29 (82.9%) 
      
Subsamples based on the comparison of the correlation of regime 4 with its median 
λ1 (corr4 < median(corr4)) 382 268 (70.2%) 48 (12.6%) 41 (85.4%) 
λ1 (corr4 => median(corr4)) 382 175 (45.8%) 57 (14.9%) 26 (45.6%) 
        
λ2 (corr4 < median(corr4)) 382 322 (84.3%) 34 (8.9%) 34 (100.0%) 
λ2 (corr4 => median(corr4)) 382 94 (24.6%) 25 (6.5%) 2 (8.0%) 
      
Subsamples based on the comparison of the correlation of regime 1 and regime 4 with their medians 
λ1 (corr1 &corr4 < median) 199 184 (92.5%) 37 (18.6%) 37 (100.0%) 
λ1 (corr1 & corr4 => median) 199 44 (22.1%) 33 (16.6%) 3 (9.1%) 
      
λ2 (corr1 & corr4 < median) 199 151 (75.9%) 7 (3.5%) 7 (100.0%) 
λ2 (corr1 & corr4 => median) 199 81 (40.7%) 8 (4.0%) 2 (25.0%) 
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We perform a similar analysis on a division of the results based on the level of the 
correlation coefficient of regime 1, where both assets are in the low volatility regime, and 
regime 4, where both assets are in the high volatility regime. The results in Table 5.5 show 
that the level of the correlation has an impact on the sign and the importance of the time 
trends in the correlation. These results are not very surprising. Due to the introduction of a 
time trend for the correlation coefficient, the estimate of the base correlation might differ 
from the actual average correlation (leverage). The results suggest that the level of the 
correlation in regime 1 has an impact on the overall time trend (λ1), while the correlation in 
regime 4 has a bigger impact on the significance of λ2. For the observations where the 
estimate of the correlation of regime 1 (4) is lower than the median, more than 82.5% 
(84.3%) of the observations has a positive value for λ1 (λ2) and 98.4% (100%) of the 
significant estimates are positive. 
Table 5.6 presents the results of conditioning on the fact whether the banks are 
located in countries, which do or do not use the euro as their main currency. The results 
indicate that the location does not really matter for the sign of the parameters λ1 and λ2. 
Table 5.6 
Differences between euro area countries and non-euro area countries 
This table summarizes the statistics on λ1 and λ2 based on the country where the banks originate. All 
bank pair regression thus fall into three separate categories: 1) both banks originate from a euro area 
country; 2) both banks originate from a country that is not in the European Monetary Union and 3) 
the two banks come from different subsets, i.e. one is from a euro area country, while the other is 
not. 
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λ1 (euro banks only) 413 222 (53.8%) 54 (13.1%) 26 (48.1%) 
λ1 (non-euro banks only) 49 28 (57.1%) 5 (10.2%) 2 (40.0%) 
λ1 (euro vs. non-euro) 302 193 (63.9%) 46 (15.2%) 39 (84.8%) 
      
λ2 (euro banks only) 413 235 (56.9%) 41 (9.9%) 27 (65.9%) 
λ2 (non-euro banks only) 49 20 (40.8%) 4 (8.2%) 2 (50.0%) 
λ2 (euro vs. non-euro) 302 161 (53.3%) 14 (4.6%) 7 (50.0%) 
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Again we see that the number of significant correlation parameters is not high (around 
10%). We do see, however, that for combinations of banks for which only one bank has a 
euro home currency, the significant values for λ1 are predominantly positive. 
In Table 5.7 we split our sample in terms of bank size. Based on market 
capitalizations (measured in 2000, downloaded from the BankScope database) we divide 
our sample in banks that have market capitalizations that are either higher or lower than the 
median capitalization (73,859 million euros). The former banks are denoted ‘big’, the rest 
is called ‘small’. The table shows that estimating the model for two big banks the λ1 
parameter is positive in 142 of the 180 cases (78.9%). Moreover, if the parameter is 
significant, it is positive in 92.5% of the cases. Interestingly, λ1 is positive in only 75 of the 
191 cases when we estimate the model for two small banks, which implies that in 116 
cases λ1 is negative (60.7%). The significant values for λ1 in this case are predominantly 
negative (22 out of 27 cases). The results suggest that big European banks are becoming 
more integrated over time, whereas smaller banks show opposite behavior. This result 
cannot be attributed to econometrical issues (like conditioning on the base level of the 
correlation coefficient, see Table 5.5). A reason for this result could be that investors 
perceive that the activities of bigger banks are becoming more correlated. An alternative 
explanation can be found in papers by Rouwenhorst (1999), Cavaglia, Brightman, Aked 
(2000), and Moerman (2004). They argue that (institutional) investors in European capital 
markets (should) shift from a country-based towards a sector-based approach. As a 
consequence, investors are tracking industry indices, thereby focusing more on bigger 
banks than on smaller banks. 
The lower half of Table 5.7 reports estimates on the λ2 parameter. This parameter 
gives an indication on the level of systemic risk between two bank stocks, since it is 
measured during highly volatility periods only. In other words, a significantly positive 
estimate would mean that a portfolio containing these two assets becomes riskier. We find 
that these risks do not increase over our sample period. For the different groups the number 
of positive estimates ranges from 52% to 60% and the number of significant estimates is 
relatively low (less than 10%). 
5.5 Conclusions 
Although the European banking sector has been deregulated over the last few decades 
individual banks remain highly focused on their home markets. In this chapter we have 
analyzed whether this apparent lack of physical or real integration also holds for the stock 
price behavior of European banks. More specifically, we have analyzed whether the stock 
price dynamics of individual banks become more correlated. 
Based on a sample of stock prices of 41 European banks over the period January 
1990 – March 2003 we estimate the correlation dynamics between all 820 bank pairs. The 
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sample that we used consisted of European banks that have a continuous listing over the 
period 1990-2003. We realize that this procedure excludes some interesting banks, which 
as a result of a merger or take-over do not have a continuous listing over our sample 
period. We leave it to further research to deal with this issue. 
Our modeling approach is motivated by the bivariate regime switch model of Ang 
and Bekaert (2002), who show that a regime-switch specification is very well capable to 
deal with different correlations over business cycle periods. Based on the combination of 
high/low volatility states for each pair of banks, we have 4 regimes. In each of these 
regimes we allow for specific correlation dynamics in the sense that they can change 
according a linear time trend. The regime identifying both banks being in a high volatility 
state is designed as to pick up increased correlations in times of financial distress by 
adding an additional time trend. This correlation specification is motivated by Longin and 
Solnik (2001). We find that in general the correlations between banks decline, but in times 
of high volatility the correlation increases. 
In our analysis we have conditioned on a number of variables: variance, 
unconditional correlations, euro membership, and bank size. Since the regimes are 
Table 5.7 
Differences between big banks and small banks 
This table summarizes the statistics on λ1 and λ2 based on the size of the banks. All bank pair 
regressions thus fall into three separate categories: 1) both banks are big banks; 2) both banks are 
small banks and 3) one of the banks is considered a big bank, while the other is small.  
The size of the bank is measured on the basis of the total market capitalization in the year 2000 
(source: BankScope). A bank is considered big when the total market capitalization is higher than the 
median and smaller otherwise. 
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λ1 (big banks only) 180 142 (78.9%) 40 (22.2%) 37 (92.5%) 
λ1 (small banks only) 191 75 (39.3%) 27 (14.1%) 5 (18.5%) 
λ1 (1 big and 1 small) 393 226 (57.5%) 38 (9.7%) 25 (65.8%) 
      
λ2 (big banks only) 180 108 (60.0%) 9 (5.0%) 6 (66.7%) 
λ2 (small banks only) 191 100 (52.4%) 15 (7.9%) 7 (46.7%) 
λ2 (1 big and 1 small) 393 208 (52.9%) 35 (8.9%) 23 (65.7%) 
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identified on the basis of the bivariate covariance matrix, we find anticipated results when 
we condition on the variance and the correlation. For example, it appears that if the 
volatility of a bank is relatively low, the correlation with other banks decreases. We also 
report that there are no significant differences between banks that originate from the euro 
area and banks from Denmark, Sweden or the U.K.  
A more interesting result is that size offers some explanation for the correlation 
dynamics between bank stocks in our sample. The results show that bigger banks, 
measured by their market capitalizations, have a tendency to become more integrated over 
time. Smaller banks seem to show more divergence, as shown by decreasing correlation 
coefficients over time. Simultaneously we find that the risk, as measured by the correlation 
in periods of financial distress, has not increased significantly for both bigger and smaller 
banks. An explanation for this result could be that the bigger banks, which are more 
diversified in their activities, are perceived to be more integrated by investors. Another 
explanation is that the bigger (institutional) investors are turning their equity portfolio 
strategies for the European area from a country-based style towards a sector-based style. 
This requires these investors to track industry indices instead of country indices. For the 
banking sector this would imply that these investors will focus more on the larger banks 
than on the smaller banks in the European area, thereby inducing a tendency for 
correlations to increase. An implication of this phenomenon could be that the European 
banks will be forced to follow either of two strategies. The first one is to remain a small 
and specialized bank, with activities in a regional setting. The other strategy is to integrate 
and become a larger player in Europe. The advantages of the latter strategy are that banks 
can have easier access to capital markets, leading to lower funding risk, lower costs of 
capital, and higher credit ratings. As a result capital market forces will help in breaking the 
integration paradox of European banking. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 6  
 
Measurement of Contagion in European 
Banks’ Equity Prices 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter proposes a new methodology, which we believe may be able to identify the 
direction of contagion from one bank to another, given a relatively non-restrictive set of 
assumptions about the shocks affecting banks. The chapter builds upon the approach taken 
in a recent study by Bae, Karolyi and Stulz. (2003), who considered contagion among 
stock market returns in emerging markets. The approach is related to the growing 
conviction that the behavior of tail observations for financial market data is quite different 
from the behavior of other observations (extreme value theory).  
The previous empirical literature on bank contagion has largely employed three 
distinct approaches: autocorrelation tests, survival time tests and event studies. Along the 
lines of the first approach, a number of papers have tested for autocorrelation in bank 
failures, controlling for macroeconomic conditions (Grossman, 1993; Hasan and Dwyer, 
1994; Schoenmaker, 1996). A positive and significant autocorrelation coefficient indicates 
that bank failures cluster over time, given that all macroeconomic factors have been 
appropriately controlled for. All authors find evidence in favor of contagion, although the 
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approach suffers from a number of inherent disadvantages. In particular, omitted macro 
variables, which exhibit autocorrelation would bias the results, the approach is limited by 
the frequency of the availability of macroeconomic data and third, the implications of the 
papers for today’s banking system may be limited, as all papers have examined contagion 
in historical periods, in order to avoid problems associated with public safety nets (such as 
deposit insurance, lender of last resort).67 
More recently, Calomiris and Mason (2000) examine the question whether 
fundamentals can explain the survival time of banks during the great depression. They find 
that micro, regional and national fundamentals indeed can explain a large portion of the 
probability of survival of banks during the great depression. There is some evidence of 
contagion, although it appears to have been limited to specific regions of the US. 
Somewhat more closely related to the approach taken in this chapter is the quite 
extensive literature examining the reaction of stock prices to news (for a survey see De 
Bandt and Hartmann, 2002). Overall, the literature suggests that stock price reactions to 
news vary proportionally to the degree of the news’ extent of affecting the bank. Hence, 
the results tend to be consistent with “information based” contagion, rather than “pure” 
contagion. Overall, the evidence, however, is limited to the US banking system (an 
exception is Gay, Timme and Yung (1991) which examine data for Hong Kong) and the 
approach is not well suited to distinguishing macro shocks affecting all banks 
simultaneously and “proper” contagion as defined above. Further, as for example Gropp, 
Vesala and Vulpes (2002) argue, the measure employed in these papers, namely 
cumulative abnormal stock market returns may not be well suited to measure certain types 
of shocks, such as increases in earnings volatility or leverage. In order to avoid these 
problems, in this chapter we consider the distance to default, which combines information 
on leverage, asset volatility with information contained in stock returns, in addition to 
using abnormal returns. 
While this chapter is concerned with bank contagion, the approach followed is 
much more closely related to the empirical literature on financial market contagion and 
extreme value theory. Financial market contagion (equity markets, foreign exchanges 
markets and, to a more limited extent, bond markets) up until fairly recently was largely 
examined by testing whether the correlation between two markets increased in crisis 
periods (e.g. Bennett and Kelleher, 1988; King and Wadhwani, 1990; Wolf, 2000). 
However, Boyer, Gibson and Loretan (1997) point out that observed increases in asset 
price correlations during crisis periods may simply be a statistical artifact. They show that 
for any bivariate normal return distribution, the correlation coefficient of the two marginal 
distributions, conditional on the marginal distributions’ standard deviations, increases with 
                                                          
67 Grossman (1993) looks at US data for 1875-1914, Hasan and Dwyer (1994) consider the US free banking era 
(1837-1863) and Shoenmaker (1996) the years 1880-1936, also in the US. 
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the conditioning standard deviation. Hence, dividing a sample into crisis periods, which by 
definition tend to exhibit higher volatilities, and tranquil periods, which show lower 
volatility, will statistically result in a higher measured correlation during crisis periods, 
which, however, is not a reflection of contagion. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) correct for the 
problem and conclude that contagion during the 1987 stock market, the 1994 Mexican and 
the 1997 Asian crises may have been significantly overstated. Virtually all of the observed 
patterns can be explained by the markets’ usual interdependence. Recently the Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) approach has been criticized as regards to its lack of robustness with 
respect to omitted variable bias (Corsetti, Pericolo and Sbracia, 2002), as well as its choice 
of time window (Billio, Lo Duca and Pelizzon, 2002). Following this criticism, Ciccarelli 
and Rebucci (2003) present a Bayesian time-varying coefficient model and show that it 
provides improvements in the (joint) presence of heteroskedasticity and omitted variables.  
Another avenue of research has been the application of extreme value theory, 
which concentrates on extreme co-movements, rather than examining statistical 
interdependence for the entire distribution. Examining interdependencies in the tails of the 
distribution, permits the examination of non-linearities in co-movements, as well as a 
relaxation of the assumption of multivariate normality of returns, which in case of fat-
tailed financial market data tend to be violated (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2002; 
Straetmans, 2000). Hartmann, Straetmans and De Vries (2004) apply non-parametric 
extreme dependency measures to study extreme co-movements between stock, bond and 
money markets across G5 countries. They find that while the probability of a crash of the 
size as experienced in 1987 in the US is extremely low, the conditional probability of 
having a stock market crash of the size of 1987 in a G5 country, given a crash of this size 
in another G5 country, is significantly higher. In addition, the paper shows that the tails of 
the distribution exhibit substantial non-linearities relative to the entire distribution of 
returns. Longin and Solnik (2001) apply extreme value theory to monthly G5 equity 
returns between 1958 and 1996, assuming a logistic distribution function. They reject 
normality in the left tail (crashes), but not in the right tail (booms).68 
In this chapter we examine contagion in a sample of 67 EU banks. For these 
banks we analyze the weekly first difference of the distance to default and weekly 
abnormal stock returns. We define contagion as one bank being hit by an idiosyncratic 
shock, which is transmitted to other banks. We will not specify the channel of 
transmission, but one could imagine money markets, payment systems, equity (ownership) 
links and “pure” contagion. The approach employed is quite closely related to Longin and 
                                                          
68 Another strand of literature has advocated the use of GARCH models (Hamao et al., 1990; Lin et al., 1994; 
Susmel and Engle, 1994). Ramchand and Susmel (1998) extent the approach such that high variance and low 
variance states are no longer required to be drawn from the same distribution. Hence, they estimate a bivariate 
switching ARCH model, with the advantage that crisis episodes are endogenously determined by the data. 
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Solnik (2001), in the sense that we test whether the observed co-exceedances (i.e. the 
presence of two or more banks in the tail of the distribution simultaneously) are consistent 
with a multivariate normal distribution. As in Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) we also 
examine, whether a student t distribution under different assumptions about its kurtosis is 
consistent with the observed patterns in the data. We find that within countries, 
multivariate normality can be rejected in all cases. A student t distribution may be 
consistent with the observed patterns in some countries but generally we cannot replicate 
the co-exceedances either under multivariate normality or student t assumptions. The same 
result is found for simulations across country pairs. The findings are strongly suggestive of 
non-linearities in the tails of the distribution. We argue that an appropriate way to address 
this finding may be a non-parametric approach. Hence, the chapter presents a simple 
measure of what we label “net-contagious influence.” Using this method we identify 
banks, which appear to have been of systemic importance both for individual countries and 
across countries. Overall, the results suggest that there may be few banks with EU-wide 
systemic importance. 
The chapter has implications for the ongoing debate on how to use market 
information for supervisory purposes and for monitoring financial stability. It is also of 
relevance to a better understanding of the extent to which European banking systems have 
become interconnected and how banking problems could spread across borders. The 
remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, the calculation of our 
main measure of bank risk is briefly described. In section 6.3 the sample and the data used 
in this chapter are described, section 6.4 discusses the approach to identifying contagion 
employed and presents the main results. In section 6.5, we apply the methodology to 
identifying systemically important banks in the EU and section 6.6 concludes. 
6.2 Calculation of ln(∆dd) 
We use the weekly first difference of the distance to default as our measure of bank risk. In 
Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2002) it was argued that specifically with respect to banks, the 
distance to default may be a particularly suitable and all-encompassing measure of bank 
risk. In particular, the measure’s ability to measure risk is not affected by the presence of 
explicit or implicit safety nets (unlike e.g. subordinated debt spreads). Further, it combines 
information about stock returns with leverage and volatility information, encompassing the 
most important concepts of risk (unlike e.g. unadjusted stock returns). As we are interested 
in the transmission of shocks from one bank to another we use the first difference of the 
distance to default. We calculated the distance to default for each bank in the sample and 
for each time period, t, using that period’s equity market data. The distance to default is 
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derived based on the Black-Scholes model, in which the time path of the market value of 
assets follows a stochastic process: 69 
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assumes is normally distributed, with zero mean and unit variance, N(0,1).  
Hence, the current distance d from the default point (where DV TA lnln = ) can 
be expressed as:  
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That is, the distance to default, DD  
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represents the number of standard deviations that the firm is from the default point. The 
inputs to DD, VA and σA, can be calculated from observable market value of equity capital, 
VE, volatility of equity σE, and D using the system of equations below: 
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69 See KMV Corporation (1999) for a similar derivation and more ample discussions.  
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The system of equations (6.4) is solved by using the generalized reduced gradient method 
to yield the values for VA and σA, which in turn entered into the calculation of the distance 
to default. The measure of bank risk used in this study is then obtained by taking  
ln(ddt/ddt-1), using the end of week distance to default, which in the following will be 
denoted as ln(∆dd). Hence, ln(∆dd) measures the percentage change in the number of 
standard deviations away from the default point. 70 
As underlying data we used monthly averages of the equity market capitalization, 
VE from Datastream. The equity volatility, σE, was estimated as the standard deviation of 
the daily absolute equity returns and, as proposed in Marcus and Shaked (1984), we took 
the 6-month moving average (backwards) to reduce noise. The presumption is that the 
market participants do not use the very volatile short-term estimates, but more smoothed 
volatility measures. This is not an efficient procedure as it imposes the volatility to be 
constant. However, equity volatility is accurately estimated for a specific time interval, as 
long as leverage does not change substantially over that period (see for example Bongini, 
Laeven and Majnoni, 2002). The total debt liabilities, VL, are obtained from published 
accounts and are interpolated (using a cubic spline) to yield weekly observations. The time 
to the maturing of the debt, T was set to one year, which is the common benchmark 
assumption without particular information about the maturity structure. Finally, we used 
the government bond rates as the risk-free rates, r. 
6.3 Sample selection and characteristics 
We started with all EU banks that are listed at a stock exchange and whose stock price and 
total debt are available from Datastream during January 1991 to January 2003 (92 banks). 
We deleted all banks that had trading volume below one thousand stocks in more than 30% 
of all trading days (7 banks). Furthermore, we deleted three additional banks where we had 
serious concerns about data quality71 and 15 banks due to data covering less than half of 
the entire sample period. As will be seen below, completeness of data for each bank 
remaining in the sample is important, in order to avoid distortions in our measure of 
contagion due to few (tail) observations. The resulting sample contains 38600 week/bank 
observations for 67 banks, i.e. on average around 576 observations per bank (Table 6.1). 
The sample contains 39 banks with maximum number of observations, given the 
time period considered (628) and only three banks with less than 400 observations. The 
minimum number of observations is 351 (Banco di Desio e della Brianza). On average the 
                                                          
70 Below we will also show results for the absolute first difference in the distance to default, ∆dd, and abnormal 
returns. 
71 The banks showed zero equity return on a high number of trading days, resulting in extremely volatile distances 
to default.  
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banks in the sample are just above four standard deviations away from the default point (a 
mean distance to default of 4.03). However, this hides substantial variation in the health of 
banks. Banco di Napoli represents the minimum with a distance of default dipping below 
zero at -0.29, suggesting that the bank was in default. No other banks exhibit negative 
distances to default in the sample; Banco Espaniol de Credito (Spain), Bankgesellschaft 
Berlin (Germany), Sampo Leonia (Finland), SEB (Sweden) all show distances to default 
below one and all are well known to have experienced significant difficulties during the 
period under consideration in this chapter. At the other end of the spectrum, there were 14 
banks with a maximal distance to default of above 10. Interesting the global maximum of 
17.11 is attributable to the same bank that also experienced the global minimum: Banca di 
Napoli. The mean of the first difference in the distance to default is approximately zero, 
the largest negative change is about –4, which given a mean level of 4 can truly be 
considered a sizeable weekly shock. 
The banks in the sample are generally quite large. On average, total assets amount 
to EUR 152 billion. The relatively large average size is an outcome of the requirement for 
the bank to be traded at a stock exchange. Nevertheless, the size variation is considerable 
within the sample. For example, the largest bank, Deutsche Bank, is 300 times the size of 
the smallest, Banco Desio e della Brianza. Table 6.2 gives all banks in the sample, ranked 
by total assets. The table suggests that in most countries, the largest banks are covered, 
although there are some notable exceptions, such as Belgium, where Dexia and Fortis both 
had to be excluded due to data limitations. This results in an above 50 percent coverage of 
total banking assets in the EU, despite the fact that in numbers the sample contains less 
than 1 percent of all EU banks (Table 6.3). The degree of coverage in each country 
depends on the number of banks traded at a stock exchange and the structure (especially 
concentration) of the banking system. The sample contains banks from all EU countries 
except Luxembourg. The ranking of all banks by total assets (with the largest bank in each 
country in bold) is also presented, because it permits a check of all results presented 
subsequently in the chapter. Clearly, the naïve approach to determining within country 
Table 6.1 
Descriptive statistics of the distances to default 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation 
Distance to default 4.03 -0.29 17.11 1.88 
Log-differenced DD -0.0003 -1.47 1.25 0.031 
Total assets (in billions of euro) 152.0 2.8 927.9 198.5 
Number of observations 576 351 628 77.0 
Number of tail observations 60.1 20 125 28.6 
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Table 6.2 
Sample banks (sorted by total assets in 2000, millions of euro) 
1 Deutsche Bank DE       927,900  
2 BHVB        694,300  
3 BNP Paribas FR       693,053  
4 ABN AMRO NL       543,200  
5 Barclays UK       486,936  
6 Dresdner Bank        482,600  
7 Societe Generale        455,881  
8 Commerzbank        454,500  
9 ING        406,393  
10 Banco Santander Central Hispano ES       347,288  
11 Banca Intesa IT       331,364  
12 National Westminster        294,695  
13 Abbey National  293,395 
14 BBVA        292,557  
15 HSBC        288,339  
16 Royal Bank of Scotland        206,176  
17 Bankgesellschaft Berlin        203,534  
18 UniCredito Italiano        202,649  
19 Danske Bank DK       182,520  
20 KBC Bank BE       176,909  
21 Sanpaolo IMI        171,046  
22 Bank Austria AT       164,669  
23 Standard Chartered        161,964  
24 DePfa Group        156,446  
25 Bank of Scotland        136,288  
26 Banca di Roma        132,729  
27 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB) SE       118,261  
28 Natexis Banques Populaires        113,131  
29 Svenska Handelsbanken        112,804  
30 Allied Irish Banks IE         77,932  
31 Bank of Ireland          73,859  
32 Banco Comercial Portugues PT         61,850  
33 BHF-BANK          53,863  
34 Rolo Banca 1473          47,044  
35 Banco Espanol de Credito          44,381  
      (continued on next page) 
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        continued 
36 Banca Popolare di Bergamo          37,670  
37 Banco di Napoli          34,361  
38 Banca Popolare di Lodi          34,223  
39 Creditanstalt          34,040  
40 Banco Espirito Santo          33,862  
41 Sampo Leonia FI         32,795  
42 IKB Deutsche Industriebank          32,359  
43 Banco Popular Espanol          31,288  
44 Alpha Bank GR         30,183  
45 Banca Popolare di Milano          28,282  
46 Okobank          27,086  
47 Banca Lombarda          26,816  
48 Banco Totta e Acores          23,166  
49 BPI-SGPS          21,906  
50 Banca Popolare di Novara          20,959  
51 Banca Popolare Commercio e Industria (BPCI)          20,911  
52 Jyske Bank          17,044  
53 Commercial Bank of Greece          16,164  
54 Credito Emiliano          15,148  
55 Anglo Irish Bankcorp          11,047  
56 Banca Agricola Mantovana          10,190  
57 Banco Pastor            9,404  
58 CPR            8,616  
59 Credito Valtellinese            7,416  
60 Banco Guipuzcoano            5,518  
61 Kas-Associatie            5,417  
62 Banco Zaragozano            5,175  
63 Schroders            4,180  
64 Banca Popolare di Intra            3,929  
65 Close Brothers            3,241  
66 Singer & Friedlander Group            2,792  
67 Banco di Desio e della Brianza            2,776  
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systemically important banks would be to pick the largest bank(s) in each country and for 
the EU as a whole, the largest banks in the EU. 
As the first step we calculated the full correlation matrix of ln(∆dd) for all banks 
in the sample.72 As expected, within country correlations are higher than across country 
correlations. For example in Germany, BHVB correlation with Deutsche Bank, Dresdner 
Bank and Commerzbank are around 0.7, the correlation between Deutsche Bank and 
Dresdner Bank is 0.86. Similarly, the correlation between the distribution of ING and ABN 
Amro in the Netherlands is 0.6. The correlation in ln(∆dd) among UK banks is also high, 
in many cases above 0.5. However, in some cases within country correlations among banks 
are much lower, i.e. in Italy where most correlations cluster around 0.2, as well as in 
Portugal, Sweden and Austria. In Spain, we have some banks that show quite high 
correlations, especially involving BBVA, whose ∆dd shows a correlation of 0.6 with 
Banco Santander and 0.5 with Banco Popular Espanol. Most other Spanish banks show 
correlations that range between just above zero and 0.2. 
                                                          
72 The matrix is not presented due to space limitations, but is available upon request. 
Table 6.3 
Sample composition and coverage by country 
The total assets of banks in the sample  
 
Country 
Number of 
banks 
Percentage of total assets of 
commercial banks 
Austria 2 35.3% 
Belgium 1 22.7% 
Germany 8 55.4% 
Denmark 2 85.3% 
Spain 7 68.3% 
Finland 2 43.5% 
France 4 36.2% 
Greece 2 33.4% 
Ireland 3 44.0% 
Italy 17 59.5% 
The Netherlands 3 58.9% 
Portugal 4 53.7% 
Sweden 2 79.2% 
United Kingdom 10 72.8% 
  
Total 67 53.9% 
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Again as one would expect, correlations are also generally quite low for cross-
country bank pairs. Of the 4489 cross-country correlations, only around 60 (less than 2 
percent) are above 0.3. High correlations exist between German and some Spanish banks, 
between the largest French and Spanish banks, between Dutch and German, as well as 
Dutch and Irish banks. Interestingly, some banks tend show negative correlations with 
most banks in the sample. These include Banco di Napoli and Okobank, both of which 
experienced substantial difficulties during the sample period.73 
As we have argued above, the study of correlations may be misleading or 
uninformative in a number of respects. Correlations may not be constant during crisis 
times, precisely when they would be of particular interest. It has been well established that 
the behavior of tail observations for financial market data is quite different from the 
behavior of other observations. In addition, we are specifically interested in distinguishing 
contagion, as opposed to common shocks affecting banks simultaneously. We define 
contagion as one bank being hit by an idiosyncratic shock, which then is transmitted to 
other banks. Correlations, by definition, will not be able to distinguish the two, unless one 
attempts to fully control for common (macro) shocks. Related to this, in the case of banks 
in particular, the direction of contagion is of interest, i.e. which bank may have systemic 
importance for other banks. 
For these reasons, in this chapter we follow Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) and 
focus on co-exceedances in the tails of the distribution of ln(∆dd). We count the number of 
periods at least one bank’s ln(∆dd) is in the tail of the distribution (“exceedance”) and, 
more importantly, the number of periods more than one bank is in the tail of the 
distribution (“co-exceedance”). We arbitrarily define a tail event as one in the 5 percent 
(positive and negative) tail of the distribution. Figure 6.1 shows the number of tail events 
per week: panel A shows the histogram of both tails simultaneously, while panel B and 
panel C represent the number of tail events in the positive and negative tail respectively. 
The histograms show that the tail events are not evenly spread over the sample period. The 
maximum number of co-exceedances is reached in the first week of November 1997, when 
49 (out of 67) banks have a big (negative) change in their distance to default. 
In Table 6.4 we report the counts of the number of co-exceedances within countries. For 
the within country exercise to be meaningful, we were limited to countries with at least 
three banks. Hence, no figures are provided for banks in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece and Sweden.74 
                                                          
73 As we will see below, idiosyncratic shocks facing each bank are crucial in order to identify contagion. This 
issue will be revisited below. 
74 Note that the banks in these countries will, however, be considered when we examine systematically important 
banks below. 
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Figure 6.1 
Histogram of tail events 
This figure shows the number of tail events per week in ln(∆dd). The tail is defined as the 5% largest 
(positive tail) and smallest (negative tail) observations of the distribution of ln(∆dd). Panel A shows 
the histogram of both tails simultaneously. Panel B and panel C represent the number of tail events in 
the positive and negative tail respectively. 
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For the following, we also limit the sample to banks for which we have at least 
500 concurrent observations; this is necessary for the simulations reported below.75 Let us 
examine co-exceedances within countries first. The maximum number of co-exceedances 
is naturally constrained by the number of banks for which we have observations. From this 
perspective, Germany, Italy, and the UK are the most interesting countries, as we have 8, 
10 and 7 banks in the sample, respectively. Considering only these three countries, one is 
immediately struck by the fact that Germany and Italy have 6 and 8 weeks, during which 5 
or more banks were in the bottom tail and 4 and 7 weeks, respectively, in which 5 or more 
banks were in the top tail. In contrast, the corresponding figures for Spain are 2 and 2 
weeks. Recall that the correlations among banks of ln(∆dd) considering the entire 
distribution were higher in Germany and Spain compared to Italy. Next, consider the three 
countries with three banks (France, Ireland and the Netherlands) together with Portugal, 
which has 4 banks in the sample. Ireland and Portugal have substantially more weeks, in 
which all three (or more, in case of Portugal) banks were in the bottom tail compared to the 
                                                          
75 The requirement will be relaxed in section 6.5 of this chapter. 
Table 6.4 
Summary statistics of (co-)exceedances for weekly log-differenced distance to defaults 
for EU banks 
 
Number of (co-) exceedances in the bottom tails 
 >6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
DE (8 banks) 3 3 8 9 20 79 416 
ES (7 banks) 1 1 5 11 29 98 483 
FR (3 banks) - - - 2 15 29 384 
IE (3 banks) - - - 7 15 43 563 
IT (10 banks) 5 3 5 10 36 114 403 
NL (3 banks) - - - 3 11 40 418 
PT (4 banks) - - 3 7 9 46 420 
UK (7 banks) 0 6 1 6 33 102 480 
Number of (co-) exceedances in the top tails 
 >6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
DE (8 banks) 1 3 6 9 29 83 407 
ES (7 banks) 0 2 7 12 22 102 483 
FR (3 banks) - - - 3 11 34 382 
IE (3 banks) - - - 4 13 56 555 
IT (10 banks) 5 2 8 18 27 105 411 
NL (3 banks) - - - 7 2 46 417 
PT (4 banks) - - 1 5 11 56 412 
UK (7 banks) 1 0 6 10 25 109 477 
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other two countries. Furthermore, there are considerable asymmetries with respect to 
bottom and top tail co-exceedances. In Ireland, for example, there are seven weeks, in 
which all three Irish banks experienced a bottom tail event, but only four weeks in which 
all three banks had a top tail event. Also, in the UK bottom tail co-exceedances are more 
frequent than top tail co-exceedances, as there is only one week with five banks co-
exceeding in the top tail, but six such cases in the bottom tail. 
We are also interested in cross-border contagion. Hence, we performed the same 
exercise of counting co-exceedances for bilateral country pairs of the largest EU countries 
(Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the UK). The results are reported in Table 6.5. For ease 
of presentation, we report co-exceedances if at least one bank from each country is in the 
tail in a given week. Hence, the category “5 co-exceedances” for the UK-FR country pair 
contains at least one bank each from the UK and France, but we do not distinguish between 
whether there are four French banks and one UK bank or four UK banks and one French 
bank. Overall, there are a substantial number of weeks with more than five banks 
concurrently in the tail. Excluding the country pairs with France, which given the low 
number of French banks in the sample are not strictly comparable, this figure varies from 6 
(Spain-UK) to 16 (Germany-Spain) for the bottom tails and from 7 (Spain-UK) to 20 
(Spain-Italy) for the positive tails. For the country pairs involving France, five or more 
banks are in the bottom tail 5-7 weeks, in the top tail 3 to 9 weeks. This high variation in 
itself may suggest that there are differences across country pairs, although clearly this may 
be due to common shocks hitting banks in the two countries simultaneously as much as to 
contagion. Looking across the table, one also notices that in some cases the frequency of 
bottom tail co-exceedances appears to be quite different from the one in the top tail, 
although no strong patterns emerge. 
In summary, both the relatively high number of co-exceedances and the 
asymmetry in bottom and top tail co-exceedances are suggestive that the correlation among 
banks may not be constant during “extreme” times. In the following section, we compare 
the observed co-exceedances with those generated by Monte Carlo simulations under 
standard distributional assumptions. 
6.4 Identification of contagion 
6.4.1 Co-exceedance and Monte Carlo evidence 
Suppose that the variance/covariance matrix of ln(∆dd) is stationary over the sample period 
and that the returns follow a multivariate Normal or student t distribution. Using that 
variance-covariance matrix, we simulate 1000 random realizations of the time series of 
weekly realizations of ln(∆dd). In order to limit computations, rather than simulate the 
joint distribution of all 67 banks, we simulated country pair by country pair. For each 
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realization, we identify the 5 percent tail for the bottom tail and the top tail separately and 
perform a non-parametric count across banks within countries. This process yields a set of 
simulated exceedances (one bank in the tail) and co-exceedances (two or more banks in the 
tail), which we can compare to the number of exceedances and co-exceedances in the 
actual data. 
The distribution of the co-exceedances will depend on the assumptions made 
about the data generating process. We perform Monte Carlo simulations under three 
assumptions: The data have been generated by a multivariate normal distribution, by a 
student t distribution with 5 degrees of freedom or by a student t distribution with 10 
Table 6.5 
Summary statistics of (co-)exceedances for weekly log-differenced distance to defaults 
for EU banks, cross-country evidence 
In parenthesis the number of banks in each country. Co-exceedances are defined such that at least 
one bank from each country is in the tail. Hence zero co-exceedances does not preclude that many 
banks in one country can be in the tail simultaneously. The number of observations may differ across 
country groups, as they are determined by the bank with the least number of observations available. 
Only concurrent samples for banks were used. 
 
Number of (co-) exceedances in the bottom tails 
 >6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
ES-UK (7,7) 5 1 6 10 30  576 
ES-DE (7,8) 10 6 9 8 7  498 
ES-FR (7,3) 3 3 4 5 7  408 
ES-IT (7,10) 8 2 4 18 24  520 
DE-UK (8,7) 9 2 9 6 8  504 
DE-FR (8,3) 5 2 2 4 5  384 
DE-IT (8,10) 10 3 8 9 15  493 
FR-UK (3,7) 4 1 4 3 4  414 
FR-IT (3,10) 5 1 4 6 6  408 
UK-IT (7,10) 10 3 6 12 19  526 
Number of (co-) exceedances in the top tails 
 >6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
ES-UK (7,7) 0 7 5 11 24  581 
ES-DE (7,8) 10 4 9 10 11  494 
ES-FR (7,3) 3 02 4 2 7  412 
ES-IT (7,10) 11 9 8 12 24  512 
DE-UK (8,7) 4 6 9 14 16  489 
DE-FR (8,3) 1 5 2 5 9  380 
DE-IT (8,10) 11 5 5 12 22  483 
FR-UK (3,7) 1 2 3 7 7  410 
FR-IT (3,10) 5 4 3 1 11  406 
UK-IT (7,10) 9 5 11 7 22  522 
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degrees of freedom.76 The results of this exercise are reported in Table 6.6 for each country 
separately. We, as before, limited ourselves to countries with three or more banks. We find 
that the multivariate Normal distribution is unable to replicate the number of co-
exceedances in the actual data for any of the banks in the countries we study, regardless of 
whether we consider positive or negative co-exceedances. Even more striking, in some 
countries, the student t distribution with 5 degrees of freedom, i.e. under fairly strong 
assumptions about kurtosis, is unable to generate the number of co-exceedances in the data 
or if it is, is unable to replicate the number of single exceedances. 
Let us consider the countries with at least 7 banks first. The multivariate Normal 
distribution generates zero weeks with five or more co-exceedances for Spain, the UK, and 
Italy for both tails, while the actual figures are 2, 6 and 8 weeks for the bottom tail and 2, 1 
and 7 weeks for the top tail, respectively. In Germany the Normal distribution, due to the 
higher correlations among banks, generates 3 weeks with five or more co-exceedances in 
both tails, which compares to 6 (4) weeks for bottom (top) tails in the data. In general, in 
the case of Germany, the Normal distribution comes closest of all countries to replicating 
the actual data. In Ireland, France, and the Netherlands, there are only three banks in the 
sample. The Normal distribution generates 1.7, 0.9 and 1.1 weeks, respectively, in which 
all of these banks are simulated to be in the bottom tail. This compares to 7, 2 and 3 weeks 
in the data. The figures for the top tails look quite similar. 
The student t distribution yields simulation results closer to the actual data. For 
example, the German and Spanish co-exceedances for both tails can largely be replicated 
assuming a student t distribution with 10 degrees of freedom. In countries with 3 or 4 
banks, we find that the student t distribution with 5 degrees of freedom is able to replicate 
the results for both tails in France and Portugal and for bottom tails in the Netherlands and 
the top tails in Ireland. Nevertheless, the results overall suggest that in most countries it is 
exceedingly difficult to replicate the distribution of co-exceedances. Looking at the 95 
percent confidence bands of the simulated distributions, we can reject equality for all 
countries at least for some level of co-exceedance for the Normal distribution and for many 
in case of the student t distributions.  
                                                          
76 The degrees of freedom in a student t distribution equal N+K-1, where N is the number of banks (8 for 
Germany, 7 for Spain, 3 for France, 3 for Ireland, 10 for Italy, 3 for the Netherlands, 4 for Portugal and 7 for the 
UK) and where K can be set from 1 (significant positive excess kurtosis) to 25 (little excess kurtosis, 
approximating Normal). We also explored scenarios with lower values for K, but found them to vastly understate 
the number of cases with co-exceedances of less than 3 banks. Bae et al. (2003) report also scenario’s using a 
multivariate GARCH approach, but find that it also is unable to generate the number of co-exceedances in their 
sample of emerging market stock returns. 
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We wanted to check whether this result would extend to other measures of bank 
risk. We report the results for the first differenced distance to default in Table 6.6a. 
Conceptually, the simple first difference in the distance to default reflects shocks, which 
are large in absolute terms. This has the consequence, however, that banks, which are 
already close to the default point, by construction, cannot experience a tail event, as the 
distribution of the level distance to default is truncated at zero. The log-differenced 
distance to default highlights percentage changes, which avoids the problem of truncation. 
However, to the extent that our measure is noisy, for banks close to the default point we 
may be interpreting noise as tail events. 
Table 6.6a is organized exactly as Table 6.6 above. Comparing the two tables it 
turns out that the results are very similar. As before, a multivariate normal distribution is 
not able to replicate our counts of co-exceedances. The fatter-tailed student t-distribution 
does a better job in this respect. For example, both measures suggest equal frequencies of 
weeks in which at least five banks were concurrently in the tail (in countries with at least 5 
banks). More formally, we examined whether applying the first-differenced simulation 
results to the log-differenced actual co-exceedances would have resulted in more or less 
rejections of the simulated co-exceedances. We found this not to be the case, the only 
exception being the UK in the case of negative tail co-exceedances. In addition, we 
checked whether the measures pick up the same exact weeks with a high number of 
exceedances and whether the banks with an exceedance are the same. Again we found this 
to be the case.77  
For the second robustness check we use abnormal returns, which we obtained by 
using the residuals from the following standard one factor model: 
itctit MR εαα ++= 10        (6.5) 
where Rit denotes the weekly log return of bank i in week t and Mct denotes the weekly log 
return of the broad market index of the country c, where bank i is headquartered. The 
estimated residuals itεˆ  are then the abnormal returns of bank i. Results from estimating 
equation (6.5) are given in Appendix 6.A. The estimated coefficient on α1 (“beta”) is of 
particular interest. On average, it is 0.89, with a maximum of 1.58 (Standard Chartered) 
and a minimum of 0.22 (Banco Guipuzcoano). In all cases, the coefficient is significant at 
the one percent level. On average, the market portfolio explains around a third of the total 
variation in log weekly returns (R2 = 0.32). 
                                                          
77 In most cases the number of extreme observations was approximately the same and deviations were small, i.e. 
no more than one bank. For example, looking at the negative tail for Italy, during weeks with 6 or more banks in 
the tail in the first differences of the distance to default distribution (Table 6.6), there were at least 4 banks in the 
tail of the log difference distribution. The same holds for the positive tail: the two extra observations in table 6.6a, 
had respectively 5 and 4 banks in the tails when the first difference of the distances to default was used. 
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Descriptive statistics for the resulting abnormal returns are given in Table 6.7. 
Notice that the number of observations is higher (647 versus 576), since some data were 
lost in the calculation of stock price volatility used as in input in the distance to default and 
there were missing values for other inputs. The mean for the abnormal returns is equal to 
zero, as expected. The minimum and maximum are quite high and are caused by 
exceptional cases: the maximum is due to Banca di Napoli in January 1998 and the 
minimum is due to Banco Espanol de Credito in February 1994. Note that outliers should 
not be a problem, given that we consider the presence in the tail rather than the absolute 
size of returns. 
The comparison between the actual abnormal return data and the simulations are 
reported in Table 6.6b, which is constructed in the same way as Tables 6.6 and 6.6a above. 
It shows that we observe significantly fewer instances, in which many banks experienced a 
bottom tail event concurrently, compared to the other two measures. This is not entirely 
surprising, because we have eliminated at least some macro shocks as a source for the 
concurrent presence in the tail of the distribution of more than one bank. It is striking, 
however, to observe that as for the two measures used before, the normal distribution is 
unable to replicate the observed frequencies of co-exceedances. Further, even when 
assuming fat tailed distributions such as the student t distribution with 5 and 10 degrees of 
freedom, in many countries we can reject that such distributions adequately describe the 
observed patterns. Note one important conceptual difference between the distance to 
default and abnormal returns. The distance to default is declining in the volatility of the 
underlying assets, while returns are increasing in asset volatility (see Goh and Ederington, 
1993; Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes, 2003 and Gropp and Richards, 2001), due to the call 
option characteristic of the stock price.78 While we examine results for abnormal returns  
 
                                                          
78 The increase in stock prices in response, say, to an increase in leverage may result in a positive abnormal 
return, while the distance to default will decline. 
Table 6.7 
Descriptive statistics for first differenced distance to default and abnormal returns 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum St. deviation 
∆ Distance to default -0.001 -3.97 6.69 0.15 
Abnormal returns 0.000 -94.20 131.94 3.75 
Number of observations 647 402 681 69.73 
Number of tail observations  65 20 153 30.7 
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also below, we view this as a major caveat and would place greater emphasis on results 
obtained using the distance to default as a measure of bank risk.79 
We reach similar conclusions when considering cross-country co-exceedances. 
The results for the log-differenced distance to default, the first differenced distance to 
default and abnormal returns are reported in Tables 6.8, 6.8a and 6.8b, respectively. We 
performed exactly the same exercise, simulating multivariate Normal and student t 
distributions with 5 and 10 degrees of freedom, using the historical variance-covariance 
matrix to replicate the patterns of co-exceedances reported in Table 6.5. In case of the log-
differenced distance to default (Table 6.8), neither the multivariate Normal nor the student 
t distributions can replicate the patterns of co-exceedances observed in the data for any 
country pair, except for Germany-France. In all cases (aside from Germany-France) we 
can reject equality based on the 5 percent simulated confidence band at least for some level 
of co-exceedances. This is true for the bottom as well as for the top tail co-exceedances. 
Again, patterns are strikingly similar for the first differenced distance to default (Table 
6.8a), although in this case there is rejection in all cases. Finally, for the abnormal returns 
(Table 6.8b), we find that we cannot reject that the simulated patterns coincide with actual 
patterns for two country pairs: Germany-France and France-Spain. Nevertheless, the 
difference for the cross-border co-exceedances between the three measures seem even 
smaller than in the case of within country co-exceedances and the inability of the 
simulations to replicate the patterns observed in the data even more striking. 
Table 6.9 gives some summery statistics for the Monte Carlo Simulations. 
Overall, the normal distribution is unable to explain the patterns in the data. There is 
virtually no country or country pair, in which there is not at least one rejection. The student 
t distributions, especially the student t with 10 degrees of freedom, do slightly better, but 
for all measures there are only few countries or country pairs, for which there is not at least 
one rejection. While our simulation difficulties may ultimately concern only a relatively 
small number of observations, the events that occur “too often” compared to multivariate 
Normal or student t distributions may be precisely those one would be interested in from 
the perspective of bank contagion. 
6.4.2 Differences in conditional sample frequencies: A measure of net contagious 
influence 
Given this evidence in favor of non-linearities in the tail of the distribution, there are a 
number of avenues for how to proceed. Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) propose a multi-
nomial logistic regression model, utilizing the fact that the co-presence of observations 
                                                          
79 We also examined the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the size of the tail. While all calculations in the 
paper were performed for 5 percent tails, we redid the analysis for 10 percent tails and found virtually identical 
results for the difference in the distance to default. The results are available upon request. 
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Table 6.9 
Summary statistics for Monte Carlo simulations 
 
 Log-differenced 
distance to default 
First differenced 
distance to default 
Abnormal returns 
Within country    
   % rejections     
      Bottom tails (total 45)    
Multivariate normal 62.2% 73.3% 55.5% 
Student t (5) 28.9% 24.4% 13.3% 
Student t (10) 26.7% 20.0% 15.6% 
      Top tails (total 45)    
Multivariate normal 57.7% 62.2% 44.4% 
Student t (5) 17.8% 17.8% 31.1% 
Student t (10) 13.3% 15.6% 13.3% 
   No rejection: # of countries 
(total 8) 
   
      Bottom tails     
Multivariate normal 0 0 1 
Student t (5) 3 4 6 
Student t (10) 3 3 5 
      Top tails     
Multivariate normal 1 1 2 
Student t (5) 3 4 3 
Student t (10) 5 4 5 
      Both tails    
Multivariate normal 0 0 0 
Student t (5) 1 3 3 
Student t (10) 1 1 5 
Across country pairs    
   % rejections     
      Bottom tails (total 60)    
Multivariate normal 61.7% 63.4% 36.7% 
Student t (5) 30.0% 43.3% 25.0% 
Student t (10) 18.3% 25.0% 20.0% 
      Top tails (total 60)    
Multivariate normal 61.7% 63.4% 35.0% 
Student t (5) 21.7% 30.0% 30.0% 
Student t (10) 15.0% 20.0% 23.3% 
   No rejection: # of country pairs  
   (total 10) 
   
      Bottom tails     
Multivariate normal 0 0 1 
Student t (5) 1 0 2 
Student t (10) 4 3 3 
      Top tails     
Multivariate normal 0 1 1 
Student t (5) 2 2 2 
Student t (10) 4 3 2 
      Both tails    
Multivariate normal 0 0 0 
Student t (5) 0 0 2 
Student t (10) 1 0 2 
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in the tails can be modeled as a polychotomous variable. Alternatively, GARCH-M 
models, modeling changing volatilities asymmetrically, may also be a way forward (see 
e.g. Ang and Chen, 2002). We follow a different approach, refraining from making any 
assumptions about the underlying data generating process. Instead we propose the 
following simple non-parametric measure of net contagious influence of bank A on bank B 
)/()/(/ TTTTBA BAPABP −=Ω       (6.6) 
where P(BT / AT) denotes probability that bank B is in the tail of the distribution in some 
period given that bank A is also in the tail. Expression (6.6) is simply the difference in the 
observed conditional sample frequencies of bank A and bank B experiencing a tail event. 
Under which circumstances does (6.6) give us an accurate signal regarding the net 
contagious influence between the two banks? Assume that all shocks are i.i.d. over time. 
Suppose further that idiosyncratic shocks and the macro shock are jointly distributed. In 
addition, we need to define some notation: 
(i) IS represents the realization of bank I’s idiosyncratic shock, where I ∈ (A,B). 
(ii) IT represents the event that bank I is in the tail of the distribution. 
(iii) M is the realization of the common shock. A common shock is defined such that 
upon its realization both banks are in the tail. 
(iv) pAB represents the probability that there is contagious influence from bank A to 
bank B. We define contagious influence such that bank B is not hit by a shock 
(either common or idiosyncratic) but is in the tail and A is hit by an idiosyncratic 
shock, which through contagious influence results in bank B experiencing a tail 
event. 
We claim that there is net contagious influence from bank A to bank B if pAB>pBA. 
Recall that for any two banks A and B, bank A can be in the tail of the distribution if  
(i) it is hit by an idiosyncratic shock (AS) and B is or is not hit by an idiosyncratic 
shock, or  
(ii) if there is a common (macro) shock (M) affecting both banks simultaneously, or  
(iii) if bank B is hit by an idiosyncratic shock and there is contagion from bank B to 
bank A. 
We do not assume that the system of the two banks A and B is closed. This means 
that we do not exclude the possibility of outside contagion. However, if this outside 
contagion affects either bank individually, this is observationally equivalent to an 
idiosyncratic shock affecting the bank and, hence, is subsumed under IS. Similarly, suppose 
both banks experience contagion from some bank other than A and B. In our framework 
this would be subsumed under the banks experiencing a common shock. Note that the 
phrase common shock, as used here, is distinct from a macro shock affecting all banks; 
rather a common shock is simply a shock affecting both banks, such that they are in the tail 
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of the distance to default or abnormal return distribution. This can, but must not be, a 
macro shock. 
Breaking down the conditional probabilities of being in the tail into their 
components we obtain (where ¬ denotes ‘not’): 
)(),,(),,(),,(
)(),,(),,(),,()|(
MprpMBAprMBAprMBApr
MprpMBAprpMBAprMBAprABp
BASSSSSS
BASSABSSSS
TT +¬¬+¬¬+¬
+¬¬+¬¬+¬=   (6.7) 
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+¬¬+¬¬+¬=   (6.8) 
A necessary condition for these probabilities to be defined is that the denominator of the 
two expressions does not become zero. For this we need that each bank has some non-zero 
probability of experiencing an idiosyncratic shock or that there exists some common 
shock. 
Further, given the decomposition, we immediately see that p(BT|AT)-p(AT|BT )>0 
is equivalent to 
0
),,(
),,(
)1(
)1( >¬¬
¬¬−−
−
MBApr
MBApr
p
p
SS
SS
AB
BA       (6.9) 
Condition (6.9) gives some idea about when the measure of contagious influence gives an 
accurate signal. The accuracy of the signal is inversely related to the ratio of the 
probabilities that that bank A or bank B is hit by an idiosyncratic shock. Put differently, if 
those probabilities are approximately equal, then the measure identifies contagion 
accurately. Unfortunately, the measure may also understate or overstate true contagion, if 
the difference in the probability of experiencing an idiosyncratic shock is large. For 
example, suppose in reality there is no contagion (i.e. pAB=pBA=0), but bank B has a much 
higher probability of experiencing an idiosyncratic shock compared to bank A (i.e. if 
pr(¬AS, BS, ¬M) >> pr(AS, ¬BS, ¬M)). Condition (6.9) tells us that in this case, the 
measure may suggest contagion, even though there is none. Conversely, suppose in reality 
there is contagion. If bank A is very likely to experience an idiosyncratic shock (i.e. if 
pr(¬AS, BS, ¬M) << pr(AS, ¬BS, ¬M)), then the measure tends to understate true 
contagion.80 
                                                          
80 In fact, given our assumption that the system is “open”, pr(As, ¬Bs, ¬M) is composed of the probability of 
being his of an idiosyncratic shock plus the probability of experiencing contagion from some “outside” bank i≠B. 
Hence, a somewhat less stringent requirement for ΩA/B to give a correct signal is that the two components be 
perfectly negatively correlated. If this is violated, holding the probability of experiencing an idiosyncratic shock 
constant, the measure will understate contagion from banks with a lot of outside contagion to banks with little 
outside contagion. This means that the measure understates contagion from banks, which themselves experience a 
lot of contagion to banks which do not and may overstate contagion from banks, which do not experience 
“outside” contagion to those that do.  
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In order to illustrate the intuition behind equation (6.5) consider the example 
given in Figure 6.2. In Case 1, there are five periods. In period 1 we observe that both 
banks are in the tail of the distribution of ∆dd and in period 2, we see only bank B in the 
tail. This means that in period 2 bank B experienced an idiosyncratic shock. If we assume 
that the probabilities of experiencing an idiosyncratic shock are equal across the two banks 
then the two banks should have an equal number of realizations of the idiosyncratic shock 
on average.81 This means the presence of bank A in the tail in period 1 must be the 
realization of an idiosyncratic shock. In turn this implies that there was contagion from 
bank A to bank B. Hence, the approach uses the information contained both in the 
realization of idiosyncratic as well as common shocks. Now consider Case 2. The only 
change involves period 3, in which both banks again are present in the tail. As before, we 
                                                          
81 Of course this is not necessarily true over five periods as in this example. In the actual data, there are around 
600 periods. 
Figure 6.2 
A Simple Example 
 
 
Panel A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 1 Case 2
Period Bank A Bank B Period Bank A Bank B
1 * * 1 * *
2 * 2 *
3 3 * *
4 4
5 5
Pr(x in tail) 0.20 0.40 Pr(x in tail) 0.40 0.60
Pr(A and B in tail) 0.20 0.20 Pr(A and B in tail) 0.40 0.40
Omega Omega
Case 3 Case 4
Period Bank A Bank B Period Bank A Bank B
1 * * 1 * *
2 * 2 *
3 * * 3 * *
4 * 4 *
5 5
Pr(x in tail) 0.40 0.80 Pr(x in tail) 0.60 0.60
Pr(A and B in tail) 0.40 0.40 Pr(A and B in tail) 0.40 0.40
Omega Omega
0.50 0.33
0.50 0.00
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observe that Bank B has a realization of an idiosyncratic shock in period 2. Again, this 
suggests that bank A must have experienced an idiosyncratic shock either in period 1 or in 
period 3, which was transmitted through contagion to bank B. Why does ΩA|B decline from 
0.5 in Case 1 to 0.33 in Case 2? The reason is that we have information, which may 
suggest that the contagious influence from bank A to bank B may be smaller. We know 
that there is contagion from bank A to bank B either in period 1 or 3. But we do not know 
what happened in the other period. Suppose there was contagion in period 1. In period 3, 
there was either the realization of the common shock or each of the banks experienced an 
idiosyncratic shock. This means that the probability of contagion from A to B may be 
lower (but must not be lower), hence the lower ΩA/B. In Case 3, bank B experiences one 
additional realization of the idiosyncratic shock in period 4. Again this provides additional 
information. Under the assumption that both banks have an equal number of realizations of 
the idiosyncratic shock, both periods when both banks are in the tail bank A must have 
experienced an idiosyncratic shock and transmitted it to bank B. In the final Case 4, we 
cannot distinguish the case of a common shock affecting both banks in periods 1 and 3 
from the possibility that in one period bank A transmitting its idiosyncratic shock to bank 
B and in another the contagion goes the other way. Hence, ΩA|B shows no “net contagious 
influence.” 
This discussion has highlighted that the accuracy of the contagious influence 
measure proposed depends on the difference between the probabilities of each bank to be 
hit by an idiosyncratic shock. The example shows that if this probability is not equal, the 
signal given by ΩA|B is not informative. This probability of an idiosyncratic shock is 
unobservable. One solution to this problem may be to attempt to control for the difference 
between the two probabilities through some bank characteristic, which may be related to 
the likelihood of experiencing an idiosyncratic shock. The problem is that the variable 
should also be orthogonal to the likelihood of being subject to contagion. In this chapter, 
we use the size of the bank as measured in total assets as a candidate variable. We view 
size as a summary variable of the different business mix of large banks compared to small 
banks, which in turn tends to expose them to different shocks. For example, large banks 
may have only very little exposure to the small business sector, while small banks may 
conduct a majority of their business there. Similarly, large banks exposure to the stock 
market or to foreign exchange markets may be much larger than the one of small banks.82 
Hence we estimate 
 
BA
B
A
BA S
S
/10/ εββ +⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡+=Ω       (6.10) 
                                                          
82 Obviously, larger banks may also be better diversified compared to small banks and, hence, less likely to be 
subject to contagion.  
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where Si represents an indicator of the size of bank i (see below). We then calculate the 
“adjusted” measure of net-contagious influence as the residuals of equation (6.10), i.e. 
 
01/
*
/
ˆˆ β−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡β−Ω=Ω
B
A
BABA S
S       (6.11) 
To calculate S, we assign each bank a quartile ranking for size in each sample year (i.e. a 
ranking from 1 to 4, with one being “smallest” and four being “largest”). Hence, SA/SB can 
potentially vary from 0.25 to 4. As Ω*A/B is a time invariant measure, we use simple 
averages over the ten-year sample period of the bank characteristics. Put differently, we 
assign a quartile ranking in each year and then take an average of this ranking. As the 
dependent variable exists for each bank pair in the sample, with 67 banks, the sample size 
is 67!/(65!-2!)=2211 observations. 
Table 6.10 
Results from the estimation of equation (6.10): Adjusted net-contagious influence 
*, **, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Coefficients for 
differences in sample size not reported. 
 
Dependent variable β0 β1 R2 n 
Log-differenced distance to 
default 
    
   Positive tail 0.01* 
(0.006) 
0.03*** 
(0.001) 
0.24 2211 
   Negative tail 0.076*** 
(0.006) 
0.023*** 
(0.001) 
0.28 2211 
   Both tails 0.043*** 
(0.005) 
0.028*** 
(0.001) 
0.35 2211 
Abnormal returns     
   Positive tail 0.023*** 
(0.007) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.02 2211 
   Negative tail 0.024** 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.01 2211 
   Both tails 0.02** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.01 2211 
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Equation (6.10) is estimated separately for the log-differenced distance to 
default83 and the abnormal returns. In addition, we estimate equation (6.10) separately for 
negative and positive tails, and for both tails. The estimated coefficients are reported in 
Table 6.10. Before we discuss them, we should clarify that we have no particular prior 
about the sign of 1βˆ . If size is positively correlated with being exposed to idiosyncratic 
risk, because larger banks have a greater exposure to volatile asset markets (especially if 
they take significant unhedged positions), we would see a positive coefficient. If the 
diversification effect dominates, we should see a negative coefficient. Table 6.10 shows 
that the estimated is indeed positive and significant at the 1 percent level in 5 of the 6 
specifications. Only for negative tails of abnormal returns, we find no significance. Note 
also, however, that while we explain between 24 and 35 percent of the variation in Ω*A/B 
for log-differenced distances to default, equation (6.10) only explains very little of the 
variation in Ω*A/B for abnormal returns. 
Next, we examine the obtained results for Ω*A/B for the two measures of bank risk. 
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is 0.17 for positive tails, 0.09 for negative tails 
and 0.16 for both tails. Independence can be rejected at any significance level. While this 
is encouraging, the correlation coefficients are quite low and it may be instructive to 
examine whether the method yields consistent signals across the measures of bank risk 
regarding which banks may be of particular systemic importance. We use the term 
“systemic importance” here in the sense that banks with systemic importance are banks 
that tend have net-contagious influence on other banks. 
6.5 Systemic banks 
6.5.1 Within-country systemic risk 
We define a bank i as having systemic importance within-country Y if: 
 0*/ >Ω=Φ ∑
∈Yj
ji
within
i
       (6.12) 
This simply suggests that if the sum of the net contagious influence of a bank with respect 
to its peers in the same country is positive, it may have systemic importance for the 
banking system as a whole. See Table 6.11 for the statistics of the measure. We report 
results for Ωiwithin >0.1, in order to eliminate contagious influence that is very close to 
                                                          
83 We report the results only for the log differences of the distance to default and not the results for the first 
differences of the distances to default, since we saw in the simulations that both measures yield essentially 
equivalent patterns of co-exceedances. 
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zero84. The results for this exercise are given in Table 6.12. Note that we can only identify 
systemically important banks in countries, where the sample contains more than one bank 
and that in countries where the sample only contains two very large banks, we tend to not 
to be able to detect significant contagious influence.85 This excludes Belgium and in 
Austria, Denmark, Finland and Greece we are unable to identify systemically important 
banks. In the table, we rank banks within countries, i.e. the bank listed first has the largest 
net-contagious influence within a country. A first result is that there seems to be little 
difference between considering negative versus positive tails or both tails jointly, but 
noticeable differences across the two measures of bank risk (log-differenced distance to 
default and abnormal returns). Contagion, as measured here, appears to be symmetric for 
negative and positive shocks. This finding will largely carry through to cross-border 
contagion considered below. 
Now consider the banks that one would have expected to have systemic 
importance judging simply from their size in the country. These banks include Deutsche 
Bank and HVB (DE), and BBVA (ES). In addition, while not the largest banks in the 
country, it is no surprise to find National Westminster Bank, and HSBC (both UK) in this 
group, as well as Sanpaolo IMI,  Unicredito (both IT), Svenska Handelsbanken (SE) and 
ING (NL). These results are largely unaffected whether we consider the log-differenced 
                                                          
84 The threshold of Ωiwithin >0.1 does not imply any claim about significance of the results. Merely, we want to 
exclude those banks whose contagious influence is very close to zero. 
85 Essentially we need at least some banks that are exposed to contagious influence. 
Table 6.11 
Statistics of the measure Ω*i/j , Ωiwithin and Ωiacross 
This table presents the statistics for our measure used. For sake of brevity we only mention the 
statistics for the both tails simultaneously. The results for the negative and positive tail are similar for 
each measure. 
 
Variable Mean 
Stand. 
dev. 
Min. Max. Obs. 10% tail 5% tail 
Ω*i/j  ln(∆dd) 0.000 0.042 -0.292 0.172 2211 0.047 0.068 
         
Ω*i/j  abnormal returns 0.000 0.059 -0.303 0.239 2211 0.069 0.097 
         
Ωiwithin  ln(∆dd) 0.000 0.309 -0.904 0.877 67 0.322 0.498 
         
Ωiwithin abnormal returns 0.000 0.549 -2.055 1.866 67 1.693 2.101 
         
Ωiacross ln(∆dd) 0.000 1.488 -5.830 3.741 67 0.491 0.710 
         
Ωiacross abnormal returns 0.000 2.177 -7.126 5.429 67 2.58 2.94 
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Table 6.12 
Within country contagious influence 
All banks with Ωiwithin > 0.1. Within countries banks are ranked by the size of Ωiwithin. Abbreviations 
used: Banco Popular Espanol (BPE), Banco Guipuzcoano (BG), Credito Valtellinese (CV), Banca 
Agricola Mantonvana (BAM), Banca Popolare di (BP), Banca Desio e della Brianza (BDB), Banca 
Popolare Commercio e Industria (BPCI), Banco Espirito Santo (BES), National Westminster (NW). 
   1/ There is only one bank from Belgium in the sample. 
 
Country
Positive tail Negative tail Both tails Positive tail Negative tail Both tails
Austria None None None None None None
Belgium n.a. 1/ n.a. 1/ n.a. 1/ n.a. 1/ n.a. 1/ n.a. 1/
Germany BHVB IKB Deutsche B Deutsche B Deutsche B Deutsche B
Deutsche B Deutsche B BHVB IKB IKB IKB
Dresdner B Dresdner B BHF BHF
Denmark None None None None None None
Spain B Zaragozano BPE BPE BG BG BG
B Santander B Pastor B Zaragozano BBVA
BBVA BG
BG
Finland None None None None None None
France BNP Paribas CPR BNP Paribas None Societe Generale Societe Generale
Greece None None None None None None
Ireland None None None B of Ireland B of Ireland B of Ireland
Italy Sanpaolo IMI Sanpaolo IMI Sanpaolo IMI CV CV CV
Unicredito Rolo Banca Rolo Banca BP Bergamo BAM BP Bergamo
BP Milano Banca di Roma Unicredito BDB B Lombarda BAM
BDB BP Intra BP Milano BPCI BP Bergamo BDB
Rolo Banca BP Bergamo BDB BAM BPCI BPCI
BPCI BDB B di Roma Unicredito BDB B Lombarda
BP Bergamo Sanpaolo IMI Sanpaolo IMI Sanpaolo IMI
B Lombarda Rolo Banca Rolo Banca
Rolo Banca BP Intra
Netherlands ING None ING None ING None
Portugal None BES None BES BES BES
BPI
Sweden Handelsbanken Handelsbanken Handelsbanken None Handelsbanken Handelsbanken
United Kingdom NW NW NW NW HSBC HSBC
B of Scotland B of Scotland B of Scotland HSBC NW NW
Abbey National Abbey National Abbey National RB of Scotland
HSBC HSBC HSBC
Stand. Chartered
RB of Scotland
Log-differenced distance to default Abnormal returns
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distance to default or abnormal returns. However, there is a number of important 
exceptions to this consistency. One, using the log-differenced distance to default, we 
identify Dresdner Bank as systemically important in Germany, BNP Paribas in France and 
a number of UK banks including Bank of Scotland and Abbey National. Using abnormal 
returns, we no longer identify these banks and instead IKB (DE), Societe Generale (FR) 
and Royal Bank of Scotland appear. We explain these inconsistencies across the log-
differenced distance to default and abnormal returns by their differences. An increase in 
stock price volatility associated with an increase in the stock price will result in an 
unambiguously positive abnormal return, while the effect is ambiguous on the distance to 
default. This is so because the distance to default is declining in asset price volatility. 
Hence, the observed differences can very likely be explained by differences in the type of 
shocks (rather than their frequency) that the banks experienced. 
There are a number of additional surprises, mainly relating to Portuguese, Italian 
and Spanish banks. In Portugal, instead of the largest bank in the country, Banco 
Comercial Portugues, Banco Espirito Santo is identified, which is considerably smaller. 
The most surprising findings emerge for Italy and Spain. In Spain, while BBVA and Banco 
Santander do appear in the table, neither is consistently identified as systemically 
important, although they are by far the largest banks in Spain. Instead, we identify some of 
the smallest banks in our sample: Banco Popular Espaniol (1/10 the size of Banco 
Santander), Banco Guipuzcoano (1/60 of Banco Santander) and Banco Zaragozano (1/60 
of Banco Santander). Similarly in Italy, while Sanpaolo IMI is consistently identified and 
somewhat less consistently Unicredito, Banca Intesa, the largest bank in Italy, does not 
appear at all. Instead, the method identifies a number of very small banks as having 
contagious influence within Italy. 
What can explain these surprising findings? Recall that the measure employed 
crucially depends on the equality of the probability of being hit by an idiosyncratic shock. 
We used differences in size to proxy for this, but it appears from these results that the 
proxy is insufficient. Hence, below we will also report results limited to the largest banks 
in the sample. 
6.5.2 Across-country systemic banks 
Analogously to identifying within country systemically important banks, we can also 
identify systemically important banks for the sample countries as a whole. We define a 
bank i as systemically important for banks in country Z if 
 YZYi
Zk
ki
across
i ≠∈>Ω=Φ ∑
∈
,,0*/     (6.13) 
Hence, this section attempts to identify banks that can be considered systemically 
important in the EU as a whole. The results are summarized in Table 6.13, where we –as  
Measurement of Contagion in European Banks’ Equity Prices 167 
 
Table 6.13 
Cross-country contagious influence 
Only banks with Ωiacross >0.1 listed. Abbreviations used: Banco Popular Espanol (BPE), Banco 
Guipuzcoano (BG), Credito Valtellinese (CV), Banca Agricola Mantovana (BAM), Banca Popolare 
di (BP), Banca Desio e della Brianza (BDB), Banca Popolare Commercio e Industria (BPCI), Banco 
Espirito Santo (BES), Banco Totta e Acores (BTA), Banco Commercial Portugues (BCP), National 
Westminster (NW). 
 
Country
Positive tail Negative tail Both tails Positive tail Negative tail Both tails
Austria None Creditanstalt None None Bank Austria None
Belgium None None None KBC KBC KBC
Germany Deutsche B IKB Deutsche B Deutsche B Deutsche B Deutsche B
BHBV Deutsche B IKB IKB IKB IKB
Dresdner B BHBV BHF BHF BHF
IKB Dresdner B Dresdner B Dresdner B Dresdner B
Commerzbank Commerzbank
Denmark Danske Bank Jyske Bank Jyske Bank Danske Bank Danske Bank Danske Bank
Jyske Bank Danske Bank Danske Bank Jyske Bank Jyske Bank Jyske Bank
Spain BG BPE BPE BG BBVA BBVA
B Zaragozano B Pastor B Pastor BBVA BG BG
B Zaragozano B Zaragozano BPE B Pastor B Pastor
BG BG B Santander BPE BPE
B Zaragozano B Santander B Santander
B Pastor B Zaragozano B Zaragozano
Finland Okobank Okobank Okobank None None None
Sampo Leonia
France BNP Paribas CPR CPR None None None
CPR Natexis BP Natexis BP
Natexis BP BNP Paribas
Greece None Alpha Bank None Alpha Bank None Alpha Bank
Ireland Allied Irish B Allied Irish B Allied Irish B Allied Irish B Allied Irish B Allied Irish B
Anglo Irish B Anglo Irish B Anglo Irish B B of Ireland B of Ireland B of Ireland
B of Ireland B of Ireland B of Ireland
Italy BP Milano Rolo Banca Sanpaolo IMI CV CV CV
Sanpaolo IMI Sanpaolo IMI BP Milano BAM BAM BAM
Unicredito B di Roma Rolo Banca BP Bergamo B Lombarda B Lombarda
BAM CV BPCI BP Bergamo BP Bergamo
BDB BDB BDB
B Lombarda BP Intra BP Intra
Netherlands ING None ING ING ING ING
Kas Assoc. ABN Amro ABN Amro ABN Amro
ABN Amro Kas Assoc.
Portugal None BPI BPI BCP BCP BCP
BES BES BES BES
BPI BPI BPI
BTA BTA BTA
Sweden Handelsbanken Handelsbanken Handelsbanken None None None
United Kingdom Abbey National Abbey National Abbey National NW NW HSBC
B of Scotland RB of Scotland HSBC HSBC HSBC NW
NW NW Barclays
HSBC Barclays B of Scotland
RB of Scotland Stand. Chartered RB of Scotland
Barclays HSBC NW
Stand. Chartered B of Scotland Stand. Chartered
Log-differenced distance to default Abnormal returns
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before- only report the banks with Ωiacross >0.1.86 Let us start with the expected. Deutsche 
Bank (#1 by total assets), Dresdner Bank (#6), ABN Amro (#4), ING (#9), National 
Westminster Bank (#12), Danske Bank (#19) and HSBC (#15) are all consistently 
identified as systemically important for the banks in the sample outside of their own 
country. In addition, there is evidence that HBV (#2), BNP Paribas (#3), Banco Santander 
(#10) and BBVA (#14) have some systemic importance, but the evidence is less clear. On 
the other hand, we have surprises among the included as well as the omitted banks. Among 
the included banks, we find IKB (DE, #42), Allied Irish Banks (#30) and Bank of Ireland 
(#31, both IE), BPI (PT, #49) and some very small Spanish and Italian banks to have 
contagious influence. The notable omissions include Barclays (UK, #5), Societe Generale 
(FR, #7) and Banca Intesa (IT, #11).  
In order to ascertain to which extent this is due to insufficiently controlling for the 
likelihood of idiosyncratic shocks, we redid the analysis, considering only banks above 
EUR 50 billion in total assets (the 33 largest banks of the sample, see Table 6.2). The idea 
is that these banks may be more similar in terms of their probability of experiencing an 
idiosyncratic shock. This exercise also addresses the question of how sensitive the results 
are to the sample composition, i.e. whether or not a specific bank is included. In addition, 
of course, the limitation gives an idea of contagion among the largest banks only, which 
may be of independent interest. Table 6.14 shows that the results are quite robust. By 
definition, the smallest banks no longer appear in the table, but those that do appear tend to 
be identical to those when using the full sample. 
The approach summarized here, which consists of unweighted sums, may hide 
considerable bilateral links among banks. For example, a bank would be found not to have 
any contagious influence based on Ωiwithin and Ωiacross, if it had a strong contagious 
influence on one bank, but was subject to an equally strong contagious influence from 
another bank. In order to address this issue, we prepared Table 6.15, which lists the 
number of banks that have contagious influence on at least three other banks. We are 
considering “strong” contagious influence only; that is the upper 10 percent tail of the 
distribution of Ω*A/B. We report the results for cross-border contagion only. Comparing 
these results to those in Table 6.13, the main finding is that there is somewhat more 
consistency across the rows of the table. Fundamentally, however, Tables 6.13 and 6.15 
exhibit surprising consistency. 
                                                          
86 The list of banks would have been longer, of course, if we had reported all banks with Ωiacross > 0 (for the 
statistics on this measure, see Table 11). While we do not make any claims about statistical significance, by using 
this nonzero threshold, we exclude banks whose contagious influence is essentially zero. Note that the number of 
banks differs somewhat, as banks in the same country do not enter Ωiacross. Hence for KBC the sum Σk∈Z Ωiacross  
contains 66 items (KBC is the only Belgian bank in the sample), while for Italian banks it contains 50 items, i.e. 
67 total – 17 Italian banks. It is clear that even banks with small or even negative Ωiacross may exercise some net 
contagious influence on some banks. We will examine this in more detail below. 
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Table 6.14 
Cross country contagious influence:  
Banks with total assets of EUR 50 billion or more 
Only banks with Ωiacross >0.1 listed. Abbreviations used: Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP) and 
National Westminster (NW). 
 
Country
Positive tail Negative tail Both tails Positive tail Negative tail Both tails
Austria (1) None None None None Bank Austria None
Belgium (1) None None None KBC KBC KBC
Germany (7) Deutsche B Deutsche B Deutsche B Deutsche B Deutsche B Deutsche B
Dresdner B BHBV Dresdner B Dresdner B Dresdner B
BHBV Dresdner B BHF BHF BHF
Commerzbank
Denmark (1) Danske Bank Danske Bank Danske Bank Danske Bank Danske Bank Danske Bank
Spain (2) None None None BBVA BBVA BBVA
B Santander B Santander B Santander
Finland (-) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
France (3) BNP Paribas Natexis BP Natexis BP None None None
Natexis BP BNP Paribas
Greece (-) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ireland (2) Allied Irish B Allied Irish B Allied Irish B Allied Irish B Allied Irish B Allied Irish B
B of Ireland B of Ireland B of Ireland B of Ireland B of Ireland B of Ireland
Italy (4) Sanpaolo IMI Sanpaolo IMI Sanpaolo IMI None None None
Unicredito Banca di Roma
Netherlands (2) ING None ING ING ING ING
ABN Amro ABN Amro ABN Amro ABN Amro
Portugal (1) None None None BCP BCP BCP
Sweden (2) Handelsbanken None Handelsbanken None None None
United Abbey National Abbey National Abbey National HSBC HSBC HSBC
Kingdom (7) B of Scotland B of Scotland B of Scotland NW NW NW
Barclays Barclays Barclays
HSBC HSBC HSBC
NW NW NW
RB of Scotland RB of Scotland RB of Scotland
Stand. Chartered Stand. Chartered
Log-differenced distance to default Abnormal returns
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Table 6.15 
Cross country contagious influence 
In parenthesis: Number of banks on which bank exercises “strong” contagious influence. “Strong” is 
defined as the upper 10 percent tail of Ω*A/B. Only banks with contagious influence to at least three 
other banks are reported. Banco Popular Espanol (BPE), Banco Guipuzcoano (BG), Credito 
Valtellinese (CV), Banca Agricola Mantonvana (BAM), Banca Popolare di (BP), Banca Desio e 
della Brianza (BDB), Banca Popolare Commercio e Industria (BPCI), Banco Espirito Santo (BES), 
Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP), National Westminster (NW). 
 
Country
Positive tail Negative tail Both tails Positive tail Negative tail Both tails
Austria None Creditanstalt (3) None None None None
Belgium None None None KBC (10) None KBC (4)
Germany HBV (11) Deutsche B (4) HBV (4) Deutsche B (16) BHF (3) BHF (3)
Deutsche B (15) IKB (6) Deutsche B (10) IKB (3) Commerzbank (6) Commerzbank (5)
Dresdner B (7) Dresdner B (4) Deutsche B (10) Deutsche B (14)
Dresdner B (4) Dresdner B (3)
IKB (10) IKB (5)
Denmark None Jyske Bank (4) Jyske Bank (3) Danske Bank (11) Danske Bank (12) Danske Bank (12)
Jyske Bank (9) Jyske Bank (4)
Spain BBVA (3) B Pastor (3) BPE(3) BBVA (5) BBVA (8) BBVA (9)
BPE (3) BPE (8) BG (6) B Pastor (3) B Guipuzcoano (4)
B Santander (3) BPE (5) B Santander (3) B Pastor (3)
B Zaragozano (3) B Santander (4) BPE (3)
B Zaragozano (4) B Santander (3)
Finland None Sampo Leonia (7) None None None None
France BNP Paribas (12) None BNP Paribas (5) BNP Paribas (3) None None
Natexis BP (3)
Greece n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ireland Allied Irish B (6) Allied Irish B (22) Allied Irish B (20) Allied Irish B (14) Allied Irish B (5)
Anglo Irish B (3) Anglo Irish B (7) Anglo Irish B (9) B of Ireland (6)
B of Ireland (4) B of Ireland (18) B of Ireland (8)
Italy B Intesa (3) B di Roma (6) BDB (3) BAM (7) BAM (9) BAM (6)
B di Roma (3) Rolo Banca (8) Rolo Banca (4) BP Bergamo (7) B Lombarda (9) BP Bergamo (9)
BP Milano (6) Sanpaolo IMI (11) Sanpaolo IMI (12) BPCI. (4) BP Bergamo (10) BPCI (4)
BDB (6) Unicredito (3) BDB (6) CV (17) BDB (6)
Sanpaolo IMI (9) CV (12) BDB (5) CV (16)
Unicredito (7) Unicredito (3) Sanpaolo IMI (3) Sanpaolo IMI (4)
Netherlands ING (8) ING (4) ING (7) ABN Amro (3) ABN Amro (13) ABN Amro (7)
ING (20) ING (24) ING (26)
Portugal None BES (7) BPI (4) BCP (16) BCP (10) BCP (12)
BPI (7) BES (10) BES (22) BES (16)
Sweden None None None None None None
United Kingdom Abbey National (23) Abbey National (21) Abbey National (31) NW (3) None HSBC (6)
B of Scotland (16) B of Scotland (7) B of Scotland (15) HSBC (14)
Barclays (9) Barclays (9) Barclays (11)
NW (11) NW (10) NW (12)
HSBC (10) HSBC (8) HSBC (10)
Stand. Chartered (5) RB of Scotland (7)
RB of Scotland (16)
Log-differenced distance to default Abnormal returns
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Finally, the data easily lend themselves to the preparation of “contagion charts”, 
in which the links among the banking systems in different countries are graphically 
represented (Figures 6.3-6.7). We have limited ourselves to showing the map for the 
largest five European countries. A thin arrow on the figure indicates that there is some 
contagious influence from the banks in one country to another. A thick arrow indicates that 
there is some contagious influence from the banks in one country on a bank that was 
identified as systemically important within its own country in Table 6.12. The figures 
show how closely linked banking systems of different countries are. For example, the link 
between German and UK banks seems to be quite strong, as the banks in each country tend 
to have contagious influence on the systemically important banks in the other. But there 
are also unidirectional links among countries. Considering the German chart once more, 
Danish and Irish banks have contagious influence upon German banks, but not vice versa. 
How should this be interpreted? Clearly the converse of contagious influence as described 
in this chapter must be some sort of exposure to risks in the other banking system 
(abstracting from pure contagion). Hence, the thick arrow from Ireland to Germany in 
Figure 6.3 suggests that German banks are substantially exposed to the Irish banking 
system. This exposure could manifest itself through direct exposures, i.e. in the money 
Figure 6.3 
Cross-border contagious influence: Germany 
A thin arrow means that banks 
in country A have some 
contagious influence to at least 
one bank in country B. A thick 
arrow means that banks in 
country A have contagious 
influence to a bank in country 
B with within-country systemic 
importance. 
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Figure 6.4 
Cross-border contagious influence: France 
A thin arrow means that banks 
in country A have some 
contagious influence to at least 
one bank in country B. A thick 
arrow means that banks in 
country A have contagious 
influence to a bank in country 
B with within-country systemic 
importance. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 
Cross-border contagious influence: Italy 
A thin arrow means that banks 
in country A have some 
contagious influence to at least 
one bank in country B. A thick 
arrow means that banks in 
country A have contagious 
influence to a bank in country 
B with within-country systemic 
importance. 
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Figure 6.6 
Cross-border contagious influence: Spain 
A thin arrow means that banks 
in country A have some 
contagious influence to at least 
one bank in country B. A thick 
arrow means that banks in 
country A have contagious 
influence to a bank in country 
B with within-country systemic 
importance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7 
Cross-border contagious influence: UK 
A thin arrow means that banks 
in country A have some 
contagious influence to at least 
one bank in country B. A thick 
arrow means that banks in 
country A have contagious 
influence to a bank in country 
B with within-country systemic 
importance. 
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market, in exposures through the payment system, ownership links and potential direct 
exposures to non-financial sectors in the country. It would go beyond the scope of this 
chapter to explore the exact nature of these links, however; rather, we view these maps as a 
basis for further research into the underlying fundamentals for these links. 
6.6 Conclusions 
This chapter analyses bank contagion in a sample of 67 EU banks for the period 1991-
2003. The methodology employed builds upon previous work on financial market 
contagion (Bae, Karolyi and Stulz, 2003). First, we analyze the properties of three weekly 
indicators: the simple first difference of the distance to default (measuring absolute 
shocks), the log-differenced distance to default (percentage shocks) and, as robustness 
check, abnormal returns. Monte Carlo simulations show that the patterns observed in the 
tails of the data, regardless of the measure used, are inconsistent with standard multivariate 
Normal or student t distributions, suggesting substantial non-linearities. Based on this 
finding the study proposes a simple non-parametric measure of what is labeled “net 
contagious influence”. We show that this measure may be able to accurately measure 
contagion among any bank pair, as long as the probabilities of an idiosyncratic shock 
hitting the two banks are quite similar. We control for differences in these probabilities by 
adjusting our measure for bank size, arguing that bank size may pick up important 
differences in the business mix of banks. 
We use the measure to identify banks, which have systemic importance within 
countries and across countries. While the results seem quite sensible for most countries, in 
Italy and Spain the measure seems to suggest that an unreasonable number of very small 
banks have systemic importance. We argue that the reason for this uncomfortable finding 
may be that Italian and Spanish small banks have a particularly low probability of 
experiencing an idiosyncratic shock and hence our measure overstates contagion of these 
banks with respect to other banks. Overall, the chapter shows that there may be tight links 
among banks within countries, as well as links connecting the major banking systems in 
Europe. We do not detect a major difference between the strength of links among euro area 
versus non-euro area countries.  
We view the chapter as a first step towards devising market based indicators of 
how vulnerable banks and banking systems may be to contagion. The measure of 
contagion suggested in this chapter has the advantage of being able to identify the direction 
of contagious influence among banks, although only on a “net” basis. The results presented 
in the chapter may provide a basis to obtain a better understanding of the extent to which 
European banking systems have become interconnected and how banking problems could 
spread across borders. The study, however, is a purely statistical exercise and to explain 
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the patterns obtained in this chapter with fundamentals remains an important avenue for 
future research. 
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6.A. Results from a one factor model 
Results from estimating equation (6.5). Dependent variable is the log return of bank i in week t, the 
independent variable is the log return of the market portfolio (broad market indices) of country c, in 
which the bank has its headquarters. 
 
 
 
R-squared
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error T-value
        
Bank Austria 0.093 0.187 0.867 0.095 9.135 0.164
Creditanstalt -0.065 0.172 1.095 0.066 16.687 0.402
KBC Bank 0.078 0.102 1.194 0.045 26.274 0.504
Bankgesellschaft Berlin -0.249 0.177 0.727 0.066 11.021 0.152
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank (BHVB) -0.090 0.138 1.208 0.051 23.474 0.448
BHF-BANK 0.109 0.127 0.563 0.049 11.489 0.168
Commerzbank -0.148 0.123 1.191 0.046 26.057 0.500
DePfa Group 0.096 0.149 0.601 0.056 10.761 0.158
Deutsche Bank -0.046 0.100 1.194 0.037 32.197 0.604
Dresdner Bank 0.045 0.119 0.903 0.047 19.231 0.362
IKB Deutsche Industriebank -0.010 0.086 0.417 0.032 13.099 0.202
Danske Bank 0.068 0.103 0.952 0.045 21.132 0.397
Jyske Bank 0.068 0.110 0.632 0.048 13.193 0.204
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) 0.022 0.101 1.337 0.034 38.805 0.689
Banco Espanol de Credito (BES) -0.249 0.219 0.781 0.075 10.477 0.139
Banco Guipuzcoano (BG) 0.101 0.088 0.221 0.030 7.381 0.074
Banco Pastor 0.131 0.115 0.426 0.039 10.840 0.148
Banco Popular Espanol (BPE) 0.154 0.111 0.821 0.038 21.751 0.411
Banco Santander Central Hispano -0.016 0.110 1.335 0.038 35.501 0.650
Banco Zaragozano 0.044 0.126 0.465 0.043 10.814 0.147
Okobank 0.046 0.164 0.184 0.034 5.345 0.042
Sampo Leonia -0.021 0.233 0.581 0.050 11.617 0.166
BNP Paribas -0.008 0.169 1.209 0.059 20.665 0.470
CPR -0.139 0.181 0.618 0.071 8.750 0.116
Natexis Banques Populaires -0.068 0.143 0.659 0.052 12.692 0.192
Societe Generale 0.035 0.141 1.276 0.051 24.916 0.478
Alpha Bank 0.059 0.124 1.024 0.026 40.083 0.703
Commercial Bank of Greece -0.028 0.156 1.258 0.032 38.989 0.691
Allied Irish Banks 0.052 0.106 1.172 0.041 28.707 0.548
Anglo Irish Bankcorp 0.183 0.147 0.805 0.057 14.231 0.230
Bank of Ireland 0.122 0.102 1.181 0.039 29.910 0.569
Banca Agricola Mantovana (BAM) 0.081 0.104 0.325 0.031 10.408 0.138
Banca Intesa 0.048 0.172 0.998 0.051 19.435 0.357
Banca di Roma -0.249 0.172 1.203 0.051 23.392 0.446
Banca Lombarda 0.121 0.118 0.342 0.035 9.739 0.123
Banca Popolare di Bergamo 0.063 0.112 0.498 0.033 14.882 0.246
Banca Popolare Commercio e Industria (BPCI) -0.046 0.133 0.533 0.040 13.347 0.208
Banca Popolare di Intra 0.125 0.118 0.410 0.035 11.596 0.165
Banca Popolare di Lodi -0.028 0.134 0.502 0.040 12.492 0.187
Banca Popolare di Milano -0.066 0.150 0.782 0.045 17.438 0.309
Banca Popolare di Verona -0.018 0.157 0.610 0.047 12.987 0.199
Banco di Desio e della Brianza (BDB) 0.134 0.197 0.455 0.058 7.841 0.133
Banco di Napoli -0.160 0.311 0.697 0.091 7.638 0.101
Credito Emiliano -0.068 0.202 0.724 0.061 11.961 0.174
Credito Valtellinese (CV) 0.014 0.100 0.400 0.030 13.425 0.210
Rolo Banca 1473 0.128 0.165 0.763 0.048 15.865 0.307
Sanpaolo IMI -0.106 0.157 0.986 0.046 21.590 0.454
UniCredito Italiano 0.086 0.151 1.142 0.045 25.315 0.486
ABN AMRO 0.027 0.110 1.259 0.044 28.923 0.565
ING -0.003 0.110 1.455 0.043 33.668 0.647
Kas-Associatie 0.148 0.141 0.512 0.057 8.990 0.106
Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP) -0.010 0.104 1.008 0.044 22.723 0.432
Banco Espirito Santo (BES) 0.090 0.112 0.903 0.046 19.688 0.420
Banco Totta e Acores (BTA) 0.080 0.124 0.675 0.053 12.846 0.196
BPI-SGPS -0.015 0.150 1.259 0.064 19.780 0.366
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB) -0.033 0.259 0.897 0.075 11.979 0.174
Svenska Handelsbanken 0.149 0.190 0.653 0.055 11.936 0.173
Abbey National 0.051 0.136 1.150 0.062 18.592 0.337
Bank of Scotland 0.115 0.154 1.421 0.075 18.995 0.384
Barclays 0.070 0.132 1.423 0.060 23.639 0.451
Close Brothers 0.166 0.159 0.798 0.072 11.018 0.152
National Westminster (NW) -0.063 0.161 1.531 0.080 19.180 0.415
Schroders 0.103 0.159 1.081 0.072 15.002 0.249
Singer & Friedlander Group 0.060 0.155 0.622 0.071 8.827 0.103
Standard Chartered 0.116 0.164 1.575 0.075 21.079 0.396
HSBC 0.190 0.142 1.487 0.064 23.300 0.498
Royal Bank of Scotland 0.174 0.143 1.445 0.065 22.237 0.421
Average 0.028 0.145 0.887 0.052 18.015 0.320
α0 α1
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 7 Summary and Conclusions 
In this thesis we study euro area stock markets and the European banking sector. 
These markets are especially interesting given the huge number of developments in Europe 
over the recent past. The history of the European integration process and the changes that 
can have an impact on asset pricing are briefly described in chapter 1. The remainder of the 
dissertation shows that the implications of the European integration process clearly stretch 
to European stock markets. This overall conclusion has immediate consequences for 
investors in these assets. 
Chapter 2 explores the importance of country versus industry factors for investors 
in euro area stock markets. Most of the literature on this topic shows that country effects 
have been dominating industry effects in the previous century, both globally as well as in 
Europe specifically. Rouwenhorst (1999) examines the euro area in detail and finds no 
changes in the level of country and industry effects in his sample through mid 1998. Other 
authors, e.g. Cavaglia, Brightman and Aked (2000), Isakov and Sonney (2002) and 
Adjaouté and Danthine (2001a, 2001b, 2002), find a slow change in the ratio between 
country over industry effects. We use a mean-variance approach in order to re-examine 
this issue for the euro area stock markets using a recent sample since 1995. We find that an 
investor is better off diversifying over different industries compared to diversifying over 
different countries alone. This conclusion is supported both statistically, by spanning and 
intersection tests, and visually through plots of mean-variance frontiers. Furthermore, we 
show that the use of a conditional method leads to the same conclusions as an 
unconditional method for this sample. We contribute this change to the structural changes 
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in the euro area, since a robustness test on the inclusion of IT-related indices does not 
result in different conclusions. In other words, the IT-hype around the turn of the 
millennium did not cause the increase in relative importance of sector factors, but only 
strengthened the effect found. In line with the research of Cavaglia, Brightman and Aked 
(2000) and Isakov and Sonney (2002) we expect that this trend is moving on. An important 
argument is that real integration in the euro area will increase only more as soon as the 
legal and regulatory barriers between countries will be harmonized even more. For 
example, these barriers still impede the synergy effects that firms can achieve by clustering 
industries in the same region.  
Chapter 3 concentrates on asset pricing of (portfolios of) assets. The literature in 
the 80’s and 90’s has shown that the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the base model 
for asset pricing by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), does not perfectly explain the 
returns of portfolios formed by characteristics like size, book-to-market ratio and other 
ratios. Therefore, Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) introduce a three-factor 
model (3FM), including a market factor, a size factor and a so-called value factor. Though 
there is criticism whether these factors really reflect sources of risk, by e.g. Daniel and 
Titman (1997), the model is very popular amongst both academics and practitioners. This 
has resulted in a large stream of literature on this model. One of the practical issues 
concerning the 3FM is whether a local version of the 3FM describes the returns just as 
good as a global version of the model. Griffin (2002) shows that a local model is better in 
explaining the cross-section of returns and advocates the use of a local model for Canada, 
Japan, the U.K, and the U.S. Chapter 3 investigates which ‘domestic’ model an investor 
should pursue for the euro area financial markets. Before the introduction of the common 
currency a local (country) 3FM would intuitively be more appropriate, but this intuition is 
less strong after the elimination of exchange rate risk on January 1, 1999. We show that the 
local model has a better performance in our sample from 1991 till 2002. This result holds 
both when we test a local country 3FM against the euro area 3FM as well as for a local 
industry 3FM against the euro area 3FM. Apparently, the country or sector information is 
more important than the euro area wide information that is captured in the bigger model. 
Furthermore, this conclusion seems to be robust over time as well: the local model 
outperforms the euro area 3FM. The relative difference between the country 3FM and the 
euro area version is declining over time, especially for the major countries in the euro area 
financial markets. We assign this shift to the European integration process. The results in 
this chapter confirm the conclusions of Chapter 2, stating that the country information is 
getting less important, while sector information remains an important driver for equity 
returns. 
All attention in chapter 4 is aimed at the role of inflation risk in an international 
asset-pricing context. Since investors are concerned with asset returns in real terms, 
uncertainty about inflation is a potentially important source of risk for investors in 
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financial assets. This is especially visible in the euro area. After the elimination of nominal 
exchange rate risk in the European Monetary Union, inflation differentials between 
European countries may still imply a non-trivial real exchange rate risk. Angeloni and 
Ehrmann (2004) document that inflation differentials are still large and persistent also after 
the launch of the euro. The starting point in this chapter is the International CAPM 
(ICAPM) of Adler and Dumas (1983). This model has been empirically tested by many 
papers, starting with Dumas and Solnik (1995) and De Santis and Gérard (1998). Both of 
these papers assume that the inflation rates are non-stochastic and hence real exchange rate 
risk collapses to nominal exchange rate risk. We examine the validity of this assumption 
for the G5-countries: France, Germany, Japan, U.K., and U.S. We find that inflation risk 
forms a substantial part of the total risk premium for the considered markets in addition to 
the premium for market risk and nominal exchange rate risk. We find that all risk premia 
vary over time and that the inflation risk premium is both statistically and economically 
significant. At the same time we show that the price of inflation risk is much higher than 
the price of nominal exchange rate risk, implying that investors are more risk averse to 
bearing one unit of inflation risk than one unit of currency risk. A possible argument for 
this finding can be found in hedging. It is much easier to hedge nominal exchange rate risk 
than to hedge inflation rate risk. The market for exchange rate derivatives is very liquid 
and has been available throughout our sample period, while this is not the case for 
inflation-linked bonds (the only product that provides a hedge for inflation risk).87 Lastly, 
our parameterization provides a natural possibility to test for the validity of the ICAPM. If 
the ICAPM holds, the prices of risk for nominal exchange rate and inflation risk should be 
equal. The empirical results strongly reject this hypothesis and therefore do not support the 
ICAPM. 
The second part of this thesis, which embodies Chapters 5 and 6, examines the 
European banking sector. Chapter 5 studies the level of financial integration between 
European banks measured by the correlation of bank equity prices. We develop a 
parsimonious model that is able to detect different integration (correlation) regimes. The 
model is applied to a set of 41 European banks that have a continuous share price listing 
over the period January 1990 – March 2003. The main finding in this chapter is that the 
correlation between larger banks has increased substantially over this period, whereas the 
correlation between smaller banks has become lower. A reason for this result could be that 
investors perceive that the activities of bigger banks are becoming more integrated. 
Another reason may be that as a result of institutional and other larger investors turning 
their investment strategies towards a European sector-based approach, investors are 
increasingly tracking indices of the European banking sector. An implication of this 
                                                          
87 Only the inflation-indexed bond market in the UK has a relatively long history. 
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phenomenon could be that the European banks will be forced to follow either of two 
strategies. The first one is to remain a small and specialized bank, with activities in a 
regional setting. The other strategy is to integrate and become a larger player in Europe. 
The advantages of the latter strategy are that banks can have easier access to capital 
markets, leading to lower funding risk, lower costs of capital, and higher credit ratings. As 
a result capital market forces will help in breaking the integration paradox of European 
banking. 
In chapter 6 we examine the interdependence of bank equity prices during 
extreme events. Whereas chapter 5 concentrates on the general correlation between 
European bank stock prices, the interdependence in the tails forms the core of chapter 6. In 
the first part of chapter 6 we provide evidence for the growing conviction that the tail 
behavior of bank equity prices is not normally or student-t distributed. Monte Carlo 
simulations show that the observed frequency of large shocks for European banks cannot 
be explained by these distributions. Hence, we treat the tail observations of these stocks 
with a different approach. Following Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) we study the frequency 
of large shocks through the number of (co-)exceedances. In the second part of this chapter 
we introduce a non-parametric approach that we label “net-contagious influence”. The 
measure represents the difference in the conditional probabilities of being in the tail 
between two banks adjusted for differences in the probabilities of being hit by an 
idiosyncratic shock. We show that this measure should give an accurate indication of 
contagious influence between two banks. Using this method we identify banks, which 
appear to have been of systemic importance within individual countries and across 
countries. 
The central theme in this thesis is the question to what extent equity markets have 
changed over the recent history as a consequence of the European integration process. 
Clearly, through the introduction of the common currency the exchange rate risk between 
euro area countries has disappeared, creating a pathway for a higher rate of integration. In 
this thesis we show with different research methodologies that the consequences of these 
structural changes are visible at the equity markets. For example, chapter 2 reports that a 
sector-based approach is more valuable for investors than the more traditional country-
based style. Chapters 3 and 5 discuss the consequences for the pricing of (portfolios of) 
individual stock returns. However, there is still a long way to go. Many differences in legal 
systems still create obstacles to the full integration of financial markets. For example, the 
government bond markets show similar yields (there is only a small spread due to 
differences in default risk of the governments), but the corporate bond markets are also 
influenced by differences in corporate taxation and tax deductions. This argument holds as 
well for the equity markets. De Grauwe (2003) states that more progress towards financial 
integration is essential in order to absorb asymmetric shocks, since the main risk-sharing 
mechanism that will be available must come from the integration of financial markets. In 
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this thesis we show that equity markets show the first signs of changing behavior caused 
by the structural changes in the euro area. But, given the necessity for the EMU to 
harmonize and liberalize financial markets much more, we expect that equity markets will 
also become more integrated with each other.  
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Nederlandse Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
In het eerste hoofdstuk staat de motivatie voor dit proefschrift beschreven tezamen met de 
geschiedenis van het Europese integratieproces en de gevolgen voor het prijzen van 
aandelen in het algemeen. De rest van dit proefschrift bestaat uit twee delen, die in totaal 
vijf hoofdstukken beslaan. Het eerste deel (hoofdstukken 2-4) bestudeert de 
diversificatiemogelijkheden binnen de Eurozone en test verschillende modellen voor het 
prijzen van aandelen. Deel II (hoofdstukken 5 en 6) concentreert zich op de Europese 
bankensector, waarbij niet alleen de correlatie (samenhang) tussen de aandelenprijzen van 
banken wordt bestudeerd, maar ook de bijbehorende risico’s ter sprake komen. Hoofdstuk 
7 vat de conclusies van dit proefschrift samen.  
Hoofdstuk 2 bestudeert de relevantie van landen- en industriefactoren voor het 
beleggen in het eurogebied. De meeste literatuur van de jaren negentig (en daarvoor) over 
dit onderwerp vindt dat landeneffecten belangrijker zijn dan industrie-effecten, op zowel 
globaal als Europees niveau. Rouwenhorst (1999) bestudeert het eurogebied in het 
bijzonder, aangezien hij wijzigingen voorziet als gevolg van het verdrag van Maastricht uit 
1992. Hij vindt echter geen bewijs van structurele wijzigingen en laat zien dat het 
landeneffect nog dominant is tot halverwege 1998. Meer recente literatuur, zoals Cavaglia, 
Brightman en Aked (1999), Isakov en Sonney (2002) en Adjaouté en Danthine (2001a, 
2001b, 2002), vindt een langzame verandering in de ratio van landeneffecten over 
sectoreffecten. Omdat de literatuur geen concreet uitsluitsel geeft over de beide effecten, 
bekijk ik dit onderzoek opnieuw vanuit het perspectief van een investeerder. Hiervoor 
maak ik gebruik van een andere methodologie (de traditionele portefeuilletheorie van 
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Markowitz, 1952) en recente data vanaf 1995 van aandelenprijzen uit het eurogebied. Ik 
laat zien dat een investeerder beter af geweest zou zijn als hij zijn beleggingen gespreid 
zou hebben over verschillende sectorindices dan over verschillende landenindices. Deze 
conclusie wordt gebaseerd op een visuele analyse van ‘mean-variance frontiers’ en 
statistisch onderbouwd door middel van spanning- en intersectietesten. Het resultaat geldt 
voor de gehele onderzoeksperiode, maar is sterker na de introductie van de euro per 1 
januari 1999. Bovendien toon ik aan dat dit resultaat robuust is en niet wordt veroorzaakt 
door de IT-hype rond de millenniumwisseling of door verschillen in volatiliteit.  
Hoofdstuk 3 concentreert zich op het prijzen van (portfolio’s van) aandelen. In de 
jaren ’80 en ’90 komt er kritiek op het ‘Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)’ van Sharpe 
(1964) en Lintner (1965). Zo blijkt bijvoorbeeld dat het model niet goed werkt voor 
portfolio’s die gevormd worden op basis van karakteristieken als grootte, boek-
marktwaarde ratio etc. Fama en French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) introduceren daarom een 
3-factor model (3FM), waarin een factor voor de markt, een factor voor de grootte en een 
waardefactor zit. Ondanks het feit dat sommige onderzoekers weer kritiek hebben op het 
3FM, omdat de factoren geen werkelijke weerspiegeling van risicofactoren zouden zijn 
(Daniel en Titman, 1997), is het model toch erg populair onder wetenschappers en 
beleggers. Dit heeft geresulteerd in een grote stroom aan literatuur over dit model. Eén van 
de praktische zaken van het 3-factor model (3FM) is de vraag of de lokale versie dan wel 
de globale versie van het model gebruikt moet worden. Alhoewel het model van origine in 
principe globaal is, laat Griffin (2002) zien dat het lokale model beter in staat is de 
aandelen te prijzen voor een steekproef die bestaat uit aandelen van de V.S., Canada, Japan 
en het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt welk ‘lokaal’ model een belegger zou 
moeten toepassen voor de financiële markten uit het eurogebied. Intuïtief is een “landen-
3FM” de meest logische keuze in de periode voor de introductie van de euro, maar na 1 
januari 1999 is dit een minder duidelijke zaak. In hoofdstuk 3 komt naar voren dat een 
lokaal model een betere performance heeft dan een eurowijd model op basis van data van 
1991 tot 2002. Dit resultaat blijkt te gelden voor zowel een “landen-3FM” tegenover een 
“eurogebied-3FM” (welke alleen Europese factoren meeneemt en geen specifieke 
landenfactoren) als voor een “sector-3FM” (tegenover een “eurogebied-3FM”). Blijkbaar 
is de land- en industriespecifieke informatie belangrijker dan de globale informatie die in 
het euro-3FM model zit. Daarnaast blijkt dat de conclusies hetzelfde blijven als de 
steekproef in twee gelijke delen wordt opgesplitst: het lokale model presteert beter dan het 
euro 3FM. Wel is het zo, dat de relatieve performance van het landen-3FM afneemt t.o.v. 
het euro-3FM. Dit laatste blijkt vooral voor de grotere landen van toepassing te zijn 
(Duitsland, Frankrijk, Italië en Nederland). Deze verschuiving zien wij als gevolg van het 
Europese integratieproces. De conclusies in dit hoofdstuk bevestigen de resultaten van 
hoofdstuk 2. Cavaglia, Brightman en Aked (1999) en Isakov en Sonney (2002) rapporteren 
een stijgende trend in de relatieve waarde van industriële informatie ten opzichte van 
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landeninformatie. De resultaten in de hoofdstukken 2 en 3 laten zien dat deze trend zich 
daadwerkelijk voortzet en dit effect zal alleen nog maar sterker worden, indien de 
hervormingen binnen de Europese Unie zich verder voortzetten. 
In hoofdstuk 4 is alle aandacht gericht op de rol van inflatierisico bij het prijzen 
van aandelen in een internationale context. Aangezien investeerders belang hechten aan 
rendementen in reële termen, kan onzekerheid omtrent de hoogte van de inflatie een 
belangrijke component zijn voor investeerders bij het bepalen van hun risicopremie. Een 
concreet voorbeeld hiervan is de huidige situatie in het eurogebied. Na de afschaffing van 
de wisselkoersen in de Europese Monetaire Unie kan het nog steeds zo zijn dat verschillen 
in inflatiepercentages tussen eurolanden een zeker reëel wisselkoersrisico met zich 
meedragen. Angeloni en Ehrmann (2004) laten zien dat de inflatieverschillen tussen 
eurolanden nog steeds groot zijn na de introductie van de euro. Het uitgangspunt in dit 
hoofdstuk is het internationale CAPM (ICAPM) van Adler en Dumas (1983). Dit model is 
empirisch getest door verschillende onderzoekers, waaronder Dumas en Solnik (1995) en 
De Santis en Gérard (1998). Beide artikelen nemen aan dat inflaties niet-stochastisch zijn 
en daarmee is het reële wisselkoersrisico gelijk aan het nominale wisselkoersrisico. 
Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de validiteit van deze aanname voor de G5-landen: Duitsland, 
Frankrijk, Japan, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en de V.S. en toont aan dat (naast de 
risicopremie voor de markt en de nominale wisselkoers) inflatierisico een substantieel deel 
van de totale risicopremie voor de onderzochte markten vormt. Ik laat zien dat alle 
risicopremies variëren over de tijd en dat de inflatierisicopremie zowel statistisch als 
economisch significant is. Dit resultaat komt niet voort uit hoge onzekerheid, omdat de 
volatiliteit van inflatieverschillen niet erg groot is, maar meer door de hoge prijs voor 
inflatierisico (de risicopremie is het product van de volatiliteit en de prijs voor de 
betreffende stochast). Dit houdt in dat investeerders grotere risicoaversie hebben voor het 
hebben van (een eenheid) inflatierisico in hun portefeuille dan voor nominaal 
wisselkoersrisico. Ons model biedt daarnaast een natuurlijke mogelijkheid om de validiteit 
van het ICAPM te testen, aangezien de risicoprijzen dan aan elkaar gelijk moeten zijn. De 
empirische resultaten verwerpen deze test met klem en dus wordt het ICAPM verworpen. 
De meest logische verklaring voor het feit dat investeerders een grotere mate van 
risicoaversie vertonen voor inflatierisico dan voor nominaal wisselkoersrisico ligt in het 
feit dat het hedgen van inflatierisico erg moeilijk is. Voor het afdekken van 
wisselkoersrisico zijn voldoende liquide instrumenten voorhanden, maar voor inflatierisico 
zijn er bijna geen. Alleen de inflation-indexed bonds dekken het inflatierisico grotendeels 
af, maar deze zijn (met uitzondering van het Verenigd Koninkrijk) pas sinds kort op de 
markt. 
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift concentreert zich op de Europese 
bankensector. Sinds 1999 is er sprake van een monetaire eenheid voor het eurogebied, 
waardoor integratie tussen de eurolanden gestimuleerd moet worden - te beginnen met de 
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bankensector. Uit onderzoek blijkt echter dat de bankensector nog voornamelijk nationaal 
opereert. Zo is bijvoorbeeld het aandeel van buitenlandse banken in een (ander) Europees 
land kleiner dan 10% (Dermine, 2003). Hoofdstuk 5 bestudeert de financiële integratie 
tussen Europese banken, gemeten door middel van de correlatie tussen de aandelenprijzen 
van banken. Wij ontwikkelen een model dat in staat is verschillende ‘integratie-regimes’ te 
detecteren. Het model wordt toegepast op een steekproef van 41 Europese banken, die van 
januari 1990 tot maart 2003 genoteerd staan aan een Europese beurs. De belangrijkste 
bevinding in dit hoofdstuk is dat de correlatie tussen grote banken significant is 
toegenomen over deze periode, terwijl de correlatie tussen kleinere banken lager is 
geworden. Een reden hiervoor zou kunnen zijn dat investeerders denken dat de activiteiten 
van grotere banken steeds meer overeen komen. Een andere reden zou kunnen zijn dat 
investeerders steeds meer een Europese bankenindex als benchmark gebruiken, omdat 
institutionele beleggers en andere grote partijen na de invoering van de euro zijn 
overgegaan op een sectoraanpak (binnen het eurogebied of Europa). De benchmark-indices 
bestaan voornamelijk uit aandelenprijzen van grotere banken, wat de vraag naar deze 
aandelen kan verklaren. Dit geeft een nieuwe richting aan de discussie over mogelijke 
strategieën van banken, welke ook aangestipt worden in dit proefschrift. 
In hoofdstuk 6 onderzoek ik de samenhang tussen de aandelenprijzen van banken 
gedurende extreme situaties. Waar in hoofdstuk 5 de aandacht meer uitgaat naar de 
correlatie tussen Europese bankaandelen in het algemeen, staat in hoofdstuk 6 de 
samenhang in de staarten van de verdeling centraal. In het eerste deel van hoofdstuk 6 laat 
ik zien dat het gedrag in de staarten van de aandelenrendementen van banken niet normaal 
verdeeld of student-t verdeeld is. De Monte Carlo simulaties tonen aan dat het aantal 
waarnemingen van grote schokken voor Europese banken niet verklaard kan worden door 
deze verdelingen. Daarom moeten de staarten van een verdeling onafhankelijk onderzocht 
worden met een andere aanpak. Ik volg daarom de aanpak van Bae, Karolyi en Stulz 
(2003) om de frequentie van co-exceedences (banken die gezamenlijk een grote schok 
ervaren en dus allemaal in de staart van hun verdeling zitten) te bestuderen. In het tweede 
deel van dit hoofdstuk introduceer ik een niet-parametrische aanpak, die ik “netto-
besmettingsinvloed” noem (met besmetting wordt hier bedoeld dat een bank die in 
financiële problemen komt, een andere bank met zich meetrekt in financiële onzekerheid). 
Allereerst wordt er bepaald wat de conditionele kans is dat een bank zich in de staart van 
zijn verdeling bevindt. De maatstaf wordt vervolgens bepaald door het verschil in de 
conditionele kans van twee banken te berekenen. Ik laat zien dat deze maatstaf een goede 
indicatie is van de besmettingsinvloed tussen de twee banken. Met behulp van deze 
methode identificeer ik banken, wiens financiële stabiliteit belangrijk lijkt te zijn voor het 
bankensysteem binnen de verschillende landen en tussen de Europese landen.  
De rode draad in dit proefschrift is de vraag in hoeverre de aandelenmarkten de 
afgelopen jaren veranderd zijn als gevolg van het Europese integratieproces. Door de 
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introductie van de gezamenlijke munteenheid is het wisselkoersrisico tussen de landen in 
het eurogebied verdwenen, wat de weg vrijmaakte voor het vervolg van het 
integratieproces. In dit proefschrift laat ik met verschillende onderzoeken zien dat de 
gevolgen van deze structurele veranderingen zeker zichtbaar zijn. Zo blijkt bijvoorbeeld 
dat het voor beleggers verstandiger is om binnen het eurogebied een sectoraanpak te 
volgen in plaats van de meer traditionele landenaanpak (hoofdstuk 2). Hoofdstukken 3 en 5 
laten zien dat dit ook gevolgen heeft voor het prijzen van individuele aandelen. Er is echter 
nog steeds een lange weg te gaan voordat de financiële markten volledig geïntegreerd zijn. 
Verschillen in regelgeving tussen de landen vormen nog immer een obstakel voor het 
integratieproces. Zo zijn bijvoorbeeld de staatsobligatiemarkten bijna volledig geïntegreerd 
(er is slechts een kleine spread als gevolg van het verschil in faillissementsrisico). De 
bedrijfsobligatiemarkt wordt daarentegen ook beïnvloed door verschillen in 
belastingstelsel en mogelijke aftrekposten. Deze verschillen zijn zelfs nog belangrijker 
voor aandelenmarkten. De Grauwe (2003) stelt dat het essentieel is om meer voortgang te 
boeken naar financiële integratie om asymmetrische schokken te kunnen opvangen, omdat 
het belangrijkste mechanisme om risico te spreiden moet komen van die financiële 
markten. In dit proefschrift toon ik aan dat de eerste veranderingen op de aandelenmarkten 
al duidelijk zichtbaar zijn. Ik verwacht dat de integratie van financiële markten nog verder 
zal toenemen gegeven de noodzaak om regelgeving te harmoniseren en de financiële 
markten te liberaliseren voor de stabiliteit van de EMU. 
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Empirical Studies on Asset Pricing and Banking in the
Euro Area
European capital markets have changed dramatically over the last
couple of years. Due to the harmonization of monetary and policy
rules and the elimination of exchange rate risk (through the intro-
duction of the euro) countries in the European Monetary Union (EMU)
are becoming more integrated. In this thesis the author tries to
determine the consequences of this integration process for asset
pricing in the euro area. The most important conclusion, which is a
central theme of the thesis, is that the characteristics of financial
markets in the euro area have been changing. In other words, inves-
tors and researchers cannot base their expectations on the (long)
historical evidence of these markets, because the structural changes
have a clear impact on the characteristics of the markets. For example,
the author shows that industry information has become more valuable
in terms of portfolio diversification benefits than country informa-
tion, especially after the introduction of the euro, which contrasts
with the literature of the 90’s. Therefore, investors should change
their view in the euro area to a sector-based approach. Most institu-
tional investors, which are the biggest investors in the euro area,
have already changed their view into a sector-based approach. As a
consequence, euro area portfolio managers are nowadays tracking
sector indices instead of country indices. One of the chapters in part
II of the thesis shows the implications of that change for the banking
sector. Stock returns of big banks have become more correlated,
while this is not the case for smaller banks. The author argues that
this is not a result of a similar performance or product portfolio of
these banks, but is likely the result of the change in perspective of
most euro area investors. Next to these topics, the thesis also covers
different asset pricing models (Fama and French three factor models
for the euro area and an international asset pricing model that
provides evidence of a significant risk premium for inflation risk)
and an innovative measure for contagion among European banks.
ERIM
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the
Research School (Onderzoekschool) in the field of management of the
Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM
are RSM Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics.
ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research
undertaken by ERIM is focussed on the management of the firm in its
environment, its intra- and inter-firm relations, and its business
processes in their interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage-
ment, and to offer an advanced graduate program in Research in
Management. Within ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and
Ph.D. candidates are active in the different research programs. From
a variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM commu-
nity is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront
of creating new business knowledge.
www.erim.eur.nl ISBN 90-5892-090-9
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